Muslims as Archetypal Suspect Citizens in Australia

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To cite this article:
MUSLIMS AS ARCHETYPAL SUSPECT CITIZENS IN AUSTRALIA

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Abstract: Muslims as archetypal suspect citizens in Australia is a product of the Australian state approach to manage a section of supposedly “rogue population.” Muslims have been increasingly framed as a security problem and, therefore, requiring securitisation. The horrendous atrocities of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States followed by a period of similar attacks in various parts of particularly the Western world provided a new stage for an extensive range of discourses involving politicians, public intellectuals, academics and journalists, who swiftly securitised Islam as an existential threat to Australian liberal democracy. This article probes the politics of the Muslim suspect and how the securitising and “othering” of Australian Muslims in the name of managing the security threat to Australian national order render Australian Muslims as archetypal suspect citizens. It suggests the politics of suspecting, securitising and othering of Muslims in Australia transforms security from a problem of producing national order to making Muslims feel like unwelcome citizens.

Keywords: Muslims, securitisation, othering, suspect, citizen

INTRODUCTION

Australian Muslims have confronted numerous challenges since the 1970s when large scale Muslim migration commenced, which further intensified after the events of 11 September and the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). These and other past global events, although far removed from their religious beliefs, commitments and values, have rendered Muslim citizenship “precarious” and Muslims as archetypal suspect citizens who must “prove” their citizenship credentials to feel belongingness to Australian society. Australia gives an appearance of being an open, rational and pluralistic society but these self-defined attributes may prove misleading when attention is directed to Australian Muslims, many of whom find themselves living in unfamiliar abodes suffering rampant Islamophobia, marginalisation and increased securitisation, and reified as archetypal suspect citizens.

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In the process, Muslim immigrant identity becomes essentialised and racialised through viewing Muslims as a homogeneous group. Through the involvement of state institutions in the so-called interest of multicultural principles and national security, this renders the Muslim identity, under the process of immigration and settlement, as traditional, conservative and even problematic. The tighter security and immigration measures heavily impact the experience for many Muslims in Australia. With the development of modern securitisation and new forms of governance in the “age of terrorism,” which seeks to promote “active citizenship” based on neoliberal and resurgent nationalist demands for citizens to be seriously active in the economy through employment and be more self-reliant as welfare provision shrinks, many Muslims not only find themselves vulnerable to socio-economic disadvantages but their accommodation in the Australian national mosaic is difficult if not impractical. At a general level, the Muslim situation and sense of belonging in the “age of terrorism” have deteriorated as Muslims have been placed under intense societal scrutiny and subjected to significant hostility and everyday acts of racism. Even high profile Muslim politicians are not spared this kind of scrutiny and the New South Wales member of the opposition Labour Party Shaoquett Moselmane, whose home and office was raided by Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) on 26 June this year, is a case in point. Many have been confronted with extreme social pressure to conform and subscribe to Australian “leading culture,” while at the same time figure out how to remain Muslim in Australia.

Since the events of September 11 and subsequent Muslim terror attacks in various parts of the Western world, Australian Muslims have come under intense scrutiny. They have come to be seen as an archenemy of liberal democracy and secular order, which produces growing fears in the community and gives the state the excuse and “right” to exercise extraordinary powers to devise emergency measures such as countering violent extremism to securitise Muslims. Muslims are no longer seen as “ordinary” citizens but archetypal suspect citizens who pose a threat not only to Australian modern liberal democracy but Western civilisation and international security.

This article explores the politics of the Muslim suspect and how the securitising and “othering” of Australian Muslims render Australian Muslims as archetypal suspect citizens. It suggests the politics of suspecting, securitising and othering of Muslims in Australia only intensifies many Muslims’ experience of exclusion and marginalisation, and throws various social and economic obstacles in the way of active citizenship and feeling of stronger sense of belonging.

