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## JIHAD IN VIOLENT ISLAMIST PARADIGM

Jan A. Ali\* and Anum Sikandar\*\*

**Abstract:** Violent Islamism is a modern sociological phenomenon with origins in the crisis of society and the negative consequences of modernity. It sees the society and modern world as steeped in a quagmire with an obscene level of wealth and power in the hands of a few and a large section of society in perpetual strife and suffering. Apart from the West, in various other parts of the world there is economic stagnation, many in the society are excluded from resources revenue, and the trade and social networks are being disrupted and societies torn apart with the creation of new nation states. The society has huge urban agglomerations and people in their millions, especially young men and women, are either unemployed or underemployed and many feel alienated from the prosperous way of life enjoyed by the urban elite and uprooted from the social fabric of the society where a sense of solidarity has been pilfered away. This crisis needs to be addressed and the imbalance corrected immediately. This article posits that violent Islamism purports to have a solution, which is to totally rearrange the social, economic and political structures of the society, Islamise the knowledge and civil and economic institutions, and establishment the Caliphate with Sharia as its constitution. Violent Islamists are only too willing and ready to remake the world and will use any means to achieve this goal, even defensive and offensive jihad as a weapon of choice.

**Keywords:** *Caliphate, jihad, modernity, Sharia, violent Islamism, West*

### INTRODUCTION

Jihad is a fundamental concept in Islam. It is a multi-dimensional concept covering social, spiritual and political spheres of Muslim life. However, it is surrounded by much controversy because Westerners and some Muslims understand jihad exclusively as an armed struggle or ‘holy war,’ often associating jihad with violence and fanaticism. Of course, this is a very narrow understanding of jihad and even misleading as the term has a much broader meaning. How jihad is defined, understood and practised has wide-ranging implications relating to inter-Muslim relations, Muslim and non-Muslim relations, intercontinental relations, dispute resolution and global perceptions of Islam. In classic Islamic thinking, much of the discussion

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of jihad has principally been the purview of the *fuqaha* (jurists).<sup>1</sup> Jihad in Islam has been more concerned with the spiritual reformation of the self, the purification of the soul, the struggle against inner selfish desires such as dishonesty and avarice, and the establishment of a sound social order and harmonious social relations.<sup>2</sup> Physical struggle including war also constitutes one form of jihad, but it is undertaken as a last resort in pursuit of solving a crisis. Besides, there are stringent guidelines that need to be followed to implement jihad against aggressors in the context of a declared war.<sup>3</sup> Jihad as a physical warfare is possible only if the aggressor breaches the agreement or strikes first, and even then, the reaction needs to be measured and just and not excessive. The Qur'ān and *sunna* (traditions and practices of Prophet Muhammad) lay out clear rules in relation to seeking and honouring peace treaties, avoiding disruptions to government and immediate cessation of fighting if or when the enemy surrenders.

In the modern period, however, with the disappearance of a Muslim central authority (by central authority, we are referring to an established state structure such as a caliphate), compartmentalisation and consequent diminution of juristic authority and role, and subsequent emergence of a plethora of Muslim scholarships and legal authorities, discussion of jihad and its construction are very much an individual enterprise. What can be deduced from this is that comparing modern Muslim constructions and expressions of jihad with the more classic constructions, especially among the jurists, sharp and multivariant understandings of jihad emerge.<sup>4</sup> In modernity, competing constructions and understandings of jihad have emerged, battling for authenticity and legitimacy. These constructions and understandings have been greatly influenced by the social, economic and political situations in many Muslim societies. Thus, in the contemporary context, the tendency is to construct jihad around the idea of physical warfare or equate it with warfare and as a result the subjects of jihad and warfare are always considered as one. This is problematic and there are two logical explanations as to why they should be considered individually and discussed independently.

There should be clear distinction between the behaviours of the people and the ideology of the religion as well as between spiritual warfare (the inner struggle for the discovery of God) and physical warfare (the war with the “sword”). The ideals of Islam are explained in the Qur'ān and *sunna*, and these ideals may be quite different from what a few fanatical Muslims may believe. Often, jihad in the media is taken to be what these few fanatical Muslims as so-called ambassadors of the Muslim world represent it and as a result particularly the non-

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<sup>1</sup> Richard Martin, “Discourses on Jihad in the Postmodern Era,” in *Islamic Ethics of Life: Abortion, War, and Euthanasia*, ed. Jonathan Brockopp (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003).

<sup>2</sup> Onder Bakircioglu, “A Socio-Legal Analysis of the Concept of Jihad,” *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 59, no. 2 (2010).

<sup>3</sup> Syed Abul-Ala Maududi, *Jihad in Islam* (Beirut: The Holy Koran Publishing House, 2006); John Esposito, John, “Islam and Political Violence,” *Religions* 6, no. 3 (2015).

<sup>4</sup> Mustansir Mir, “Jihad in Islam,” in *The Jihad and Its Times*, ed. Hadia Dajani-Shakeel and Ronald Messier (Ann Arbor: Centre for Near Eastern and North African Studies, University of Michigan, 1991), 115-116.

Muslim community not only formulates an understanding of jihad but forms an entire image of Islam that sharply contrasts with the actual scriptural explanation.<sup>5</sup>

In this article, we frame the discussion of jihad in violent Islamist paradigm. Islamists share many beliefs and practices with Islamic revivalist movements and general Muslim population; therefore, not all Islamists are violent. To subscribe to the ideology of Islamism does not automatically make one violent or a terrorist. Islamism is a varied form of social and political activism advocating that private and public spheres of Muslim life must be governed by Islamic principles and be based on Sharia (Islamic law). Islamists generally believe the glory and grandeur of Islam existed during Islam's Golden Age because Prophet Mohammed and his Companions practised jihad – struggle in the path of God. Decadence entered the Muslim world and Islam started to decline with the expansion of European colonialism and many Muslims and a section of the *ulema* (Islamic scholars) strayed from Islam's true righteous path. Islamists envision a return of the Islamic Golden Age and the re-establishment of Islamic global superiority with the renewal of faith in Muslims' hearts and expressed in character, worship and human relationships in a uniform state founded upon Sharia and its strict implementation.

