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## Citizenship in the Minds of Political Islamists

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# CITIZENSHIP IN THE MINDS OF POLITICAL ISLAMISTS

Elisa Orofino\*

**Abstract:** The term ‘Islamists’ represents a complex category of actors mostly associated with research on terrorism and radicalisation. While many studies have investigated the dangers posed by Islamist groups in various national contexts, only a few analyses have explored Islamist views on core concepts, including citizenship. This article examines the concept of citizenship through the lenses of two long-living transnational Islamist groups, *Ikhwan al-Muslimun* and *Hizb ut-Tahrir*. Starting by framing the concept of citizenship within Islamism as an ideology, this article derives the main causes that have led Ikhwan and Hizb to hold diverse views on citizenship. This analysis concludes that different visions on citizenship are caused by two main factors (terminal and instrumental values), due to the different evolutionary paths undertaken by the groups over the decades. Together, these values define a new social identity each individual develops as a result of their membership to the group. This emergent identity eventually aligns the members’ interpretation of reality and their interaction with the group’s core values.

**Keywords:** *citizenship, Islamists, values, Ikhwan al-Muslimun, Hizb ut-Tahrir*

## INTRODUCTION

Citizenship might seem a straightforward concept from a general point of view, but the legal, political and emotional values attached with this term makes it quite complex. At the most basic level, citizenship can be identified as the status of a person who is a recognised legal member of a sovereign state. Citizenship has also been defined as “the capacity of individuals to defend their rights in front of the governmental authority.”<sup>1</sup> Undoubtedly, the concept of citizenship entails a set of rights and obligations upon an individual living in a specific state.<sup>2</sup> These rights are embedded in the word “citizens” as often opposed to “non-citizens.” While the former usually enjoy entitlements deriving from their status, non-citizens are excluded from a wide array of privileges, such as the right to vote, run for elections, freely use the national healthcare system (in some nations) or claim state benefits.

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<sup>1</sup> Roger W. Caves, *Encyclopedia of the City* (London: Routledge, 2004), 97.

<sup>2</sup> Melissa G. Garcia, “Spiritual Citizenship: Immigrant, Religious Participation and the Management of Deportability,” *IMR SAGE* 52, no. 12 (2018): 415.

Nevertheless, the concept of citizenship is much more ingeniously articulated and goes far beyond legal rights and obligations. Citizenship has a lot to do with the sense of belonging and the emotional value individuals connect to that belonging. Legal citizenship coexists with different forms of citizenship, such as “informal citizenship” and “spiritual citizenship.”<sup>3</sup> While informal citizenship is established through individuals’ participation in local civic organisations as an informal way to legitimise their status, spiritual citizenship is related to the individuals’ faith and membership within a specific religious organisation.<sup>4</sup> Although both kinds of citizenship – informal and spiritual – do not have any legal implications as they are not formally recognised, they have a great impact on individual behaviours and feelings towards formal (state) citizenship.

This study aims to answer two specific questions: what factors determine the emergence of different visions of state-citizenship among Islamist groups? And how do Islamist groups impact their members’ attitudes towards state-citizenship over time? To answer these questions, this analysis looks at how Islamist groups endorse the concept of state-citizenship and how they connect informal/spiritual citizenship with the state (formal) one. Starting by shedding light on the concept of citizenship within Islamism as an ideology, this study explores two significant case-studies: Ikhwan al-Muslimun (the Muslim Brotherhood or Ikhwan) and Hizb ut-Tahrir (Hizb). Both groups stand as long-living transnational organisations and can be considered forerunners of contemporary Islamist activism.

By using Ikhwan and Hizb as a case study, this analysis demonstrates that specific values conveyed by the groups determine their members’ vision of state-citizenship. These values (terminal and instrumental) represent the two factors used in this study to examine the groups’ different evolutionary paths and the emergence of diverse social identities conveyed to the members. This article shows that different ideas of state-citizenship (active vs passive) emerge as a result of the groups’ shift in their instrumental values over time.

## ISLAMISM AND CITIZENSHIP

As an ideology, Islamism is often considered analogous with communism, fascism and Nazism.<sup>5</sup> Sternhell defined ideology as a “set of ideas by which men explain and justify the ends and means of organised social action, with the aim of preserving or reconstructing a given reality.”<sup>6</sup> Similar to the totalitarian ideologies mentioned above, Islamism proved to be a very effective tool for mass mobilisation and leadership legitimisation. Nevertheless, when

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<sup>3</sup> Monica W. Varsanyi, “Interrogating ‘Urban Citizenship’ vis-a-vis Undocumented Migration,” *Citizenship Studies* 10 (2006): 235; Sébastien Chauvin, Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas and Albert Kraker, “Migrant Legality and Employment in Europe,” *International Migration* 51 (2013): 82; Garcia, *Spiritual Citizenship*, 404.

<sup>4</sup> This paper uses the terms ‘group,’ ‘movement’ and ‘organisation’ as synonyms.

<sup>5</sup> Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West* (Maryland, USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 85; Mehdi Mozaffari, “What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept,” *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8, no.1 (2007): 22.

<sup>6</sup> Zeev Sternhell, “Fascist Ideology,” in *Fascism: A Reader’s Guide*, ed. Walter Laqueur (London: Penguin Books, 1982), 329.

comparing it to communism or Nazism, Islamism appears to be much more inspiring as it stands as a sort of sacred ideology. Islamists' duties and tasks are also regarded as religious obligations, and this is a main point of difference between Islamism and other ideologies. While a Nazi is responsible to his Führer alone (who is a man after all), Islamists are not only responsible to their leaders, but they are ultimately accountable before God.