MUSLIMS IN AUSTRALIA

Muslims have been linked with Australia much earlier than European settlers. It has been documented that Islam had links with Australia as early as the 14th century.¹ The Macassan fishermen from the south-western corner of the Indonesian island of Sulawesi made seasonal

trips to *Marege* (literally ‘wild country’) on the north and north-west coastlines of the Australian continent in search of ‘trepang’, sea slugs commonly known as *beche-de-mer.*\(^2\) This contact definitely predates the European interest in the Australian continent and Ganter asserts “That Macassan contact predates the arrival of the British on the Australian continent is not disputed.”\(^3\) The latter part of the 20th century, however, saw citizens of Muslim countries arriving in Australia in growing numbers in search of business prosperity, employment, refuge and, in some instances, religious freedom. Thus, the last quarter of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century saw a steep increase in the growth of Australia’s Muslim population. For instance, in 1991, there were 148,096 Muslims, which constituted 0.9% of the total Australian population;\(^4\) in 1996, there were 200,902 Muslims, constituting 1.1% of the total Australian population;\(^5\) in 2001, there were 281,578 Muslims, constituting 1.5% of the total Australian population;\(^6\) in 2006, there were 340,392 Muslims, constituting 1.7% of the total Australian population;\(^7\) in 2011, there were 476,291 Muslims, constituting 2.2% of the total Australian population;\(^8\) and in 2016, there were 604,200 Muslims, constituting 2.6% of the total Australian population.\(^9\)

This steady increase has been mainly attributed to immigration, although high birth rates have also contributed to the rapid increase in the Muslim population. The Muslim birth rate in Australia is a significant factor in Muslim population growth. Muslims in Australia are increasing significantly in numbers due to a steady increase in birth rate. If this trend in Muslim population growth continues, it is possible that second and third generation Muslims could gradually expand over the years and become an important factor in Australia’s social, economic and political reality.\(^10\) Notwithstanding this, it is worth noting that, compared to the total Australian population, Muslims are significantly more likely to be ‘first generation’ Australians, meaning people living in Australia but born overseas.\(^11\)

Like other world religions such as Christianity and Judaism, Islam has various groups and sub-groups. They are divided along ideological, theological, sectarian and jurisprudential lines, immensely complicating the Islamic diversity. Some Muslims attach themselves to a


particular theological school or legal school while some belong to a group that seeks to align religious teachings with contemporary issues and vice versa, and still others belong to a group that focuses on how one should interpret religious texts, namely the Qur’ān and ḥadīth. Some divisions are politically based while others are theologically or spiritually based. This division is further compounded by separation along cultural, denominational/sectarian, linguistic, parochial and national lines. As such, Muslims in most parts of the world, including Australia, are not a homogeneous people.

In Australia, the vast majority of Muslims belong to the Sunni denomination followed by a minority Shi’ah denomination and what exists in Islam and the Muslim population generally elsewhere in Muslim majority countries as well as in diasporas is also true in Australian context.\textsuperscript{12} Saeed notes:

They come from practically every corner of the world: from the Middle East, Russia, Europe, the Indian Subcontinent, Africa, South East Asia and even China. They speak languages ranging from English, Arabic, Turkish, Persian and Bosnian to Chinese, Tamil, Italian, German, French, Greek, Croatian, Thai, Vietnamese, Serbian, Spanish, Russian, Maltese and Hungarian.\textsuperscript{13}

According to Riaz Hassan, Muslim migrants have been arriving from various parts of the world for many years and, using 2011 census data, he calculated that “Altogether Australian Muslims came from 183 countries, making them one of the most ethnically and nationally heterogeneous communities in Australia.”\textsuperscript{14}

**MUSLIMS TAKING CITIZENSHIP**

Muslims take Australian citizenship for a variety of reasons. However, the effect of citizenship on migrants’ material situation is generally minimal. As permanent residents, they are already entitled to free health services through the Medicare system, public education and welfare support in an attempt to function at the basic level in society. A lot of them also have access to special settlement services when they first arrive to Australia to facilitate their prompt participation in mainstream life. The instrumental benefits of citizenship for migrants are an Australian passport, eligibility for permanent government employment in public service as well as navy and armed services, and protection from deportation. Australian citizenship also allows individuals to enrol to vote, stand for political elections and undertake jury duties. For some, such as those born in Australia, these might be seen as trite but for many, these citizenship benefits are considered to be of great value, including the symbolic representation of citizenship, which denotes membership to the national community.

For many Muslims who take Australian citizenship, the benefits are obvious but mostly the important benefit for them of becoming Australian citizen is to feel a sense of inclusion.


\textsuperscript{13} Saeed, *Islam in Australia*, 1.