In contrast, violent Islamists – the focus of this article – direct their efforts towards or focus their attention on fulfilling the duty of jihad using various means, including violence, as an important option such as summary executions, suicide bombings, assassinations, mass shootings and physical warfare. In this pursuit they often excommunicate their Muslim rivals, Muslim secularists and non-Muslims particularly Westerners. They differentiate themselves as 'practitioners of authentic Islam' and *redeemers* of the prevailing Muslim malaise. They highlight Muslim misgovernment by dictatorial regimes and prevailing social injustice and make an issue of the oppressive practices of non-Muslim political and military powers in the Muslim world. In a purported attempt to extract Muslims living in an era of stark decline and reduce religious strife, they seek to regain political power and enforce Islamic global supremacy. In this thinking, violent Islamists magnify their Islamic attributes and authenticity and present themselves as most deserving to represent Islam compared to all other forms of Islamic activism because they see themselves as the only ones emphasising Islam as a religion of strength and not weakness, and Islam must protect itself even with armed resistance if necessary.

This article argues these are some of the motivating factors for violent Islamists to develop a violent Islamist paradigm. Violent Islamists want to return Islam to its former glory by waging physical jihad, if need be, against what they consider to be the destroyers of Islamically based socio-economic and political order, principal civic institutions, and social relations. Violent Islamists – also sometimes referred to as Islamist-based jihadists – find themselves and their societies in a state of socio-economic and political ruin, and point to the West and its Muslim allies for causing the devastation. Unable to bring improvements and development through 'proper' means, they simply opt for non-traditional and unorthodox

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<sup>5</sup> Riaz Hassan, *Inside Muslim Minds* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2014), 77.

means including offensive jihad in the form of physical warfare as the solution to the crisis. What transpires from this is that in order to avert or overcome the crisis, offensive jihad takes Muslims into a greater quagmire.

## ETYMOLOGY AND TYPES OF JIHAD IN ISLAM

The Encyclopedia of Britannica defines jihad as “a religious duty imposed upon Muslims to spread Islam by waging war. Jihad has come to denote any conflict waged for principle or belief and is often translated to mean holy war.”<sup>6</sup> However, this definition is open to debate and theologically and scholarly quite problematic. Theological and academic consensus on the definition of jihad is weak to say the least. Some look at the concept of jihad holistically, drawing on the Qur’ān, *ḥadīth* (Prophetic tradition) and Islamic history while others selectively pick verses and prophetic traditions and indiscriminately refer to aspects of Islamic history to justify their views, as can be seen in the discussion below. Jihad in Islam represents completely different meanings and interpretations. Etymologically, jihad is derived from the word *jahd* or root *j-h-d*, meaning effort, exertion, strive, struggle or application. The term jihad appears repeatedly in the Qur’ān, often in the idiomatic expression *al-jihad fi sabili llah* (striving in the cause of God). According to Ibn Rushd, the four categories of *jihad fi sabili llah* are:

1. *jihad bil qalb/nafs* (jihad of the heart/soul) is concerned with struggling against the devil and is regarded as the greater jihad – *al-jihad al-akbar*
2. *jihad bil lisan* (jihad by the tongue) or *jihad al-qalam* (jihad by the word) is concerned with speaking the truth and spreading the teaching of Islam with one’s tongue
3. *jihad bil yad* (jihad by the hand) is concerned with doing what is right and fighting against evil with action
4. *jihad bis saif* (jihad by the sword) is concerned with armed struggle in the cause of God.<sup>7</sup>

Generally speaking, scholars of Islam often talk about two forms of jihad: *al-jihad al-asghar* – a lesser outer jihad such as a military struggle or warfare as a physical struggle against the enemies of Islam, and *al-jihad al-akbar* – a greater inner jihad such as a spiritual struggle, the struggle of personal moral self-development against wicked desires, which takes a non-violent form. *Al-jihad al-asghar*, a military or physical struggle against the enemies of Islam,<sup>8</sup> is treated as only a temporary measure or momentary reaction against armed hostility from an enemy and when the hostility is over jihad ceases too. Robert Spencer, in his book entitled *Islam Unveiled*, is of the view:

The Jihad that aims to increase the size of the Dar al-Islam at the expense of the Dar al-Harb is not a conventional war that begins at a certain point and ends at another. Jihad is a

<sup>6</sup> Aqab Malik, “Jihad: Conflict-resolution or its Antithesis?” *Strategic Studies* 32, no. 2-3 (2012): 203.

<sup>7</sup> Rudolph Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam* (Princeton: Marcus Wiener, 1996), 9-25.

<sup>8</sup> Louay Fatoohi, *Jihad in the Quran* (Kuala Lumpur: A.S. Noordeen, 2004), 97.

“permanent war” that excludes the idea of peace but authorizes temporary truces related to the political situation.<sup>9</sup>

Similarly, David Cook also concludes that, after surveying the evidence from classical to contemporary times, one can easily come to the conclusion that the jihadist movements of today are as legitimate for Muslims nowadays as they were in the past. Even though the jihadists today are fighting without official leadership, they justify all their acts with reference to the Qur’ān and *sunna*. Hence, one can conclude, during the first several centuries of Islam, jihad was interpreted as aggressive and expansive.<sup>10</sup>

Christopher van der Krogt also tries to investigate jihadi ideology in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. He understands, even though most Muslims denounce the terrorist acts of 9/11, they must acknowledge the terrorists and their jihadist ideology are a product of Islamic history. The purpose of Islamic conquests was not only based on converting the locals to Islam; rather, it had been to rule over them and collect revenues.<sup>11</sup>

Cook and van der Krogt fall prey to a selective use of Islamic scripture and Islamic history. They usually refer to selective aspects of Islamic history, failing to contextualise it and focusing on only certain verses or *aḥādīth* (plural for *ḥadīth*) and ignore the *asbab nuzul* (revealed cause) of the jihad in the Qur’ān. However, many intellectuals and academics such as Esposito prioritise the greater jihad to promote a positive appreciation of Islam.<sup>12</sup> Farmer says:

In the Most widely accepted definition, jihad is largely an affair between the believer and God, and normally is an act of faith rather than an act of politics;...the jihad or struggle is for God; hence, the struggle itself is successful if it demonstrates one’s devotion to God and is therefore pleasing in His sight, even when a specific action is physically unsuccessful in the temporal world.<sup>13</sup>

This shows that jihad as a concept and practice has multiple meanings and is a multi-stranded religious tradition. The two broad meanings of jihad, non-violent and violent, are often contested. A variety of interpretations and constructs around the term jihad exist and this is the case because the interpretations and constructions of jihad are shaped by prevailing social, economic and political conditions in different contexts. Despite this, jihad as physical war or in its military sense is still permissible in Islam and can be declared by a legitimate and authorised body such as the government for a legitimate struggle to defend human rights, and for the protection of freedom of people, freedom of faith and national sovereignty. There are stringent guidelines that need to be followed to implement jihad against aggressors,

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<sup>9</sup> Robert Spencer, *Islam Unveiled: Disturbing Questions About the World’s Fastest Growing Faith* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002), 145.