The holistic approach of Islamism as an ideology and the strong religious bond between the tasks performed and religious duties make Islamism the main force governing the life of the individuals who espouse this ideology. Islamism provides a precise system of values that determine specific patterns of behaviour together with stable long-lasting loyalties, assured by its religious nature, due to which leaving a certain Islamist group also means betraying God.<sup>7</sup>

We often read about Islamists in news and literature. In both contexts, this term is frequently associated with terrorism and collective anxiety. But who are the Islamists? The term refers to organisations (or individuals) who have espoused a specific ideology, i.e. Islamism. They strongly reject modernity, colonisation, capitalism and stress the failure of political leaders in the Middle East.<sup>8</sup> Islamists advocate for a revival of Islam in all fields (political, economic, social and religious), stressing “the need to go back to the roots of the religion and its holistic implementation as a *din*, i.e. a way of life.”<sup>9</sup>

Islamists criticise the West as a political, social and economic system with specific religious values and practices that are all to be rejected as *haram* (illicit) and impure.<sup>10</sup> Islamists also insist on the need to go back to the purity of Islam and follow the example of Prophet Mohammad, his companions (the *Sahabi*), and the pious ancestors, i.e. *salaf al-salihin*.<sup>11</sup> The emulation to the pious ancestors is advocated by the majority of Islamist groups having a *Salafi* mind-set: as the pious ancestors were uncompromising towards the integrity of Islam, Muslims today should not compromise their Islam with alleged Western *haram* values and culture:

Islam is the same religion that was revealed to the Prophet Mohammad (saw) in 610 CE...we cannot pick and choose what we like but as Muslims, we should accept it as a whole...we should keep the same uncompromising stance Prophet Mohammad had.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Mozaffari, *What is Islamism*, 24.

<sup>8</sup> Taquiddin An-Nabhani, *The Islamic State* (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 1998), 128; Elisa Orofino, *Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Caliphate* (London: Routledge, 2020), 7.

<sup>9</sup> Orofino, *Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Caliphate*, 7.

<sup>10</sup> Hasan Al-Banna. *Between Yesterday and Today*, trans. Charles Wendell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 31; Hizb ut-Tahrir. *The American Campaign to Suppress Islam* (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 1996), 8.

<sup>11</sup> Samir Amghar, “Salafism and Radicalisation of Young European Muslims,” in *European Islam: Challenges for Society and Public Policy*, ed. Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekeur and Michael Emerson (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007), 39; William A. Costanza, “An Interdisciplinary Framework to Assess the Radicalization of Youth towards Violent Extremism across Cultures” (PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2012), 190; Orofino, *Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Caliphate*, 53; Farhaan Wali, *Radicalism Unveiled* (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2013), 152.

<sup>12</sup> Interview with Mohammad, Hizb Australia, March 19, 2016.

As suggested by this quote from Mohammad, a senior member of Hizb Australia, Hizb members do not want to accept any compromise with Western values or any modern trend within Islam, such as *al-Wasatiyyah* (middle ground or centrism). The latter is considered by some Islamist groups as a sign of apostasy.<sup>13</sup> These positions are fuelled by the common belief that the loyalty of every Muslim should be ultimately devoted to “his creator Allah, the almighty” and the *ummah*, the global community of Muslims around the world.<sup>14</sup> According to this position, the Muslim sense of belonging should not be oriented towards a nation, a physical state with boundaries (state-citizenship). Instead, Muslims should focus their sense of belonging towards their spiritual nation (spiritual-citizenship), the community of believers scattered throughout the world, i.e. the *ummah*.

As a result, spiritual citizenship is far above state-citizenship in the mind of many Islamists. If Islamic principles (as understood by specific groups) happen to contrast with what Western authorities say or Western society advocates as good or legal – such as personal freedoms, abortion and homosexuality – Islamists always prioritise their spiritual citizenship over their state-citizenship and behave accordingly.

Besides these exclusivist visions, some Islamist groups recognise the possibility of “partial and multiple loyalties” that can co-exist with their spiritual citizenship:

A person can be loyal to his boss but this loyalty would not be considered as an absolute loyalty rather it would go under the partial loyalty. Similarly, a person can be loyal to Allah SWT while being loyal to his parents. In the issue of loyalty, a general principle had been outlined by our holy prophet Mohammed PBUH which must be observed in all condition as much as possible.<sup>15</sup>

As explained by Sheikh Rahman – imam at London Central Mosque – there is no harm in having multiple loyalties and to be loyal to Allah and other authorities on earth, for instance parents but also legal authorities of the state the individual lives in. Still, this position is refused by some extreme Islamists groups who claim state authorities (mostly in the West) normally allow and promote practices that contrast with Islamic principles, such as gambling, use of alcohol and same-sex relationships.<sup>16</sup> As a result, in the eyes of Islamists, Muslims need to choose who they want to be loyal to, either to their faith or the national authorities, as the two are not compatible, especially for Muslims living in Western states.

This argument is supported by many Islamist groups, both violent and non-violent (such as Hizb, ISIS and Boko Haram), who claim there can be no coexistence between spiritual and state citizenship. This inherent incompatibility between the two kinds of citizenships has been confuted by some researchers showing the basic notion of state citizenship is not alien to

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<sup>13</sup> Houriya Ahmed and Hannah Stuart, *Hizb ut-Tahrir: Ideology and Strategy* (London: The Centre for Social Cohesion, 2009), 74.

<sup>14</sup> Kazi L. Rahman, *Citizenship and Islam* (London: Central Mosque Trust & the Islamic Cultural Centre, 2016), 3.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Hizb ut-Tahrir, *The Inevitability of the Clash of Civilisations* (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 2002), 28.

Islam.<sup>17</sup> The Islamic equivalent of citizenship dates back to the renowned Constitution of Medina (623 CE). This legal document established the foundation of a new community (*ummah*) within the city-state of Medina.<sup>18</sup>

Native people (Muslims and non-Muslims) and migrants who had settled in the territory were granted specific rights and protection. In exchange, residents had to comply with specific norms and observe Sharia (Islamic law). Some intellectuals<sup>19</sup> further support the compatibility between Islam and state-citizenship by affirming that state-citizenship also finds its roots in the Qur'ān: "We have made you into tribes and nations so that you may know one another."<sup>20</sup> This verse appears as the expression of Divine will to provide people with a territorial organisation and marks the evolution from nomadic tribes into settled communities. Kamali also stresses some passages in the Qur'ān highlight the sense of belonging to a specific landscape and the security it can provide to the people: "By the fig, and the olive, and the mount of Sinai, and this city of security."<sup>21</sup>

Considering the elements discussed above, it seems reasonable to assume there is no inherent incompatibility between Islam and state-citizenship *per se*, but this is related to Islam and state-citizenship in Western states. More precisely, this incompatibility is mostly connected to the dualistic worldview adopted by many Islamist groups that see the world as divided between *Dar al-Islam* (Land of Islam) and *Dar al-Kufr* (Land of Unbelief). *Dar al-Islam* is that part of the world where Muslims can live under Sharia and covers those territories where the Caliphate was in place, protecting Muslims and implementing Islamic law. As the Caliphate collapsed, *Dar al-Islam* today includes Muslim majority countries around the world.