\textsuperscript{14} Hassan, *Australian Muslims*, 19.
and acceptance into their adopted country as their new permanent home. They feel, by
becoming Australian citizens, they can fully participate in the Australian society and
practices, and promote Australian values. In this understanding of Australian citizenship,
Muslims find themselves feeling a sense of national belonging and wanting to make positive
and important contributions to the society to show their appreciation for being granted
Australian citizenship. They want to return the favour of the citizenship benefits they have
been provided by becoming responsible and duty-bound citizens who care about their new
home, wish for it to flourish and demonstrate “pride in being Muslim and Australian.”

Citizenship is an important marker of identity for many Muslims. Muslim identity, thus, is
the ability to imagine and express oneself in relation to the values, goals and purposes of
Australian society. This is evident in the 2016 census record, when 69.7% of Australian
Muslims chose to nominate their national identity as “Australian” compared with 82.4% of
all Australians. Samina Yasmeen elucidates that Muslims’ feeling of a sense of belonging to
Australia is evident in them accepting Australian citizenship conferral in very large
numbers. Using 2006 census data and statistics from the Department of Immigration and
Citizenship, David Smith and colleagues reinforce this fact, noting that naturalisation rates
among immigrants from countries from which Muslims predominantly came were
particularly high. Based on this fact, it is worth noting that, as more Muslims arrive in
Australia who then go on to complete their residency and citizenship requirements, it is
highly likely they will end up identifying themselves as Australian.

However, the feeling of a sense of national belonging and identifying as Australian, where
belonging denotes being part of a collective, is not a two-way street in Australia when it
comes to overall Muslim experience. The acceptance and inclusion of Muslims in
mainstream society is questionable, as we will later see, particularly when attacks on local
mosques and Muslim schools, racism and Islamophobia continue unabated. Importantly, in
light of increased Muslim securitisation through new legislations and public policies in
Australia raises the question: Are Muslims welcome to Australia and are they treated fairly
and their feelings reciprocated?

**Western Conception of Citizenship**

According to Richard Bellamy, there are three linked components of citizenship where:

…membership of a democratic political community, the collective benefits and rights
associated with membership, and participation in the community’s political, economic and

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15 Rachel Woodlock, “Being an Aussie Mossie: Muslim and Australian Identity Among Australian-born

16 Hassan, *Australian Muslims*.

17 Samina Yasmeen, “Muslim Women as Citizens in Australia: Perth as a Case Study,” in *Muslim Minorities
in the West: Visible and Invisible*, ed. Yvonne Haddad and Jane Smith (Walnut Creek: Altamir Press,
2002).

18 David Smith et al., *Citizenship in Australia* (Canberra: Department of Immigration and Citizenship,
social processes – all of which combine in different ways to establish a condition of civic equality.\textsuperscript{19}

For Linda Bosniak, “citizenship” can be understood in relation to a variety of conceptualisations more broadly, “Depending on whether we are addressing citizenship as a legal status, as a system of rights, as a form of political activity, or as a form of identity and solidarity.”\textsuperscript{20}

Different sets of individuals stress the importance of citizenship ranging from politicians to church leaders to leaders of industry to campaigning parties – from those struggling for global causes, such as combating international refugee crises, to others with a more local focus, such as combating child labour. Types of citizenship abound, for example, dual and transnational citizenship, corporate citizenship or international citizenship. Whenever there are problems in the society such as child abuse, rise in migrant unemployment level or terrorism, “citizenship” is proposed as a remedy. For instance, recently, allegations were levelled against some Western-born Muslims for fighting with ISIS against coalition forces and upon their return home from Syria some politicians suggested revoking their citizenships. The sheer variety and range of “citizenship” definitions, models and uses can prove to be challenging and even perplexing, and what constitutes political membership within the broader structure of the state remains, in almost all instances, unresolved. Nevertheless, citizenship has important social, cultural, legal and political functions.

The citizenship rights for racial and ethnic minorities are closely linked with their social rights. In Australian multiculturalism this is a cause for major concern for immigrants because Australian multiculturalism tends to homogenise racial and ethnic minorities and at the same time claims to be pluralistic society in which every citizen is equal. The homogenisation of racial and ethnic minorities in Australian multiculturalism is problematic, as heavy emphasis is placed on the treatment of immigrants as equal rather than equal treatment of immigrants.\textsuperscript{21} For example, in Australia, Lebanese immigrants constitute one ethnic clustering but within this clustering there are Christian Lebanese and Muslim Lebanese who have sharp and distinct cultural and even social needs and a collective provision reflective of policies of positive action to meet their needs does not necessarily avoid conflicts of interest but fuel them. The multicultural policy becomes even more problematic when it is implemented to render collective provisions to different cultural needs in the same ethnic group or different ethnic groups. They can vary from something like the appropriateness of meals on wheels services to the allocation of funds to religious organisations. Matters can be exacerbated in a unique or extreme situation such as the debates around Christians in Pakistan or Muslim minorities around the Rushdie affair in Britain. Thus, it is critical that multicultural policy or what is sometimes referred to as multicultural