<sup>10</sup> David Cook, *Understanding Jihad* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 10.

<sup>11</sup> Christopher van der Krogt, “Jihad Without Apologetics,” *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 21, no. 2 (2010): 139.

<sup>12</sup> John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam and What Everyone Needs to Know about Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

<sup>13</sup> Brian Farmer, *Radical Islam in the West: Ideology and Challenge* (London: McFarland & Company Publishers, 2011), 4.

usurpers and enemies. When human rights and freedom have been violated, people are subjected to oppression and national sovereignty is threatened or attacked then mounting a defence – jihad – is permitted and in fact becomes obligatory.

## JIHAD IN THE ISLAMIC SCRIPTURE

Islam arose in an environment where warfare and organised violence were part of everyday life. Pre-Islamic poetry had been devoted entirely to the joys and turmoils of fighting. Even after the arrival of Islam, such heroic ethos continued to hold considerable power. War was a central theme not only in Islamic literature, but had also been equally significant among Christians and Jews.<sup>14</sup> It is imperative to understand the historical context or *asbab nuzul* (revealed causes) in which the jihad verses of the Qur’ān had been revealed to the Prophet. There are a few verses that have been mostly quoted by those who criticise Islam and relate it to terrorism:

Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed, Allah does not like transgressors.<sup>15</sup>

And kill them wherever you overtake them and expel them from wherever they have expelled you, and fitnah is worse than killing. And do not fight them at al-Masjid al-Haram until they fight you there. But if they fight you, then kill them. Such is the recompense of the disbelievers.<sup>16</sup>

Fight them until there is no [more] fitnah and [until] worship is [acknowledged to be] for Allah. But if they cease, then there is to be no aggression except against the oppressors.<sup>17</sup>

These are among the most controversial and misinterpreted verses of the Qur’ān and have often been quoted out of context. The Qur’ān does not impose an absolute obligation to resort to warfare against all those who reject their faith. Warfare can only be recognised as legitimate in Islam, if it follows certain principles and conducts.<sup>18</sup> Notably, none of these verses use the word jihad; rather, they have used the word *qital* (root q-t-l), which is exclusively connected to the word *harb* (war). It should also be noted that the Qur’ān does not use the word jihad in the verses of war. The Qur’ān has always dealt with the concepts of *qital* and jihad separately.<sup>19</sup>

It is clear from the above translation that Allah is asking the Muslims to fight. But whom is Allah asking the Muslims to fight? The exegesis<sup>20</sup> of the Qur’ān tells us that these verses are asking the Muslims to fight the Quraish of Mecca, who had inflicted every hardship

<sup>14</sup> Fred Donner, “The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War,” in *Just War and Jihad*, ed. James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay (Westport: Glenwood Press, 1991), 31–69. Michael Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), 6-7.

<sup>15</sup> Qur’an 2:190.

<sup>16</sup> Qur’an 2:191.

<sup>17</sup> Qur’an 2:193.

<sup>18</sup> Bakircioglu, “A Socio-Legal Analysis of the Concept of Jihad.”

<sup>19</sup> Maududi, *Jihad in Islam*; Syed Abul-Ala Maududi, *The Meaning of the Quran* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1993).

<sup>20</sup> Maududi, *Jihad in Islam*.

imaginable on the Muslims, who had tortured them in every way possible just because of their faith, who had killed their young ones and socially boycotted them and left them to starve for three years in a valley. After 13 years of this torture, the Muslims were finally forced to leave their ancestral homes, possessions and families who had not accepted Islam and emigrate to Medina. When the Muslims began to rebuild their lives, the Quraish waged a war against them and began marching towards Medina. In these circumstances, the Muslims believe Allah commanded them to fight back and even here, in the next few verses, Allah reminds the Muslims not to transgress and have mercy on the enemies – if they cease fighting, so should the Muslims. The Muslims believe this is the way of Allah. Even in the harshest verses of the Qur’ān, Allah reminds the Muslims to be kind and forgive the enemy if he accepts defeat.<sup>21</sup>

Permission [to fight] has been given to those who are being fought, because they were wronged. And indeed, Allah is competent to give them victory. [They are] those who have been evicted from their homes without right - only because they say, “Our Lord is Allah.”<sup>22</sup>

And what is [the matter] with you that you fight not in the cause of Allah and [for] the oppressed among men, women, and children who say, “Our Lord, take us out of this city of oppressive people and appoint for us from Yourself a protector and appoint for us from Yourself a helper.”<sup>23</sup>

These verses from surah Hajj have been considered by numerous scholars of Islam as the first revelation allowing the Muslims to participate in fighting back the enemy. Before this, the Prophet was not instructed to defend himself and his Companions against any atrocities committed by the Quraish of Arabia. In more than 70 verses before these, he had been ordered to simply preach God’s message, to endure insult and remain patient.<sup>24</sup> Whenever the Companions of the Prophet came to him wounded, he would ask them to seek help with patience and prayer. However, the Quraish kept on persecuting his followers by socially boycotting and torturing them. After 13 years of this torture, the Prophet and a handful of his Companions migrated to Medina and this was where the permission to fight was given.<sup>25</sup> It has been noted that all the verses of jihad that are related to fighting the oppressors were revealed after the emigration to Medina and the establishment of the Islamic state in Medina.

In the Qur’ān, without having recourse to Qur’ānic exegesis, the term jihad only appears 36 times and only ten of these “can be unequivocally interpreted as signifying warfare.”<sup>26</sup> The rest are open to different interpretations but some of them definitely signify effort or struggle, such as, “The believers are only the ones who have believed in Allah and His Messenger and then doubt not but strive with their properties and their lives in the cause of

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<sup>21</sup> Muqtedar Khan, “The Political Philosophy of Islamic Resurgence,” *Cultural Dynamics* 13, no. 2 (2001); Maududi, *The Meaning of the Quran*, 136-146.

<sup>22</sup> Qur’an 22:39-40.

<sup>23</sup> Qur’an 4:75.

<sup>24</sup> Esposito, *Unholy War*.