Very different from *Dar al-Islam*, in *Dar al-Kufr* laws are made by unbelievers who live according to a man-made system of regulations that ignore Islam.<sup>22</sup> Within the Land of Unbelief there is *Dar al-Harb* (Land of War) where the Islamic system is challenged through attempts to colonise and oppress Muslims. As a result, the only way out envisaged by many Islamist groups is a global revival of Islam that would eventually lead to the re-establishment of the Caliphate.<sup>23</sup> The latter would ensure protection to Muslims, assistance and welfare from the state as well as compliance to Islamic law.

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<sup>17</sup> Mohammad H. Kamali, "Citizenship: An Islamic Perspective," *Journal of Islamic Law and Culture* 11, no. 2 (2009): 127; Nawaf Salam, "The Emergence of Citizenship in Islamdom," *Arab Law Quarterly* 12, no 2 (1997): 130.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Martin Partington, "Citizenship and Housing," in *Rights of Citizenship*, ed. Robert Blackburn (London: Mansell, 1993), 124; Salam, "The Emergence of Citizenship in Islamdom," 135.

<sup>20</sup> Qur'ān 49:13.

<sup>21</sup> Qur'ān 95:1-3; Kamali, "Citizenship," 124.

<sup>22</sup> An-Nabhani, *The Islamic State*, 152; Elisa Orofino, "Intellectual Radicals Challenging the State: The Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir in the West," *Contemporary Social Science* 10, no. 4 (2015): 404.

<sup>23</sup> Sadek Hamid, *Sufis, Salafis and Islamists: The Contested Ground of British Islamic Activism* (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2016), 86; Asep Muhammad Iqbal and Zulkifli, "Islamic Fundamentalism, Nation-State and Global Citizenship: The Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 6, no.1 (2016): 42; Orofino, *Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Caliphate*, 208.

The assumptions discussed above as well as the references in the Qur'ān seem to confirm there is no incompatibility between state-citizenship and Islam *per se*; rather, it is between some Islamist groups and what they perceive as Western *kuffar* (unbelievers) states. Although the incompatibility between Islam and state-citizenship is not a fact, it is worth remembering the concept of state-citizenship has evolved differently in *Dar al-Islam* and Westphalian states.<sup>24</sup> Within the territories that constituted the Caliphate (*Dar al-Islam*), all Muslims were considered as “citizens,” regardless of their racial, ethnic and hereditary status, which, on the other hand, constitute essential elements of distinction within Westphalian nation states.<sup>25</sup>

Furthermore, as the Islamic state had such large boundaries, citizens were free to travel and live wherever within the Caliphate.<sup>26</sup> Islamists argue that colonialism put an end to this ideal scenario and started the introduction of *kuffar* concepts (such as democracy and personal freedoms), undermining the Islamic foundations of the Caliphate and provoking its definitive fall in 1924.<sup>27</sup> Nation states were imposed on Muslims, inducing ethnic divisions, political struggle and shifting Muslims’ sense of belonging from the *ummah* to an artificial nation. As a consequence of colonialism, freedom of travel and residence had dramatically changed across *Dar al-Islam* and economic differences between newly established Muslim countries soon triggered rivalries over brotherhood.<sup>28</sup>

Colonialism poisoned the society with ideas such as patriotism, nationalism and socialism, as well as regional attitudes, and made these concepts the focus of any immediate attempts for revival...it also poisoned the society with the idea that establishing the Islamic state and unifying the Islamic countries is impossible.<sup>29</sup>

The above attitudes of An-Nabhani (founder of Hizb) perfectly echo Islamists’ disdain towards Western interference in the Muslim world. Furthermore, these ideas are widespread within the broad universe of Islamist activists and make the compatibility between Islam and state-citizenship in the West quite problematic. Given the idea of the West as a corrupted system and the incompatibility between Islam and modernity, it seems quite hard to imagine how somebody who is affiliated with a certain Islamist group could consider any emotional belonging to state-citizenship and even more so to the West.

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<sup>24</sup> The rise of the modern state-system in the West is known as the ‘Westphalian system,’ named after the Peace of Westphalia (1648). This treaty established the rise of different nations, each of them having sovereignty over their territory and domestic affairs. Therefore, the new system excluded interference on other countries’ domestic affairs. The Westphalian system marked the rise of nation-states as political-geographical entities aimed at legitimising their authority by consolidating national unity, in economic, social and cultural life. Hendrik Spruyt, “The End of Empire and the Extension of the Westphalian System: The Normative Basis of the Modern State Order,” *International Studies Review* 2, no. 2 (2000), 73.

<sup>25</sup> Caliphate and Islamic State are used as synonyms in this article.

<sup>26</sup> Kamali, “Citizenship,” 151; Waqar I. Ahmad and Charles Husband, “Religious Identity, Citizenship and Welfare. The Case of Muslims in Britain,” *American Journal of Islamic Social Science* 10 (1993), 220.

<sup>27</sup> An-Nabhani, *The Islamic State*, 140; Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* (Ma’alim Fi Al-Tariq) (Kuwait: International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, 1978), 187.

<sup>28</sup> Zafar I. Ansari and John Esposito, *Muslims and the West* (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, 2001), 250.

<sup>29</sup> Taquiddin An-Nabhani, *Structuring of a Party* (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 2001), 12.

Nevertheless, while sharing the same ideological foundations (such as the need to go back to the purity of Islam and the need to separate from *kuffar*), some Islamist groups encourage state-citizenship among their members even in the West. To explore these differences, the following section will use two long-living transnational Islamist groups as case-studies: Ikhwan and Hizb.

## **AL-IKHWAN AL-MUSLIMUN AND HIZB UT-TAHRIR: TWO FACES OF THE SAME COIN?**

Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (also known as the Muslim Brotherhood) and Hizb ut-Tahrir (literally, “the Freedom Party”) stand as two of the oldest transnational Islamist groups active today. Both groups can be considered as forefathers of modern Islamist activism as they have inspired several organisations (violent and non-violent) around the world. Although there is a 25-year gap between their advent (Ikhwan was founded in 1928 in Egypt while Hizb emerged in 1953 in Palestine), the two organisations present common ideological characteristics can be traced back to two main elements, i.e. the historical context and founders’ background.