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citizenship must pay attention to group difference and not treat all citizens as equal individuals; rather, it should view them as having equal rights as individuals and at the same time having different needs as part of groups with distinct characteristics and socio-cultural situations. In the absence of this, efforts have been mobilised in either situation towards obtaining autonomy and self-determination.

For Muslims in Australia, full citizenship rights mean the capacity and choice to practice Islam as a complete way of life. In matters of birth rites, daily prayers, Islamic education, burial and dietary requirements, and marriage, divorce and inheritance rules can be practiced freely and with impunity. In other words, the implementation of Sharia (Islamic law) is at the very heart of the question of full citizenship rights for many Muslims. Under the current systems in place in Australian society, this is problematic for Muslims. While the majority group is able to carry on with its everyday rituals without undergoing any level of change and have its demands fulfilled by the system because it is an inalienable part of it, minority groups such as Muslim immigrants have to campaign hard and overcome obstacles to gain recognition as a part of the social fabric and as an individual with social and civil rights. Unlike members of mainstream society, Muslims in Australia have to struggle to become equal parts of the society and maintain their Islamic identity. Atie, Dunn and Ozalp elaborate:

It suggests that while Muslims wish to integrate into Australian society, their integration is either not completed as yet or full integration is prevented by the prejudice and unfair treatment of Muslims by the media. Muslims want to feel Australian, but this is somewhat prevented by a society influenced by Islamophobic rhetoric and racism.

It will not be an exaggeration or deceptive to postulate that, after the events of 9/11, Muslims in Australia lost their citizenship in terms of identity as Kolig and Kabir note that “Among a variety of cultural and ethnic groupings, Muslims as a ‘cultural’ category…face the largest difficulty meeting the criteria of acceptable citizenship.” In other words, they are seen as not representing the nation and described as outsiders and unwanted “Other”. I want to posit that, in the post-9/11 era, Muslims in Australia as a minority community are not only further deprived of citizenship as an identity, but they are also divested of citizenship regarding rights and political participation. Perhaps the only continuing citizenship discourse for the Muslim group is formal legal status, though what value lies in it if one is not given the rights associated with that status remains hazy.

Citizenship as legal status denotes the formal legal recognition that an individual is a member of a polity. Linda Bosniak notes that citizenship as a status is generally viewed as

25 Scott Poynting et al., Bin Laden in the Suburbs: Criminalising the Arab Other (Sydney: Institute of Criminology, 2004).
exclusively connected to the nation-state. “As a practical matter, citizenship is almost always conferred by the nation-state, and as a matter of international law, it is nation-state citizenship that is recognized and honoured.”

In this understanding of citizenship, where citizenship is tied to a nation-state, a citizen has the right to belong to an organised political community because they have the “right to have rights.”

Minority communities, who are often seen as foreigners, remain outside this community and, although they take part in many socio-cultural and economic activities and enjoy benefits provided by the state, they do so only at the mercy of the host state. Even when the foreigners take up the formal legal status as citizens and are actively involved in a variety of ways of community building, they still are continually viewed as outsiders and Muslims are the main targets these days of this view.

With respect to Muslims living in Australia who have formal legal citizenship status today, there have been calls for or proposals made to formally denationalise them via revocation. Muslims are treated as naturalised citizens, meaning there is always a risk that their citizenship can be revoked in light of their continuing perceived disloyalty. This has been based on some isolated but real cases. For example, the Islamic State fighter Khaled Sharrouf, who had dual nationality, was stripped of his citizenship under the Australian Federal Government’s anti-terror laws. In the United States, in the Holy Land Foundation case, the government attempted to denationalise the defendants against whom allegations were made for providing material support to Hamas, a designated foreign terrorist organisation.