<sup>25</sup> Ira Lapidus, *History of Islamic Societies*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

<sup>26</sup> Ella Landau-Tasseron, “Jihad,” in *The Encyclopedia of the Qur’an*, vol. 3, ed. Jane McAuliffe (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 35.



Allah. It is those who are the truthful.”<sup>27</sup> “In sum, there are only ten places in the Qur’an where *j-h-d* definitely denotes warfare. Nevertheless, there are verses in the Qur’an that attest to other significations.”<sup>28</sup> For instance, “And strive hard in God’s cause with all the striving that is due to Him; ...”<sup>29</sup> and “And as for those who strive hard in Our cause, We shall most certainly guide them to paths that lead to Us, and, behold, God is indeed with the doers of good.”<sup>30</sup>

Muslims believe, when Allah expects a believer to follow a certain behaviour that is hard on the soul, it is legalised gradually (*tadriq*) as it will be difficult to follow the new law. Jihad is a difficult endeavour as it not only includes patience and persistence but also death and surrendering one’s property. Hence, it began gradually by asking the Muslims to remain patient and forgiving. Whenever the Muslims came wounded to the Prophet, he advised them to be patient as Allah had not commanded them to fight. Muslims moved to Medina after 13 years of hardship in Mecca, then verse 39 of chapter 22 was revealed, which gave the Muslims permission to defend themselves against aggression. Later, when the Muslims had experienced jihad, they were ordered to fight those who fought them.<sup>31</sup> The Qur’an says:

And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists wherever you find them and capture them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they should repent, establish prayer, and give zakah, let them [go] on their way. Indeed, Allah is Forgiving and Merciful.<sup>32</sup>

Indeed, the number of months with Allah is twelve [lunar] months in the register of Allah [from] the day He created the heavens and the earth; of these, four are sacred. That is the correct religion, so do not wrong yourselves during them. And fight against the disbelievers collectively as they fight against you collectively. And know that Allah is with the righteous [who fear Him].<sup>33</sup>

To understand these harsh verses against the Quraish, we need to understand their *asbab ul nazool* (revealed causes). These most harsh verses, which have been revealed in chapter At-Tawbah, have a definitive purpose. The Quraish and various other tribes of Mecca had repeatedly broken their pledges and persecuted Muslims in the severest of ways. Notably, these verses in chapter At-Tawbah are not only related to persecuting the enemy but are about taking care of slaves and prisoners; the people of the book are not to be harmed if they pay their *jizya* (protective tax).<sup>34</sup>

Significantly, jihad is not the main term with respect to warfare in the Qur’an. The term *qital* (kill) or the root *q-t-l* is used in the Qur’an but the warlike meaning of jihad has become predominant in modern discourse as *qital* has been glossed by jihad, giving jihad, in a sense,

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<sup>27</sup> Qur’an 49:15.

<sup>28</sup> Landau-Tasseran, “Jihad,” 36-37.

<sup>29</sup> Qur’an 22:78.

<sup>30</sup> Qur’an 29:69.

<sup>31</sup> Qur’an 2:190; Aydin Hayati, “Jihad in Islam,” *Global Journal Al-Thaqafa* 2, no. 2 (2012): 9.

<sup>32</sup> Qur’an 9:5.

<sup>33</sup> Qur’an 9:36.

<sup>34</sup> Hayati, “Jihad in Islam,” 9.

a legal definition. Shahrour<sup>35</sup> and Donner<sup>36</sup> have constructed different arguments relating to war in Islam and differ in their thoughts on whether war is permissible in Islam; however, they both are in concordance that the Qur'ān treats jihad and *qital* differently, where *qital* is exclusively connected with *harb* (war). Also, the use of the Qur'ānic phrase *jihad fi sabili llah* (struggle in the cause of God) alongside another Qur'ānic phrase *qital fi sabili llah* (armed struggle in the cause of God) seems to have contributed to equating *j-h-d* with holy war or warfare. Shahrour sheds some light on this, arguing that *jihad fi sabili llah* in particular is a struggle to secure justice and ensure the protection of freedom of religion and the freedom of speech for the entire humanity from different persuasions of faith.<sup>37</sup> The terms jihad and *qital* apparently cannot be used interchangeably because, while *qital* specifically means killing and is used in the Qur'ān in specific reference to armed struggle or war, jihad has a much broader meaning than simply killing.

## EVOLVING DEFINITIONS OF JIHAD AND JIHADISM IN THE 20<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY

It has been noted that jihadism with a negative connotation was used in English for the first time in 1986 when historian Haggai Erlich<sup>38</sup> explained the threat posed by Mahdist Jihadism to 19<sup>th</sup> century Ethiopia. It was not that the Sudanese Mahdists had been proved to be a threat to the Ethiopians, it was just a possibility that they might do that. Then, in 1994, Nikki Keddie defined jihadism as those who “called for holy war against external non-Muslim enemies or practiced jihad against local rulers and enemies who they considered not truly Muslim.”<sup>39</sup> Linking the concept of jihadism to modern terrorist movements reportedly began in 2002 when it was used in a RAND report. This report characterised jihadism as a radical cult of violence.<sup>40</sup>

Nevertheless, as has been shown above, the concept of jihad in the scripture is different from what a few disturbed individuals' practice in the name of religion. In recent years, various Muslim social groups or ideological movements have emerged who have contributed to the evolving definition of jihad. Definitions of jihad are oriented towards motivating and mobilising Muslims to participate in jihad as warfare. The meanings of jihad doctrines have changed and jihad has been transformed into an ideology of power and resistance. Muslim social groups or ideological movements insist the term jihad refers to participation in warfare. Such is the case with ISIS. With ISIS, the definition of jihad is centred on waging war on the West and anyone siding with it including Muslim Western sympathisers. ISIS uses jihad in

<sup>35</sup> Mohammad Shahrour, *Tajfif Manabi al-Irhab* [Draining the Sources of Terrorism] (Damascus: al-Ahali, 2008).

<sup>36</sup> Donner, “The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War.”

<sup>37</sup> Shahrour, *Tajfif Manabi al-Irhab*, 93.

<sup>38</sup> Haggai Erlich, *Ethiopia and the Challenge of Independence* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press, 1986); Mark Sedgwick, “Jihadism, Narrow and Wide: The Dangers of Loose Use of an Important Term,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 9, no. 2 (2015): 35.

<sup>39</sup> Nikki Keddie, “The Revolt of Islam, 1700 to 1993: Comparative Considerations and Relations to Imperialism,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 36, no. 3 (1994): 483.