Starting with the historical context, both groups emerged as a reaction to foreign occupation of Muslim countries. More precisely, Egypt and Palestine were under British control at the time of their rise. Ikhwan and Hizb stood as “protest for justice movements” aimed at opposing Western subjugation of *Dar al-Islam*.<sup>30</sup> As a matter of fact, many Muslim intellectuals at that time believed the growing Western influence in the Middle East caused the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate (1924) as well as constituting an attack against Islamic religious and cultural heritage.<sup>31</sup>

The main supporters of this argument were a newly educated middle class that rose throughout the Middle East in the first half of the 1900s. They were strongly convinced that modernism and the secularisation of society pushed Muslims away from Islam and Sharia, persuading them to adopt *kuffar* concepts and lifestyle. Universities began to work as hubs for political activity (socialist and communist-inspired) aimed at containing and ultimately annihilating Western impact in the Muslim world.<sup>32</sup> Additional factors common to the Egyptian and Palestinian contexts where Ikhwan and Hizb emerged were rapid population growth, a wider gap between rich and poor, authoritarianism and repressive apparatuses along with the failure of modernisation programmes by inefficient and corrupt state bureaucracies.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Orofino, *Intellectual Radicals Challenging the State*, 401.

<sup>31</sup> Jan A. Ali and Elisa Orofino, “Islamic Revivalist Movements in the Modern World: An Analysis of Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, Tabligh Jama’at, and Hizb ut-Tahrir,” *Journal for the Academic Study of Religion* 31, no.1 (2018): 32; Saeed Rahnema, “Radical Islamism and Failed Developmentalism,” *Third World Quarterly* 29, no. 3 (2008): 488.

<sup>32</sup> Suha Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest: Hizb Al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate* (London: Grey Seal, 1996), 78.

<sup>33</sup> Kemal Ataman, “Forerunners of Political Islam: An Inquiry into the Ideologies of Al-Banna and Al-Mawdudi,” *Review of the Faculty of Theology of Uludag University* 24, no. 2 (2015): 51; Rahnema, *Radical Islamism and Failed Developmentalism*, 490.



These factors worked as triggers for people to change the unfortunate *status quo*. As a new Muslim educated middle class emerged, these young activists started seeing the return to 'pure' Islam as the only powerful tool to invert the process of decay already started.<sup>34</sup> This desire was what motivated Hasan Al-Banna (founder of Ikhwan) and Taquiddin An-Nabhani (founder of Hizb) to create their groups amid Western colonial occupation of their lands.

As mentioned above, the second element that has impacted the ideological similarities of both groups is their founders' common background. Al-Banna and An-Nabhani were highly educated school teachers coming from very religious families who had a strong background in Islamic jurisprudence.<sup>35</sup> Al-Banna's father (Sheikh Ahmad Abd al-Rahman al-Banna al-Sa'ati) was a prominent imam and mosque teacher while An-Nabhani's parents were scholars of Islamic jurisprudence and his maternal grandfather was a judge during the Ottoman Empire.<sup>36</sup>

Al-Banna and An-Nabhani were raised looking at the splendour of the Islamic state as opposed to the present decay of Islam due to Western influence in the Middle East. Al-Banna blamed Western states for Muslims' estrangement from Islam as a *din* (way of life) and saw European military forces as subjugating Muslim lands by attacking the heart of their civilisation: their religious and cultural heritage.<sup>37</sup> Likewise, An-Nabhani was persuaded that the Westerners were carrying out a complex war in the Middle East that was not only based on military occupation but also on cultural subjugation:

Colonialism is the imposition of military, political, economical, and cultural power on the weak peoples to exploit them. Colonialism deploys all its forces to impose its intellectual leadership and to consolidate its viewpoint of life. The different forms of colonialism include annexing the colonised countries and establishing colonies, establishing governments that are nominally independent yet practically subject to the colonialist states. This is the current situation in the Islamic countries which are all subject to Western hegemony and they proceed culturally according to the Western colonialist programmes and ideas.<sup>38</sup>

These harsh words written by An-Nabhani in 1953 certainly remind of Al-Banna's vision of colonialism as a multi-faceted phenomenon. Colonialism does not only rely on military power alone but even more on the power of ideas to influence people's behaviour. The induction of new concepts, contrary to Islam, was what the two leaders believed was happening in the Middle East in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Al-Banna and An-Nabhani regarded the return to pure Islam as the only chance for Muslims to escape this process of

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<sup>34</sup> By 'pure' Islam, they referred to the emulation of the 'pious predecessors' (*al-Salaf al-Salih*), i.e. first three generations of Muslims after Prophet Muhammad. The will to resemble to pious Muslims in all domains of life gave birth to *Salafism*, a branch of Sunni Islam that stresses the need to go back to the roots of Islam, to its purest version as practiced by the pious predecessors. Joas Wagemakers, "Salafism," in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Religion* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), doi: 10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.013.255.

<sup>35</sup> Ali and Orofino, "Islamic Revivalist Movements in the Modern World," 29; Orofino, *Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Caliphate*, 160.

<sup>36</sup> Orofino, *Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Caliphate*, 160.

<sup>37</sup> Al-Banna, *Between Yesterday and Today*, 20.

<sup>38</sup> Taquiddin An-Nabhani, *Concepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir* (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 1953), 73.

subjugation by the *kuffar*. For this reasons, Al-Banna established Ikhwan as a religious and charitable organisation aiming at the dissemination of Islamic values and principles to the masses. More precisely, Al-Banna wanted to spread the *da'wah* (call to Islam) so Muslims could turn to Islam as a *din* (not just as a religion) as well as the only source of strength and binding power for the *ummah* all over the world.<sup>39</sup>

An-Nabhani, 25 years later in Palestine, experienced the same conditions as Al-Banna, developing the same negative feelings towards the West. An-Nabhani believed that Westerners were manipulating all aspects of life (social, economic, political and religious) in the Muslim world, slowly replacing Islamic teachings with *kuffar* ones. In 1938, An-Nabhani decided to quit teaching as he was convinced the school curriculum had been tailored on the desires of Western colonialist nations; therefore, it became prone to corruption.<sup>40</sup> Having Islam in mind as the only saving grace for humanity, An-Nabhani wanted to create an organisation that would act as an “educator of the masses,” recruiting an educated elite first that could then spread the message to the whole society within a state and then in multiple states all over the world.<sup>41</sup>