In Canada, Zakaria Amara, who was imprisoned for his role in the plot to bomb Toronto’s downtown in 2006, was stripped of his citizenship. These are only a few examples of citizenship revocations but citizenship revocation laws also exist in many other Western countries, as Travina notes:

Several states, including the United Kingdom, Canada and Austria, to name a few, have amended their legislation to allow for the easier revocation of the citizenship by introducing new causes. The UK in particular appears to be setting a trend in remodelling citizenship deprivation powers while many other states are considering similar measures as the phenomenon captures global attention.

This weakens the Muslim sense of belonging and citizenship, relegating them to the “archetypal suspect citizens” status.

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33 Maria Travina, “Citizenship Revocation in Response to the Foreign Fighter Threat” (Master’s diss., University of Oslo, 2016), 1-2.
POLITICS OF SUSPECT: SECURITISING AND “OTHERING” AUSTRALIAN MUSLIMS

In the “age of terrorism,” homogeneous notions in Australia render all Muslims as a single family of people and members of a “dangerous transnational society.” In this conceptualisation, Muslims are labelled as “archetypal suspect citizens” because it is claimed their faith encourages “stoning women to death,” “wife beating,” “beheading,” “suicide bombing” and “honour killing.” Muslims are then made to be seen from the mainstream as potential risks to society, who then end up being understood as terrorists. Due to the violent actions of a few, the entire Muslim population is labelled “bad” and suspect citizens who intend to destroy Australia’s modern liberal democracy. These prejudiced perceptions about Islam and Muslims in Australia have been reinforced by the impact of local events, such as an increase in Muslim drug use and trafficking and violent crimes committed by Lebanese Muslim criminal gangs, and global events such as the Iranian Revolution (1978-79), the Gulf War (1990–91), terrorist strikes against the United States (2001), the London bombings (2005) and several local councils in Moldova banning public Muslim worship (2012). In light of this, some Australians have come out in defence of Western civilisation against the “enemy within” that is religiously and culturally different from the “civilised” and “advanced” West. The homogenised concept of “the Muslim” is situated in the worldwide resurgence of Islam and exhibits a return of the suppressed. Samuel Huntington explains the Islamic resurgence as a reaction to the threat posed by secular West to Islam and its law. He remarks that Islamic resurgence is a wide-ranging global movement that embodies a struggle to find solution to the crisis of society outside Western paradigm in Islam.

After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, the “Muslim” became reified as the enemy within and a threat to national security. Muslims have been depicted as “backward, unshaven, fanatic, robe-covered, oil-rich, lecherous, desert dwellers” and people who are always bloodthirsty and only know violence. The Tampa Affair in 2001 is a good example of the ways in which Muslims and Afghans, especially Hazaras seeking asylum, were stigmatised by the Howard Government as “illegal immigrants,” “illegal arrivals” and potential “terrorists.” This occurred at a time when an Australian Federal election was looming and the government’s popularity rating rose as Australian voters largely supported the government for its stance on the matter. During the event, the Liberal Party campaigned on the issue of illegal entry to Australia and the threat of terrorism when then Prime Minister John Howard famously said “we decide who comes into this country and the circumstances in which they come,” which many say referred to

37 Woodlock, “Being an Aussie Mossie.”
Muslims. This allowed John Howard to be seen by many as a strong leader and, although his government was lagging behind Labour in the opinion polls before the Tampa Affair, during the crisis and shortly after the national mood changed dramatically and his Liberal/National coalition was returned to power with a three per cent increase in voter approval. Based on various television news polls, it was revealed that as high as 90 per cent of voters supported the Australian government’s decision on the matter. A considerable number of Australians viewed the asylum seekers as “illegal arrivals” and “queue-jumpers” fabricating their refugee status and criminals who took the Tampa hostage in their attempts to gain entry to Australia. There were heightened concerns over security risk involving an increase in people smuggling activity with Australia being targeted as a perceived “easy target”. Some anti-Islam and anti-immigration public figures, including then Minister for Defence Peter Reith, made suggestions that so-called asylum seekers entering Australia on boats could potentially be accompanied by terrorists.

This kind of politics of fear has been very impactful on Australian Muslims who, in the “age of terrorism,” are deemed to be guilty until proven innocent, an opposite to an aged old Australian legal maxim that considers people “innocent until proven guilty.” For instance, Dr Mohamed Haneef, an Indian born doctor, was falsely accused of aiding terrorists and arrested on 2 July 2007 at Brisbane Airport, which highlights this point. That is, an individual who subscribes to the Islamic faith is naturally guilty of an alleged crime and they need to prove they are innocent. In other words, for a Muslim, the burden of proof in the “age of terrorism” rests with them and not the alleger of the crime, whether that be an individual or institution.