<sup>40</sup> Sedgwick, “Jihadism, Narrow and Wide,” 35-36.

terms of global ambitions, one being the establishment of an Islamic state based on Sharia and the other to achieve global power. The support for ISIS is born of social, economic and political conditions that many Muslims find unacceptable. These conditions according to ISIS are the making of the West and its Muslim state supporters. ISIS offers these Muslims an opportunity to fight back through “legitimate” jihad and carve out their own future and the future of generations to come.

The media and Western academics occasionally connect the philosophies of these terrorists to the teachings of major Islamic intellectuals. Sometimes, these terrorists link themselves to certain Muslim philosophers and revolutionists as well.<sup>41</sup> While many Islamic revivalist movements in the 20<sup>th</sup> century seek to implement Sharia and establish a caliphate, this article focuses on the movement with violent Islamists tendencies.

## FOUNDERS OF POLITICAL ISLAM AND REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVISTS

Maulana Maududi and Syed Qutb have been mentioned as the founders of political Islam and revolutionary ideologues by the Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics.<sup>42</sup> However, many political commentators commenting on Islam and Qutb have equated Qutb’s *Milestones* with the *Communist Manifesto* by Marx.<sup>43</sup> It has been argued, even though Qutb’s book offers a detailed description of what a genuine Islamic society and its ideals should look like, thorough investigation reveals it was nothing more than an attempt to add an Islamic layer to a fascist ideological. “The roots of Al Qaeda are not in poverty or Anti Americanism but in Syed Qutb’s ideas about how Christianity went wrong and how martyrdom could change the world.”<sup>44</sup> Similarly, it has been argued that Maulana Maududi and his teachings of jihad and political Islam have had an immediate impact on fundamentalism in Pakistan. Muslim society had been divided into two parts; one that supported the system of *jahiliyyah* (ignorance God’s guidance) and the others who supported the establishment of a caliphate. Maududi has been claimed to be a strong supporter of the latter group.<sup>45</sup> For him, the Islamic state is virtuous and ruled by a group of virtuous believers who consider it absolutely critical to embed sovereignty in God alone. These virtuous believers consider themselves to be God’s vicegerents on earth with the main aim to establish the caliphate and create a just society. The aim of the following sections is to uncover the philosophies of these ‘Islamists’ and highlight the differences between them and the terrorists.

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<sup>41</sup> Lucas Thrope, “Sayyid Qutb and Aquinas: Liberalism, Natural Law and the Philosophy of Jihad,” *The Heythrop Journal* 60, no. 3 (2019): 414-415.

<sup>42</sup> John Esposito and Emad el-din Shahin, *The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

<sup>43</sup> Jason Burke, *Al-Qaeda The True Story of Radical Islam* (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 54.

<sup>44</sup> Paul Berman, “The Philosopher of Islamic Terror,” *The New York Times Magazine*, May 23, 2003, 24.

<sup>45</sup> Khan, “The Political Philosophy of Islamic Resurgence,” 220.

### *Sayyid Qutb's Revolutionary Islamist Ideology and Jihad*

Attributing fascism to Qutb and making him responsible for all the terrorism faced by the world today is erroneous and without foundation. *Milestones* is an extremely ambiguous and vague text. It is possible to read Qutb's work in several ways and one possible way to read it, which is often not discussed much, is to understand his discussion about Islamic liberalism – freeing Islam from accretions. Qutb supported offensive jihad in the same way as those who support the “just war theory” but interestingly, unlike Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda, which insists on waging an offensive war against the United States, Qutb advocated a defensive war against the United States.<sup>46</sup> Blaming Qutb for the actions of Bin Laden is like accusing Rousseau for the horrors of the French Revolution.

Qutb believed Islam is a universal religion with a universal message. At the heart of this message is an idea of justice and that all individuals are equal in the eyes of God. Hence, it is the duty of a good Muslim to struggle for justice and fight against tyranny. For Qutb, Egypt was living in a state of *jahiliyyah*<sup>47</sup> because it had discarded Allah's sovereignty and chose to live under manmade law. People were now worshipping leaders and their ideologies instead of God. This, Qutb argued, led to injustice and tyranny. This was the illness that had spread in the society and offensive jihad was the cure, theorised Qutb. For Qutb, the absence of God's sovereignty and people not worshipping God were the proofs of the existence of *jahiliyyah*, which warranted launching offensive jihad to counter the prevailing state of ignorance in the society and freeing individuals from the clutches un-Godliness.<sup>48</sup>

Qutb's radical Islamic views must be assessed within the social context in which he was writing. The Muslim Brotherhood that Qutb headed at the time supported the Nasser government initially when it came to power in 1952. However, Naser's secular ideology started to clash with the ideology of the Brotherhood, whose slogan was “the Quran is our constitution.” By 1954, the relationship between Naser's regime and the Brotherhood ceased to exist and the members of the Brotherhood started to be persecuted by the state and many were either imprisoned or killed for defying state orders. Qutb was also imprisoned and spent almost a decade in the concentration camps of Egypt where he penned *Fi Zhalil al-Qur'an* (In the Shade of the Qur'an) and *Ma'alim fi'l Tariq* (Milestones). He was finally hanged in 1966. In those conditions, Qutb reflected on the plight of the Muslims of Egypt and the whole world and described the situation as *jahilic* – a state in which a “false” system of government and worshipping false Gods were widespread. Qutb's concept of offensive jihad originated from these conditions. He claimed the Qur'an chose the path of peace and ordered Muslims to avoid war as much as possible. However, if people whether Muslims or non-Muslims threaten peaceful existence, threw obstacles in the way of God and promulgation of His teachings, then offensive jihad was justified in an attempt to bring an end to *jahillilyyah*.

<sup>46</sup> Thrope, “Sayyid Qutb and Aquinas,” 416.

<sup>47</sup> Qutb borrowed the idea of *jahiliyyah* from Maududi and expanded on it.

<sup>48</sup> Yasien Mohamed, “Muslim Fundamentalism: The Case of Sayyid Qutb,” *Scriptura* 99 (2013); A. Stahl, “Offensive Jihad in Sayyid Qutb's Ideology,” International Institute for Counter Terrorism, March 24, 2011, <https://www.ict.org.il/Article/1097/Offensive-Jihad-in-Sayyid-Qutbs-Ideology#gsc.tab=0>.