Similar to Al-Banna, An-Nabhani worked hard to create a long-living group that would call for the re-establishment of the Caliphate, engaging in an intellectual struggle for the global *ummah* against colonisers and corrupt political authorities in the Middle East and in the West. Ikhwan and Hizb faced strong political opposition since the early days of their debut on the national political scene. Given the boldness of both groups in denouncing the corruption of political leaders as well as their apostasy from pure Islam, members of Ikhwan and Hizb (together with their founders) were soon persecuted, imprisoned, tortured and even killed by oppressive state apparatuses.<sup>42</sup> These actions are still being perpetrated today in countries where the groups are banned but members still gather.<sup>43</sup>

As discussed so far, Ikhwan and Hizb started with the same goal and ideology but then evolved into different organisations with divergent opinions on a multitude of themes. While Hizb continues opposing state-citizenship as a concept contrary to Islam, Ikhwan has espoused state-citizenship and encourages its members to take part in the political scenario of the countries where the group is based. Contrary to Hizb, Ikhwan does not see democracy as a *haram* concept *per se*. Instead, Ikhwan considers democracy as an opportunity to compete

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<sup>39</sup> Ali and Orofino, “Islamic Revivalist Movements in the Modern World,” 31; Martyn Frampton, *The Muslim Brotherhood and the West: A History of Enmity and Engagement* (Cambridge, USA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 187.

<sup>40</sup> Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest*, 104.

<sup>41</sup> An-Nabhani, *Concepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir*, 103; Wahid, Abdul, “Dr Abdul Wahid: Why I joined Hizb ut-Tahrir,” YouTube video, 11:22, September 25, 2016, <http://www.hizb.org.uk/videos/dr-abdul-wahid-why-i-joined-hizb-ut-tahrir>.

<sup>42</sup> Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest*, 63; Frampton, *The Muslim Brotherhood and the West*, 94.

<sup>43</sup> This is the case of three Hizbi Britons, Maajid Nawaz, Reza Pankhurst and Ian Nisbet, who were jailed for three years in Cairo for their membership to Hizb in a country where the group is banned. All of them suffered torture, including electric shock. Owen Bowcott, “People were begging for mercy,” *The Guardian*, April 11, 2006, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/apr/11/egypt.owenbowcott>.

for political power and promote necessary reforms to resume an authentic Islamic way of life.<sup>44</sup>

These divergent opinions held by the two groups on state-citizenship can be better understood by analysing the concept of social identity developed by an organisation and the underlying set of terminal and instrumental values, which determine its characteristics.

### ***Social Identity, Terminal and Instrumental Values: What Determines the Vision of State-Citizenship***

As soon as an individual becomes part of a group, their convictions and behaviours will be unavoidably affected by the group's goals and methods. This assumption is confirmed when studying Islamist groups and their impact on their members. Most Islamist groups fall within the category of social movements, defined as "networks of interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organisations, engaged in political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared identity."<sup>45</sup> Islamist groups have the same conflictual nature of social movements and normally have specific political and cultural goals to achieve.

Members of Islamist groups share a common (social) identity that is defined over time by their belonging to the same organisation. Social identity derives from "the persons' knowledge that they belong to a certain group together with some emotional value and significance to them of this group membership."<sup>46</sup> Creating a social identity among members is essential for the leadership of the group: they need to ensure control over the affiliates' behaviours "in order to secure a coordinated, effective, and durable action against their perceived enemies or competitors."<sup>47</sup>

But how do groups ensure the creation and endorsement of a social identity among their members? The first step to create a durable and solid social identity is to convey specific schemata of interpretation, i.e. frames. Because frames enable individuals "to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large," they stand as powerful tools impacting the vision of the world of the affiliates, determining their priorities and the boundaries between good and bad.<sup>48</sup> Frames are essential for group leaders to recruit new members (focusing on specific social, economic and political grievances) as well as to identify different national problems (e.g. marginalisation of minority groups, poverty, etc.) and who to blame for them.

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<sup>44</sup> Ali and Orofino, "Islamic Revivalist Movements in the Modern World," 27; Lorenzo Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 114.

<sup>45</sup> Mario Diani, "The Concept of Social Movement," *The Sociological Review* 40, no. 1 (1992): 15.

<sup>46</sup> Elisa Orofino, "Framing, New Social Identity and Long-term Loyalty: Hizb Ut-Tahrir's Impact on its Members," *Social Movement Studies* (2020): 3, doi: 10.1080/14742837.2020.1722629; Henri Tajfel, "Experiments in a Vacuum," in *The Context of Social Psychology: A Critical Assessment*, vol. 7, ed. Israel Joachim and Henri Tajfel (Oxford, England: Academic Press, 1972), 72.

<sup>47</sup> Orofino, "Framing, New Social Identity and Long-term Loyalty," 15.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 3; Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26, no.1 (2000): 614.

When a person becomes a member of a group and fully internalises specific frames, they will not be able to see themselves as a separate entity from the group. The group's frames will impact the individual's priorities, emotions and sense of belonging: the group will provide them with a specific purpose in life, which will cause the individual to perceive themselves as an "extension of the collective whole."<sup>49</sup> As a result, the precise elements of social identity as provided by a group are defined by the frames linked to specific sets of values promoted by the organisation. These values can be labelled as "terminal" and "instrumental."<sup>50</sup> While terminal values are the movement's goals that serve as guiding principles for members, instrumental values are the modes of behaviour a group advocates, such as respect for authority, tradition and hard work.<sup>51</sup> As a result, by clearly defining terminal and instrumental values, organisations provide their members with specific goals they need to achieve (life purpose), the recommended behaviours to follow in order to be successful and specific schemata of interpretation (frames) to understand what happens in their life.

Given the relevance of these sets of values, each organisation usually insists on the need for all members to internalise terminal and instrumental values. Some groups even subordinate the internalisation of those values to full membership: for instance, in the case of Hizb, members are not considered "full-members," but *daris* (student) – until they fully understand and espouse the Hizb values and frames.<sup>52</sup> This article argues the differences in terminal and instrumental values between Ikhwan and Hizb have determined their different feelings towards state-citizenship.

## ANALYSIS

Although Ikhwan and Hizb emerged as protest-for-justice groups against Western occupation of the Muslim world and with the common goal of restoring Islam as a *din* (terminal value), their instrumental values evolved differently over the years. As discussed above, the similar historical context in which the groups emerged and common background of their founders pushed towards a converging *terminal value*. In fact, Ikhwan and Hizb's desired outcome at the time of their foundation was to restore Islam holistically through the re-establishment of the *Khilafah* (Caliphate or Islamic state).