These are some of the bases for casting suspicion on Muslims in Australia; however, apart from Muslims being suspected in connection to national security threats and considered to have a tendency to violent Islamist extremism, they are also seen as posing a specific challenge to the dominant concept of the freedom of the public institution where Australia prides itself on having complete separation of church and state with institutional arrangements in place, putting conditions for the exercise of religion and limits religious forms of expression. Not only this but when Muslims are seen, often inaccurately, as not integrating to a common Australian “leading culture” and failing to adapt to it then integration challenges are increasingly interpreted as issues of culture and religion, particularly after the events of 9/11. This culturalising of social problems, for example arranged or forced marriages, female genital mutilation and religious-based homophobia, contribute to the stigmatisation of all Muslims in Australia and bring into question their faith, values and citizenship loyalty. These have aided in questioning Muslim national identity and their citizenship rights as well as in amplifying suspicions about Muslims in Australia and

38 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
making them the target of intensified material implementation of remarkable ‘counterterrorism’ and ‘countering violent extremism’ strategies. In an attempt to combat this, departments such as Attorney-General, Australian Federal Police, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and Australian Border Force have been given increased preventative powers by the Australian government to bolster surveillance and manage latent invisible threats brought into the open by local issues and international events connected to Muslims.\(^43\) Key to these counterterrorism and countering violent extremism strategies has been new strict anti-terror laws purportedly designed and targeted at iconoclastic threats posed by terrorists but in fact are cryptogrammic instruments for the management of the so-called risky, dangerous Muslim enemy Other.

They *Muslims* (emphasis added) have become a shared “security” concern for Western governments and been made the object of suspicion and the focus of state intervention and political management. Their citizenship has become increasingly conditional on their “performance” as citizens measured by active efforts to integrate on the one hand and their rejection of radical Islam on the other.\(^44\)

Muslim immigrants and their descendants in the West have come to be problematised as inhabiting the site of the desperate, the racialised group of “folk devils,”\(^45\) “extremists” and “fanatics,”\(^46\) the “suspect other,”\(^47\) and “Risky Others”\(^48\) who make unreasonable religious, cultural and citizenship demands and refuse to integrate into mainstream society.

Unlike the pre-9/11 caricature of Muslim immigrants as merely “culturally incompatible,”\(^49\) they are now considered as “politically unfaithful”\(^50\) and even outright dangerous. The wider community in Australia as well as elsewhere in the West has been made to feel increasing levels of alarm and fear. The conceptualisation of Muslims as the “Risky Other”\(^51\) involves xenophobia or racial hatred and the mainstream society ostensibly under threat is ethically and religiously constructed, with the racialised other as the corresponding dangerous enemy Other. Muslims are equated with terrorism, religious and cultural difference, extremism, and “high risk,” resulting in them being pushed to the social margins and limits of citizenship, where constant demands are placed on them to prove their political loyalty, demonstrate integration into the mainstream society and justify the claims

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\(^44\) Ibid., 136.


\(^49\) Humphrey, “Securitisation and Domestication of Diaspora Muslims and Islam.”

\(^50\) Ibid.

over their citizenship through “attitude test,” language competency and knowledge of national civic values.\textsuperscript{52} With some exceptions where some Muslims may not feel excluded, the general outcome of this is the demonisation of Islam and Muslims, which weakens the sense of belonging and citizenship of Australian Muslims.

Against the backdrop of these prejudiced perceptions and descriptions of Muslims, the political and public calls for more stringent management of Muslims is being engineered. Thus, diaspora Muslim communities and Islam have been made objects of ‘securitisation’ as a preventative measure to secure the “home” through policies that seek to closely scrutinise and police Muslims and place demands on them for their swift social and cultural integration. In the discourse of securitisation, the ethnic and religious identity claims of Muslims and the difficulties associated with integrating into mainstream society as outcomes of existing structural problems of poverty, unemployment, discrimination, disenfranchisement, inequality, upward social mobility, xenophobia and racism are masked by focusing on the reason of these problems.