However, this offensive jihad with the sword was to be the last resort to preach the word of God.<sup>49</sup>

### ***Maulana Maududi's Islamists Political Ideology and Jihad***

An Indian and later Pakistani intellectual Abul A'Ala Maududi is considered to be one of the first Islamist thinkers to take a new approach to the concept of jihad in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. He attempted to relate jihad with the concept of justice in Islam. He presented jihad as a method to expand Islamic political dominance and establish what he considered to be a just rule.<sup>50</sup> For Maududi, the sole purpose of Islam is the welfare of mankind. For him, a just society includes freedom of religion at all levels.<sup>51</sup> He expanded the idea of jihad beyond a holy war to mean in the cause of God. He claimed God has permitted to fight the oppressors in order to safeguard wellbeing, property and their religion but the jihad with the pen and words, he stressed, was to remain for eternity.<sup>52</sup>

Maududi's outlook significantly changes jihad, beginning its association with anti-colonialism and national liberation movements that seek not to expand Islamic rule but to establish independent states, not to force non-Muslims to accept *dhimmi* status, but to make them politically independent.<sup>53</sup>

Maududi described Islam as a:

revolutionary ideology whose aim is to alter the social order of the whole world and reconstruct it in conformity of its own principles. Muslim is the title of this International Revolutionary Party organized by Islam; and Jihad is that revolutionary struggle and utmost exertion that the Islamic Party brings into play to achieve this objective.<sup>54</sup>

He explained, like all revolutionary ideologies, Islam also shuns the current vocabulary and uses its own terminologies so its ideals can be differentiated from others. Islam has purposely rejected the word *harb* (war) and used the word jihad, which is synonymous with struggle, he claimed.<sup>55</sup>

Maududi notes that wars and territorial expansions have occurred for millennia. It is incorrect, he stresses, to refer to the history of Islam as a tale of bloodshed and violence. Maududi says the aim of jihad for the territorial expansions of the Muslims was not to attain personal glory or expand territories; it was to establish a just society and make others aware of Islam's teaching and principles.<sup>56</sup> This was the main reason people welcomed these Muslims into their lands as Islam had proven to be a peaceful religion.

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<sup>49</sup> Syed Qutb, *Milestones* (Damascus: Dar Al-Ilm, 2006).

<sup>50</sup> Bouzerzour Zoubir, "Jihad as a Source of Terrorism – a Reality or Propaganda," *The Politics and Religion Journal*, no. 1 (2014): 104.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 103.

<sup>52</sup> Maududi, *Jihad in Islam*, 3.

<sup>53</sup> Zoubir, "Jihad as a Source of Terrorism," 104.

<sup>54</sup> Maududi, *Jihad in Islam*, 4-5.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

Writing in colonial India, Maududi was particularly concerned with the rise of Western modernity, colonialism, Western hegemony and the subsequent decline of the Muslim world. For Maududi, man was Allah's vicegerent (*khalifah*) on earth and it was his responsibility to ensure the establishment of a just society in which all can live peacefully and in which God's law can be implemented and His teachings spread. Hence, Maududi explained that every man has to play his role in this endeavour and actively participate in the construction of a just society. This, Maududi stressed, is the jihad all must undertake for it is for the greater good.

## VIOLENT ISLAMIST PARADIGM

In the last few decades, an unprecedented number of books and articles have been published on jihad for public and intellectual consumption, some offering a balanced discussion of the concept and practice of jihad and some a very distorted enunciation of Islam and jihad. In the latter case, Islam and the doctrine of jihad has been much maligned and distorted by many historians, academics, political figures, journalists and even some Muslims. After the events of 9 September 2001 in America and subsequent various terrorist bombings in different parts of the world, the image of Islam has been grossly tarnished. Following these events and the global fight against terrorism, many began to blame the entire Muslim population for all terrorist events and activities and even went on to blame the religion of Islam and its teachings for the atrocities and carnage caused by a handful of misguided and deluded violent Islamists. Jihad has not been understood in its proper context and in the light of the Muslim mindset.

This is true for the writings of Maududi and Qutb as discussed above who have written in support of jihad with a non-apologetic tone but rejecting unjustified and manipulative Holy War.<sup>57</sup> Both were Islamic revivalists and revolutionists who wrote about jihad in light of European colonialism, Western hegemony, the decline of the Muslim world and the malaise of the *umma* (community of believers), and urged Muslims to return to Islam and its principles. Like many others, Islam for them is not only a religion in the secular sense (series of beliefs, prayers and rituals as a private affair) but a complete way of life whose main purpose is to establish God's rule and a just society on earth. In their conceptualisation, jihad is the Islamic authorisation to defend Muslims against foreign aggression and to fight against any hurdles in the practical way of religion. For Maududi, jihad simply is "To exert one's utmost endeavour in promoting a cause."<sup>58</sup> It is a struggle and an effort directed towards the cause of God. Jihad in the way of God does not mean enjoining forced conversion of non-Muslims to Islam, waging war between nations and states for the achievement of individual or national self-interest, usurping or snatching other people's lawful rights, or forcefully ceasing territories. This is tyranny and unlawful behaviour from an Islamic perspective. Islam is a revolutionary ideology and jihad refers to this revolution, the struggle and utmost exertion to change the social order of the whole world and rebuild it in conformity with

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<sup>57</sup> Maududi and Qutb endorsed jihad only for defensive purposes but certain individuals and Islamic movements have interpreted their concept of jihad expediently to advance their political agendas.

<sup>58</sup> Maududi, *Jihad in Islam*, 5.

Islamic tenets and ideals. The sole purpose of Islam is to promote and protect the welfare of the entire humankind not just a small group or nation. Maududi, therefore, says:

Towards this end, Islam wishes to press into service all forces which can bring about a revolution and a composite term for the use of all these forces is 'Jihad'. To change the outlook of the people and initiate a mental revolution among them through speech or writing is a form of 'Jihad'. To alter the old tyrannical social system and establish a new just order of life by the power of sword is also 'Jihad' and to expend goods and exert physically for this cause is 'Jihad' too.<sup>59</sup>

In terms of jihad 'for the cause of God,' it is undertaken for the collective well-being of all humanity and those carrying it out must not have vested interest in the material world; their sole interest needs to be focused on winning God's favour, says Maududi. Thus:

[Jihad] 'in the way of God' is reserved for such deeds only as are undertaken with perfect sincerity, without any thought of gaining a selfish end, and executed on the understanding that to afford benefit to other human beings is a means of winning the pleasure of God and the sole purpose of human life is to win the favour of the Creator of the universe...The aim should not be to knock out an Emperor and occupy the vacant throne i.e., to become a Caesar replacing another Caesar. The objectives of the struggle should be completely free from the taint of selfish motives like gaining wealth or goods, fame and applause, personal glory or elevation. All sacrifices and exertions should be directed to achieve the one and the only end i.e., the establishment of a just and equitable social order among human beings; and the only reward in view should be to gain the favour of God.<sup>60</sup>