Although Al-Banna has never conceptualised the Caliphate as An-Nabhani did, he envisaged the restoration of the Islamic state as the main goal his group had to achieve.<sup>53</sup> As a result, in the early stages, both groups had the same terminal value: the restoration of Islam as a *din* through the re-establishment of the Caliphate led by an elected Caliph (supreme Muslim

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<sup>49</sup> Dina Al-Raffie, "Social Identity Theory for Investigating Islamic Extremism in the Diaspora," *Journal of Strategic Security* 6, no. 4 (2013): 78.

<sup>50</sup> Orofino, "Framing, New Social Identity and Long-term Loyalty," 3.

<sup>51</sup> Michael Kenney et al., "Organisational Adaptation in an Activist Network: Social Networks, Leadership, and Change in Al-Muhajiroun," *Applied Ergonomics* 44, no. 5 (2013): 742.

<sup>52</sup> Orofino, "Intellectual Radicals challenging the State," 405.

<sup>53</sup> An-Nabhani even wrote a constitution for the future Caliphate. The first version of the *Proposed Constitution for an Islamic State* was issued right after the creation of the Party (in 1953) and can be found in its translated version as an appendix in An-Nabhani, *The Islamic State*.

leader). Ideally, the Caliph, although supreme leader, does not have absolute power but needs to consult with a *shura* (literally ‘consultation’, an assembly similar to the parliament) to decide matters of public interest.<sup>54</sup>

While Hizb has kept the same terminal value over the decades, Ikhwan started to slightly alter the focus on the Caliphate soon after the death of Al-Banna. In 1949, Ikhwan’s leader was killed as a retaliation from the government after the assassination of Prime Minister Nograshi by a member of Ikhwan in 1948.<sup>55</sup> As the leader died, the group’s unity was compromised: different trends emerged holding diverse instrumental values. As violence started to characterise the organisation, Ikhwan soon developed its own para-military capabilities and “a special secret organ was sometimes under the guise of scout organisations.”<sup>56</sup> While enhancing its para-military resources, Ikhwan has never shifted its focus away from social welfare and soon established in Egypt a multitude of schools, hospitals, factories and business organisations.<sup>57</sup>

Over the decades, Ikhwan expanded and new branches were created, holding different positions about political participation and use of violence. Under the banner of Ikhwan, political parties with a parliamentary setting calling for reformism (such as the Movement of Society for Peace in Algeria) coexist today with groups that are considered terror organisations, like Hamas. These significant differences among Ikhwan branches are mainly due to the fact that each cell is administered at the local level and only has weak ties with the central leadership.<sup>58</sup> Therefore, each section tries to carry out interventions in the most convenient way for its local context.<sup>59</sup>

Ikhwan has four main wings to date: the political wing, the paramilitary wing, the women’s wing, and the youth wing.<sup>60</sup> The political wing is made up of all branches that have evolved into political parties and actively participate in national political arenas while those cells that still use violence to attack national authorities constitute the paramilitary wing. Among them are the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, which is quite a complex actor. In fact, Hamas stands as a terror group and political party able to win elections in the Gaza Strip.<sup>61</sup> The women’s wing is present in all countries where Ikhwan has branches. Although senior positions are mostly filled by men, women play an active role within the organisation

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<sup>54</sup> An-Nabhani, *The Islamic State*, 65; Frampton, *The Muslim Brotherhood and the West*, 105

<sup>55</sup> Hussain Ghaffar, *A Short History of Islamism* (London: Quilliam, 2010), 2.

<sup>56</sup> Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (London: Routledge, 2003), 133.

<sup>57</sup> Ziad Munson, “Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,” *The Sociological Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (2001): 495.

<sup>58</sup> Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1994), 69.

<sup>59</sup> Khalil al-Anani, *Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity, and Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 112; Elliot Friedland, *The Muslim Brotherhood Special Report* (Washington, D.C.: Clarion Project, 2015), 15.

<sup>60</sup> Friedland, *The Muslim Brotherhood Special Report*, 58.

<sup>61</sup> Hamas as a party won the Palestinian legislative elections on 25 January 2006 and administered the Gaza Strip until 2014 and again from 2016. Zena Tahhan, “Hamas and Fatah: How are the Two Groups Different? Despite the Differences between the Two Palestinian Parties, They Have Managed to Reach a Deal to End their Divide,” *Al Jazeera Online*, October 12, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/10/hamas-fatah-goal-approaches-171012064342008.html>.

but not at senior level. Finally, the youth wing is in charge of providing education, training and social activities for young people in order to build Ikhwan-inspired Islamic personalities.<sup>62</sup>

While keeping the same original terminal value (the restoration of Islam as a *din*, a way of life), the emergence of different trends within the same organisation provoked a significant change in Ikhwan's instrumental values. In fact, each branch seems to have its own instrumental values. While the political wing considers running for elections, political victories and the implementation of Islamic reforms as crucial instrumental values to achieve the terminal value, the paramilitary wing considers attacks, undercover missions and even murders as viable instrumental values.

This variety of trends is something that Hizb has never experienced. Since the early days, An-Nabhani insisted on the need for members to be educated on the group's main tenets, embedded in the 14 books constituting Hizb official literature.<sup>63</sup> The focus on education and the need for each individual to be a *daris* before becoming a member caused the emergence of a strong bond between the single member and the group's '*Aqeedah* (doctrine).<sup>64</sup> Once this bond is solid, no member will strain away from the '*Aqeedah* and their loyalty will be long-term as not related to a leader but to the heart of the organisation, i.e. its values.

By reiterating the same values established by An-Nabhani in 1950s as well as the same methods and literature, Hizb has secured a high level of consistency over time, appearing as a unified group speaking with one voice all over the world.<sup>65</sup> Its terminal value has never changed (the restoration of Islam as a *din* through the re-establishment of the Caliphate) nor have their instrumental values. Different from Ikhwan, there are no diverse trends in Hizb and all cells around the world are engaged in an intellectual battle to achieve their terminal value encouraging the same behaviours (instrumental values).

### ***Citizenship as an Instrumental Value***

As discussed above, although Ikhwan and Hizb keep sharing the same terminal value (the restoration of Islam as a *din*), Ikhwan branches have progressively differentiated over the years producing various instrumental values. Figure 1 offers a visual representation of the differences between the two groups in terms of values and their impact on social identity as sponsored by the two organisations.


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<sup>62</sup> Friedland, *The Muslim Brotherhood Special Report*, 27.