[The] modern states tend to employ the discourse of securitization as a political technique that can integrate a society politically by staging a credible existential threat in the form of an internal, or even an external, enemy, an enemy that is created by security agencies (like the police and the army) by categorizing migration together with drug trafficking, human trafficking, criminality and terrorism.\textsuperscript{53}

Securitisation directly or indirectly impacts many Australian Muslims with far reaching consequences manifesting in their political alienation, socio-economic marginalisation and Islamophobia with a cumulative effect of social exclusion. In terms of political alienation, for instance, a study commissioned by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship, exploring the attitudes of young Muslims in Sydney and Melbourne, found young Muslims to have a profound sense of alienation from the Australian political system and the media.\textsuperscript{54} This sense of alienation was further reinforced particularly through the securitisation undertakings by the Howard Government.\textsuperscript{55} Furthermore:

Legal citizenship status grants individuals full civic, social and political rights and responsibilities, including the right and duty to vote and the entitlement to run for public office. Muslims remain, however, severely under-represented in political decision-making processes.\textsuperscript{56}

While the experience of Islamophobia generates feelings of harm and disrespect, there are more practical consequences for Australian Muslims, particularly young Muslims who are locally born and expect their citizenship rights to be honoured. Patterns of discomfort and

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 8
\textsuperscript{54} Shahram Akbarzadeh and Gary Bouma, \textit{Muslim Voices: Hope and Aspirations of Muslim Australians} (Melbourne: Centre for Muslim Minorities and Islam Policy Studies, Monash University, 2009).
\textsuperscript{55} Michael Leach and Fethi Mansouri, \textit{Lives in Limbo} (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2004), 124.
\textsuperscript{56} Mario Peucker, Joshua Roose and Shahram Akbarzadeh, “Muslim Active Citizenship in Australia: Socioeconomic Challenges and the Emergence of a Muslim Elite,” \textit{Australian Journal of Political Science} 49, no. 2 (2014): 288.
fear, distrust and exclusion among Australian Muslims emphasise in a general sense that their whole way of life is not only devalued, but not to be accommodated. The pervasive sense of Islamophobia creates for Australian Muslims generally, and young Muslim Australians in particular, discomfort and fear\(^57\) that affect their sense of belonging to the nation\(^58\) and to their neighbourhoods and spaces of everyday life.\(^59\)

Muslims are not the first to be constructed as the terrorist archetypal suspect citizens: this kind of functional labelling or distinguishing “us” from “them” has a long history and has affected groups in the past such as the Irish Republican Army.\(^60\) Notions of “archetypal suspect citizens” play a critical role in the construction of the narrative of “us” and “them” and are central to ways in which “danger,” “threat” and “risk” are conceptualised.\(^61\)

The operational function of Othering is to exclude people who do not fit in and adhere to the norms of the social group, which reflects the Self. The Other is conceptualised as fundamentally dissimilar to the Self and a source of apprehension, concern and danger, which threatens to obscure boundaries and surpass the Self. The Other becomes dangerous “risky” for the society and deserves being blamed for any dangerous conduct or activity.

In Australia, a variety of strategies exist to regulate public spaces to keep out or remove members of the “Risky Other” from areas considered to be appropriate only for the privileged dominant group. The body of the “Muslim Other,” for instance, is frequently delineated as dangerous and risky and necessitates exclusion from the world of “the self.” The Other is unknown and a stranger and the fear of him or her violating the norms and security of the world of “the self” is amply evident in the discourse of privileged dominant group of the Otherness and “alienness” of minority cultures.\(^62\) Among the minority cultures Muslims as a group, in the age of the “War on Terror,” produce profound anxiety in the privileged dominant group regarding the possibility of terrorist attacks in public spaces. The possibility of the Other penetrating the world of “the self” is graphically exemplified in a series of four coordinated terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 and in the presence of Western military in the countries of the Middle East in the case of the belief of Muslim militants.

The Australian community favours increased powers of the state to combat Muslim terrorism and is bolstered by an anti-terror discourse that considers the threat posed by the stranger; that is, the “home-grown terrorist,” breaching the norms and security of the world of “the self” who is ironically both “of us” and “not of us.” Contemporary fear of breaching the


\(^{59}\) Ibid.

\(^{60}\) Kaya, *Islam, Migration and Integration*.


norms and security of the world of “the self” by the dangerous “Risky Other” who lives “among us and with us” helps strengthen religious and racial intolerance promoted in the popular media in the dominant social group. The fear of the Other produces anxiety in people and they start to coalesce. When they amalgamate, there emerges “anti-Other” movements who often explicitly exhibit xenophobic tendencies.