Qutb, Maududi's protégé, went on to refine jihad according to the 20<sup>th</sup> century world around him. For him, his own Egyptian government was tyrannical and corrupt as it had started using manmade laws and system of government. It had rejected the Islamic principles of sovereignty and justice. He advocated jihad as a defensive tool to protect Islam from Egyptian regime – i.e. to overturn the Egyptian situation through non-violent means – and never authorised the use of excessive force and killing of innocent people. As has been established above, jihad against tyranny can be carried out in many forms. Jihad with the sword is only one aspect. For Qutb, he was carrying out his jihad through the pen and activism. Ayman Al Zahwari, a violent Islamist, proclaimed to be a follower of Qutb's doctrine<sup>61</sup> but there are sharp differences between what Qutb preached and what Al Zahwari and his supporters practiced. Qutb did call for an offensive jihad because the local conditions warranted it and was in line with Islamic teachings and the protocols of *al-jihad al-asghar* (lesser jihad), but in his calling jihad did not involve killing innocent citizens and forcing people to comply with an ideology.<sup>62</sup> There are many similarities between Qutb and Locke, with Locke justifying revolution against rulers who violated the social contract.<sup>63</sup> Similarly, Qutb authorised warfare against a tyrannical political regime and its replacement with a just

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 8-9.

<sup>61</sup> Laura Mansfield, *In His Own Words: A Translation of the Writings of Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri* (New York: TLG Publications, 2006), 137.

<sup>62</sup> Qutb, *Milestones*.

<sup>63</sup> Khan, "The Political Philosophy of Islamic Resurgence," 221.

and welfare-focused system of government so all members of the society could enjoy prosperity and harmony and peace could prevail.<sup>64</sup>

It has been repeatedly argued by many academics that, if Naser's government had not tortured and hanged Qutb, he would have had many opportunities to clarify his various controversial terms encompassed in his *Milestones*. With Qutb's premature departure, many of his works were not properly and fully elucidated and violent Islamists interpreted them according to their political motives.<sup>65</sup>

As discussed above, jihad is an inner struggle to shape and re-shape the 'self' or mould the ego toward the discovery of and nearness to God, which is a greater jihad, *al-jihad al-akbar*. So, why is it that violent Islamists chase after a lesser jihad, *al-jihad al-asghar*? The answer is that each type of jihad is pursued in its appropriate context. Violent Islamists pursue *al-jihad al-asghar* to establish the caliphate, which was abolished in 1924 under Western pressures, but simultaneously pursue *al-jihad al-akbar* particularly in private matters. For violent Islamists, both types of jihad can be carried out simultaneously. Although traditionally warfare or Holy War has fallen under the category of *al-jihad al-asghar*, in the light of prevailing Muslim conditions in Muslim majority countries and the usurpatory and exploitative conduct of the West particularly in the Muslim world, according to violent Islamists *al-jihad al-asghar* has now metamorphosed into *al-jihad al-akbar*. For violent Islamists, this is possible under the conditions of necessity or forced necessity. Thus, for them, the question whether the jihad is 'greater' or 'lesser' is not important; what is important though is how to respond to prevailing conditions of Muslims in their respective countries and communities. In other words, for violent Islamists, putting together a cause of action and carrying it out under the condition of necessity is critical and whether this falls in the category *al-jihad al-asghar* or *al-jihad al-akbar* or defensive or offensive jihad does not really matter all that much. To effect Islamic revolution through social, economic and political restructuring, emancipation of the Muslim lands, Islamisation of knowledge and society, and the establishment of the caliphate according to violent Islamists combination of *al-jihad al-asghar*, *al-jihad al-akbar*, defensive jihad and offensive jihad are needed.

Violent Islamism is a socio-religious and political ideology with a holistic interpretation of Islam whose final aim is total revolution, a complete transformation and the establishment of a new world order governed by Sharia. It is a *contemporary* ideology that is oriented towards the present state of affairs. Its ideal is the Medina city state under Prophet Muhammad as well as the Khulafa al-Rashidun caliphate. In this sense, violent Islamism is a complete way of life with guidance and governance for social, spiritual, economic and political activities.

Violent Islamists rely on their own interpretation of the Qur'an and the doctrine of jihad in it to legitimise their course and movement. Through the interpretation they attempt to convince Muslims that the Qur'an permits Holy War and sanctions the use of violence as an act of defence and to preserve the will of God in Muslim societies and on earth. The

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<sup>64</sup> Qutb, *Milestones*.

<sup>65</sup> Mohamed, "Muslim Fundamentalism"; Thrope, "Sayyid Qutb and Aquinas."



following Qur'ānic verses is one example of how violent Islamists may selectively pick a verse or some elements from the Qur'ān and turn them into an ideological precept:

And slay them wherever ye find them, and drive them out of the places whence they drove you out, for persecution is worse than slaughter. And fight not with them at the Inviolable Place of Worship until they first attack you there, but if they attack you (there) then slay them. Such is the reward of disbelievers.<sup>66</sup>

Based on the Sharia (Islamic law) source of *ijtihad* (scholarly or individual reasoning), violent Islamists stress the Qur'ān's rules on armed struggle and their religious interpretations to present them as a legitimate premise for the use of violence.<sup>67</sup> *Ijtihad* as a source of Sharia is used to determine whether their actions are in concordance with the rules of law and teachings of Islam; since their actions are directed towards ensuring the will of God in Muslim societies, jihad becomes a legitimate act.<sup>68</sup> Thus, violent Islamists use *ijtihad* to emphasise Qur'ānic clauses and Sharia rules that sanction the use of armed struggle as a method ordained by God to establish a state founded upon Sharia.