<sup>63</sup> For an overview of some of the books constituting the Hizb adopted literature, see "Online Books by Hizb ut-Tahrir," The Online Books Page, <http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/book/lookupname?key=Hizb%20ut-Tahrir>.

<sup>64</sup> Orofino, *Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Caliphate*, 88.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 97.

**Figure 1: Ikhwan and Hizb: Terminal values, instrumental values and social identity**

Three main factors seem to have impacted different views on state-citizenship within the two groups, i.e. the role of central leadership, the attachment to a specific territory combined with the emergence of nationalistic feelings and the importance placed on the Caliphate as the only legitimate political system. As shown in Figure 1, both groups still have in common the final aim of restoring Islam as a *din*, a way of life. However, the recommended behaviours (instrumental values) to achieve this final aim deeply differ as the groups have undertaken different paths, which impacted their vision of state-citizenship. After the death of Al-Banna and the harsh persecutions in Egypt, Ikhwan members escaped to different countries where they created new branches of the group. Nevertheless, these new cells did not respond to a central leadership in Egypt, but started to be fully administered at the local level.<sup>66</sup>

In so doing, each new branch freely adapted to the national context in which it operated without having to respond to specific guidelines established by the central leadership. For this reason, Ikhwan seems today more as an “umbrella brand” rather than a unified transnational group where branches have adopted different behaviours to achieve their terminal value. For instance, while Hamas mainly uses violence, youth organisations are normally engaged in an intellectual struggle to fight Western influence in the Muslim world and parties like *Ennahda* (the Renaissance Party) in Tunisia fight for political power.

Completely different is the case of Hizb, where a strong central leadership has always dictated the rules of the game. No cell was to be established under the name “Hizb ut-Tahrir” if it did not comply with the main ideology, aims and values of the original establishment in Palestine. Continuity was also ensured by the *amir* (supreme leader of the group). Over the past seven decades, every *amir* was chosen among Palestinian intellectuals, such as An-

<sup>66</sup> Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, 75.

Nabhani.<sup>67</sup> Once the members of the original branch in Palestine started to be persecuted, they migrated to different areas of the world and established new cells, as in the case of Ikhwan. Still, differently from Ikhwan, new branches all responded to the Hizb central leadership. This setting is still unchanged: although Hizb adherents are present in more than 45 countries around the world, all cells respond to the central leadership.

This ability to coordinate all cells around the globe is also facilitated by the *multidivisional structure* the group has developed that allows a functional equilibrium between centralisation and local autonomy.<sup>68</sup> Cells need to implement the guidelines issued by the central leadership but they are free to choose how to implement them according to the resources available at the local level. Multidivisional structure has assured a high level of cohesion: different from Ikhwan, Hizb does not appear as an umbrella brand but as a cohesive transnational group that speaks with one voice. As highlighted in Figure 1, all cells around the world follow the same instrumental values, i.e. they reject the use of violence to achieve their terminal value, they are constantly engaged in an intellectual struggle – a ‘war of ideas’ between the West and Islam<sup>69</sup> – and they strongly reject political participation in systems other than the Caliphate.

The attachment to a specific territory combined with the emergence of nationalistic feelings is the second element that has deeply influenced contrasting visions held by the two groups on state-citizenship as an instrumental value. Ikhwan has always participated in the political life of Egypt (*active state-citizenship*) to achieve its terminal value, i.e. the restoration of Islam as a *din*. Al-Banna and the first members of Ikhwan felt strong attachment to their country, which worked as the main trigger for their will to oust the invaders. Ikhwan’s solid bond with Egypt also shaped its conviction that there was no contradiction between Egyptian nationalism, Arab nationalism and Islamic unity.<sup>70</sup>

In fact, Al-Banna believed they were three overlapping circles: Ikhwan loved its country and was willing to fight to keep and strengthen national unity, which represented the first circle. At the same time, Ikhwan also cared for Arab populations as they have always played an essential role in Islam: they have been the guardians of Islam and Arabic is the language for the Qur’ān. Therefore, Arab unity was also a priority for the group and constituted the second circle. Al-Banna believed Arab unity was essential to ultimately restore the glory of Islam and the Islamic state, which represented the third and final circle.<sup>71</sup> As a result, starting with Egyptian nationalism and moving along with Arab unity and solidarity, Ikhwan hoped to restore Islamic unity and glory eventually as a terminal value.

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<sup>67</sup> The current *amir* of Hizb is Palestinian intellectual Ata Abu Rashta, who became the group’s global leader in 2003. Rashta frequently delivers messages at Hizbi events and on Hizb websites. For more information on Rashta’s speeches in Arabic see Hizb ut-Tahrir’s archives (<http://archive.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/arabic/index.php/HTAmeer/talksindex/>). Hizb ut-Tahrir Australia’s website (<http://www.hizb-australia.org/2016/12/aleppo-will-rise-again-message-from-the-amir-of-hizb-ut-tahrir/>) and Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain’s website (<http://www.hizb.org.uk/ramadan-1438/ramadhan-message-sheikh-ata-abu-rashta/>) provide posts and speeches in English.

<sup>68</sup> Orofino, *Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Caliphate*, 78.

<sup>69</sup> Zeyno Baran, *Hizb ut-Tahrir: Islam’s Political Insurgency* (Washington DC: The Nixon Center, 2004), 11.

<sup>70</sup> Frampton, *The Muslim Brotherhood and the West*, 110.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid*, 127.



Political participation is strongly related to the groups' attitudes towards the country in which they are based and it stands as a significant point of contrast between Ikhwan and Hizb. While Ikhwan has always wanted to play an active role in the political life of its countries, Hizb was never interested. As shown in Figure 1, these contrasting attitudes deeply impacted the development of different views on state-citizenship, i.e. active (in the case of Ikhwan) vs passive (in the case of Hizb). Since the beginning, An-Nabhani and the early members had no specific attachment to their homeland (Palestine) but their sense of belonging and solidarity was totally directed towards the *ummah*. The group has always opted for passive state-citizenship and did not participate in the political life of the countries where they operate through official channels (such as elections, referendums) but only through protest.<sup>72</sup>

The lack of political participation characterising Hizb is strongly connected to the third and final element identified in this analysis as a trigger for the rise of different opinions on state-citizenship, i.e. the importance placed on the Caliphate as the only legitimate political system for Muslims. As mentioned before in this study, Ikhwan has never theorised the Caliphate in detail, as Hizb has, but Al-Banna did envisage the restoration of an Islamic state able to cross different nations, ethnicities and traditions. Al-Banna dreamt of a Caliphate that would include all Muslims, as a grand alliance between Islamic nations.<sup>73</sup>