In Australia, the intensification of state powers and increase in anti-terror laws have been designed to keep Muslims under constant surveillance63 and to manage them as strictly as possible. As far as anti-terror laws are concerned, since their development, only Muslims have been charged and prosecuted under them.64 This in itself is telling and lends support to the claim that the laws indiscriminately target Australian Muslims. All Muslims are perceived to collectively constitute the source of the threat of terrorism.65 In this imagination, Muslims are the target of anti-terror laws because they are seen as “strangers,” “archetypal suspect citizens” and the Other who does not respect and value the Australian way of life and is bent on its destruction. Muslims are the terrorist Other. The popular support for the state to develop new anti-terror laws through which to secure new powers to “fight terrorism” is a reflection of a strong anti-terror discourse that draws on the threat of the Other breaching the norms and security of the world of “the self,” which is the whole of Australia.

Thus, Muslims are constituted as a borderless homogenised transnational socio-cultural category and seen to pose a national security threat against the backdrop of the rise of so-called radical political Islam. They raise grave security concerns for the Australian government and, therefore, been made the object of suspicion and focus of specific risk assessment processes (surveillance, policing and intelligence gathering) and risk management strategies (counterterrorism, de-radicalisation and anti-terrorism legislation) in an attempt to mitigate if not eradicate the national security risk. These have made Muslims objects of “securitisation” and “archetypal suspect citizens” – governments’ disciplining and managing of a borderless socio-cultural category – thus, requiring urgent socio-cultural and economic integration. Securitisation is a pure campaign of suspect and fear – the politics of suspect and fear generated out of social relations structured around suspect and distrust. The government’s securitisation of the Muslim suspect other is managed through the interventionist state approach rather than the protective state strategy. Muslims in Australia have come to inhabit a space of utter hopelessness in which they are a “feared racialised suspect other.” Despite making concerted efforts to make positive and significant contributions to Australian society and demonstrating a willingness to be part of larger Australian socio-cultural, economic and political order through taking Australian citizenship in relatively large numbers, Muslims continue to be “otherised.” Individual and institutional xenophobia and Islamophobia and state securitisation are some of the challenges Muslims face on a regular basis, notwithstanding Muslims generally having proven to be law-abiding

63 Humphrey, “Securitisation and Domestication of Diaspora Muslims and Islam.”
65 Humphrey, “Securitisation and Domestication of Diaspora Muslims and Islam.”
industrious people from whom Australia as a multicultural society benefits immensely. Muslims also face the challenge of overcoming the securitisation of their faith as a homogenous cult that poses an existential threat to Australian security. Muslims today are suspected of political disloyalty, social agitation and being plain dangerous. Consequently, their citizenship has become increasingly contingent on their overall performance as citizens, which is judged by their active efforts to integrate into Australian society and at the same time unequivocally reject radical political Islam.

CONCLUSION

Australia is a modern secular liberal democracy in which all its members have the right to experience life “equally.” Citizenship gives all Australians the right to pursue life in Australia without fear or prejudice, have access to all kinds of public services including health, education and transportation, be treated equally and equitably, and be able to receive justice. Laws and public policies made in such a democracy must apply to all citizens and no single individual or group should be a target. This is the classic maxim of democracy.

The present securitisation of Islam and Muslims in Australia is paradoxical to the classic maxim of democracy. The radical approach of securitising Islam and Muslims in the context of countering violent extremism and de-radicalisation has become a security concern not only to the Muslim diaspora in Australia, but also to the underpinning of the Western political ideology of liberal democracy. Furthermore, the techniques employed under the prevention doctrine such as surveillance, detention and interrogations of terrorist suspects by and large have not yielded any great positive outcomes and in fact have proven to be counterproductive.

The divergent anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim social and political perceptions in Australia have created deep concerns on the future of Muslim and non-Muslim relations in Australia. The increasing unjustified securitisation and rising far-right political parties have not only created ambiguity on the future of Australian liberal values but also raised deep concerns among the Muslim diaspora as to the value of their citizenship and how welcome they are to the larger Australian order. Australian securitisation, which reifies Muslims as archetypal suspect citizens, encompassing xenophobic stereotyping and racist elements in Australia is self-interested misrepresentations employed by a range of individual and institutional actors.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