For violent Islamists, armed struggle is *fard ayn* (legal obligation that must be performed by each Muslim) and Muslims are encouraged and in some instances even instructed to carry it out to protect territories and Muslim interests. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as a group of violent Islamists is a good example who understand the use of armed struggle as an act of jihad particularly in relation to the protection of territories. It says, "We hate you for invading our lands and fight you to repel you and drive you out. As long as there is an inch of territory left for us to reclaim, jihad will continue to be a personal obligation on every single Muslim."<sup>69</sup>

For ordinary Muslims and members of Islamic revivalist movements, the crisis of Muslim societies can be resolved through peaceful means by doing jihad at individual as well as collective levels. They argue the lack of economic and human development and the socio-economic conditions, such as poverty, lack of education, economic inequality, poor health services, marginalisation and discrimination, corruption, and lack of opportunity that plague many Muslim countries and are the causes of adolescent and adult frustration, Muslim feelings of a sense of injustice and group relative deprivation do not necessarily require total revolution. Instead, a positive transformation in the society can be brought about through legitimate and nonviolent engagement in normal social and economic processes, political activism, institutional reform, and legal and policy developments.

The violent Islamists disagree with this line of thinking and their dominant interpretation and application of jihad equates with the concept with armed struggle. They argue, in light of the prevailing conditions of many Muslim countries, jihad requires a reconstruction without losing its legitimacy and authenticity through a process of new interpretation to broaden the concept to include armed struggle or violent resistance. They find jihad, which is

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<sup>66</sup> Qur'an 2:191.

<sup>67</sup> Esposito, *Unholy War*.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> "Why we Hate you and why we Fight you," *Dabiq* 15 (2015).

conceptualised and applied in warlike terms, makes armed struggle against what they consider the enemies of Islam the most authoritative and Islamically appropriate and legitimate response. The cases of Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan exemplify the necessity to reformulate the doctrine of jihad. The reformulation process is facilitated with an approach to interpretation of jihad based on contextualisation; that is, the present Muslim situation, in order to make accessible the broadest possible range of strategies in response to dispute contained in the Qur'ān and *aḥadīth*. Using Sharia rules and interpretation of the Qur'ān, jihad is rendered as not a means of self-defence, overcoming oppression and establishing a just peace but an end in itself whose form is transformable and involves multiple strategies, one being armed struggle.

The total transformation of society involves new economic structures and development, infrastructure expansion, development of advanced industries and technological capacities, creation of opportunities of universal upward mobility for all, widespread vocational training and open access to education, efficient bureaucracy, widely available affordable health and medical services, increasing state and political accountability and fairness, removal of social and economic inequalities and marginalisation, and reinforcement of the link between merit and reward all designed and managed under the divine law – Sharia.

As a paradigm, this is aimed principally at putting an end to Western influence in the Muslim world, repossessing the Muslim territories lost to the West or Western influence and establishing a global caliphate. The paradigm sanctions violent political struggle against rulers in the Muslim world who rule with an iron fist and unjustly receive support for their vested interests from the West. The paradigm offers an explanation for abuses in the Muslim world as well as support for political activism. The essence of the paradigm is to overcome the crisis caused by corrupt regimes kept in power by the West and to employ a combination of attacks and political propaganda to socialise and mobilise the *umma* to return to pure Islam and establish God's rule on earth. Thus, the duty is for every Muslim to take up arms and engage in offensive jihad.

In the perception of violent Islamists, Islam is under constant attack by external hostile forces that seek to destroy it. The hostile forces are led by the West and collaborated by renegade Muslims and corrupt Muslim regimes. Something needs to occur from their perspective and it is the ultimate war between good and evil, in which all forms of armed struggle and violence are permitted within as well as without the world. They posit that, so far, the confrontation has often been on the periphery of Islam, for example Palestine and Afghanistan. They say the fight needs to be expanded and taken to the home of the threat and fight the enemy in its own territory – the Western world. This collapsed the distinction between *dar al-Islam* (abode of Islam) and *dar al-harb* (house of war) and made the entire world the war zone where jihad can be waged.<sup>70</sup> Moving jihad from the periphery (either just in Muslim countries or just in the West) to the entire world to reorder the global socio-

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<sup>70</sup> Esposito, *Unholy War*.

economic and political system and re-establish Islamic global hegemony and ordain God's law on earth is the Islamist paradigm.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Violent Islamism, which is the focus of this article, is a modern sociological phenomenon born out of the crisis of society in the Muslim world and more broadly of the crisis of modernity. It seeks to use defensive and offensive jihad collapsed into simple "jihad" to shape the political system, reorder society and remake the globe. Violent Islamism claims that secular ideologies of nationalism and socialism and the modernisation project have failed to deliver on their promises and the Muslim world continues to remain unprosperous. Western usurpation and exploitation continue; weak, inefficient, unprofessional and corrupt Muslim political regimes persist; and record unemployment and high poverty, discrimination, inequality and marginalisation remain serious problems in the Muslim world. Accordingly, violent Islamism is motivated by the rejection of certain aspects of modernity namely secularisation produced through urbanisation, cultural and structural pluralism, and insignification of religion and Westernisation as well as by social, ethnic and nationalistic grievances and challenging social practices and government policies.

The reason for this, according to violent Islamism, is that the political system that emerged in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century following the gradually weaning of colonialism in the Muslim world was a replication of the Westocentric system of nation-states governed by the sovereignty of the people. As such, it was bound to fail because sovereignty, according to violent Islamism, lies only with Allah (God). Along this line of thinking, the power and authority to legislate rests with Allah and violent Islamists believe He is the sovereign. Allah is the lawgiver and humans are His vicegerents who are responsible for implementing the law not to make it from violent Islamist perspective. Sharia is the source of legislation in Islam, argue violent Islamists.

The Westocentric system of nation-states in the Muslim world was also corrupt and run by political elites who operated in their own interests rather than in the service of the public. It was dominated and exploited by self-serving political elite. Violent Islamism claims to provide an alternative to this based on the teachings of Islam and rules of Sharia. Violent Islamism is focused on reshaping public life in accordance with a specific interpretation of Islamic text, traditions and Islamic law. Therefore, all state affairs are subject to the standard established by violent Islamism.

Under violent Islamism, the new world order will be governed by a caliphate whose constitution will be Sharia. Key institutions and social and economic processes will be infused with Islamic features involving an Islamisation program through the institutional arrangements of the state, re-affirmation of Islam as a "blueprint" of socio-economic and political order, and total submission only to the Will of Allah. All rules and guidance for social, economic and political activities will be derived from Allah's book and there will be an iron-clad protection of Islam and the *umma* from "corrupting" non-Islamic influences.

This aim and approach to remaking the world order resonate with Islamism and revivalism-activism but what sets violent Islamism apart is the preparedness and willingness to employ all means possible, including violence or warfare in the name of jihad. For violent Islamism, the Islamic Revolution must come at all cost even if defensive and offensive jihad has to be integrated into a single socio-political strategy.

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