Nevertheless, differently from Hizb, Ikhwan participated in the life of political systems different from the Caliphate and did not consider it *haram* (forbidden). Since the early days of the group, Al-Banna had a detailed reform programme in mind that he wanted to implement by gaining political power. Some relevant reforms included the prohibition of usury and setting up Islamic banks that would lend money with no interest charged. Al-Banna also wanted to promote the exploitation of neglected natural resources (e.g. uncultivated lands, mines, etc.) and placed a greater focus on social welfare. More specifically, Al-Banna stressed the need to provide jobs to unemployed people, raise the salary of junior civil servants and reduce the number of governmental posts to avoid any waste of money that could go to significant social-impacting projects instead.<sup>74</sup>

Ikhwan still wants to carry out this reform programme via active citizenship and political participation in all states they operate. Contemporary Ikhwan branches do not see the Caliphate as the only legitimate political system for Muslims but have adapted to other political settings. They have established many political parties around the world, such as the Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt (banned in 2014), the Iraqi Islamist Party, the Kurdistan Islamic Union (Iraq), the Islamic Action Front (Jordan), Hadas (Kuwait), the Movement of Society for Peace (Algeria), the Justice and Construction Party (Libya) and the Justice and Development Party (Morocco). These parties do not enjoy much freedom today as from 2014

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<sup>72</sup> Orofino, *Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Caliphate*, 207.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 124.

<sup>74</sup> Hasan Al-Banna, "Toward the Light," in *Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden*, eds. Roxanne L. Euben, and Muhammad Q. Zaman (Princeton, USA: Princeton University Press, 2009), 56.

Ikhwan started to be considered a terrorist organisation by some governments, including Bahrain, Egypt, Russia, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Contrary to what Ikhwan claims, Hizb members believe as Muslims they should reject all systems that are not based on Islam and Sharia. They consider the Caliphate as the only legitimate political system and not only they do not participate in other systems but also have a bad opinion of those Muslims who do.<sup>75</sup> Their only “homeland” is the Caliphate they dream of, which is also the only ideal venue where to reunite state-citizenship and spiritual-citizenship. Given the Caliphate is the only system based on Islamic law where the whole *ummah* can finally inhabit in peace and find shelter, Hizb members consider it as the only legitimate setting they should actively participate in. Hizb will finally be free to perform political participation when the Caliphate is finally established.

Given the conception that the Islamic state is the only legitimate state Muslims should abide by, Hizb has always fought against the concept of the modern state, depicting it as a Western construction aimed at dividing Muslims and weakening the *ummah*.<sup>76</sup> Hizb has remained faithful to An-Nabhani’s position on the illegitimacy of Westphalian modern states in the West and even more so in Muslim regions. Hizb has been calling nationalism a “*haram* and dangerous ideology for Muslims, fostering people’s solidarity towards a wrong system of government, idolising the idea of nation instead of worshipping God.”<sup>77</sup> Noura’s words point out the notion of a wrong system of government, which is not legitimate in the eyes of Hizb; only the Caliphate can assure the correct implementation of Sharia.

As a consequence of this convictions, Hizb does not recognise the Western division of the world into nation-states and still uses the Ottoman Caliphate terminology to refer to geographical locations. For example, members of the group use the term *wilaya* (province) to identify a territory, which can correspond to a nation or region.<sup>78</sup> The uncompromising refusal to legitimise and partake in *kuffar* political systems is the main trigger for a negative vision of state-citizenship that deeply differentiates Hizb from Ikhwan.

Although sharing the same terminal value, the two groups have adopted different instrumental values over the years, which have shaped their different social identity. As shown in Figure 1, state-citizenship is a core element shaping social identity for the members of Ikhwan and Hizb. While the former may appear as political activists determined to change the world by all means (such as political participation and the use of violence), Hizb’s choice of passive state-citizenship makes it some sort of “intellectual warriors” determined to restore the glory of Islam exclusively by re-establishing the Caliphate. Hizb’s rigidity and continuity over the decades on several core topics, first and foremost state-citizenship, is due to its lack of inclination to compromise.

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 60.

<sup>76</sup> Hizb ut-Tahrir, *The American Campaign to Suppress Islam*, 10; Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, *Once Again, the UK Government Looks to Exploit Horrific Crimes for Political Ends* [press release], June 19, 2017, <http://www.hizb.org.uk/viewpoint/uk-government-looks-exploit-horrific-crimes-political-ends/>.

<sup>77</sup> Interview with Noura, Hizb Australia, April 9, 2016.

<sup>78</sup> See the division of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s branches between ‘Muslim Lands’ and the ‘West’ on Central Media Office’s website (<http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/leaflet/hizb-ut-tahrir.html>).

As social identity conveyed by the groups makes their members feel a continuation of the collective whole, it seems fair to argue, in the case Hizb, the collective whole is clearly defined – thanks to a system of well-defined terminal and instrumental values – and it will hardly change over the next decades.

## CONCLUSION

This article provided an analysis of the concept of citizenship from an Islamist perspective. Acknowledging the wide cohort of Islamists and their different goals and methodologies, this article investigated how Islamist groups impact the sense of belonging of their members towards the state they live in and what kind of emotional belonging they place on state-citizenship. To do so, this analysis focused on two long-living transnational Islamist groups still active today: Ikhwan al-Muslimun and Hizb ut-Tahrir.

Despite the differences presented, this article demonstrated how the two groups act as “two faces of the same coin”: they share the same ideological basis but have developed different methods over the decades. After exploring the original common ground and elements that led to a progressive differentiation between the two groups, this article argued the differences in their evolutionary paths and emergence of dissimilar instrumental values have determined their conflicting visions towards state-citizenship. This analysis considered state-citizenship as an instrumental value used by Ikhwan and Hizb in two different ways: *active vs passive state-citizenship*.

This study concluded the development of these contrasting attitudes towards state-citizenship was influenced by three main variables: the role of central leadership in the group, the attachment to a specific territory combined with the emergence of nationalistic feelings and the importance placed on the Caliphate as the only legitimate political system. While sharing the same terminal values, the differences in instrumental values determined diverse social identities specifically connected to the two groups. While Ikhwan still appears as political competitors (not afraid to use violence if needed!) in the countries where it operates, Hizb stands as uncompromising radical intellectuals engaged in a relentless war of ideas around the world.

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