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THE ROLE OF REASON IN ESTABLISHING CIVILIZATION: INSIGHTS FROM CLASSICAL MUSLIM PERSPECTIVES

Fadi Zatari*

Abstract: The role of reason in initiating and maintaining civilisation, as elucidated by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī (d. 1058), is pivotal, serving as the faculty for distinguishing good from bad and guiding behaviour. Al-Māwardī divides reason into two stages: natural and acquired. This understanding of reason is shared by other scholars, such as al-Muḥāsibī (d. 857) and Ibn abi al-Dunyā (d. 894). *Hawá* or desire is seen as antithesis to reason, serving as a manifestation of ethical corruption and instigating perpetual conflict. To build any society, reason takes a central role at individual and societal levels. This article argues that there are no possibilities for a civilisation to be constituted and maintained without a central role for reason. This article analyses al-Māwardī's conception of reason in relation to civilisation. Al-Māwardī contends that reason not only serves as the cornerstone for societal development, but also facilitates understanding of religion, an essential aspect in his ideology. This article concludes that deep understanding of reason's role in civilisation provides an appropriate direction for understanding civilisation and how reason can enhance and improve people's decent conduct and manners.

Keywords: *Al-Māwardī, reason, civilisation, ethics, Islamic thought, Ibn Abi al-Dunyā, al-Muḥāsibī, Islamic civilisation*

INTRODUCTION

The nexus between reason and civilisation remains a contested issue, with divergent perspectives. Some scholars emphasise the role of reason in establishing a civilisation, while others highlight the primacy of religion. The core argument of this article is that a civilisation cannot be instituted or maintained in the absence of a predominant role for reason. This study analyses Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī's (d. 1058) conception of reason in relation to civilisation. There are several academic works on al-Māwardī;¹ nevertheless, none investigate his

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¹ There are many academic resources that illuminate al-Māwardī's personality, political positions and scholarship. For instance, see Bekir Alboğa, *Lehranalytische Betrachtung bei Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Māwardī (974-1058): Oberster Richter des 4./10. Jahrhunderts im Islamischen Kalifat der Abbasiden; sein Leben und seine Gedankenwelt* [Teaching-Analytical Examination in the Case of Abu al Hasan Al-Māwardī (974-1058): Chief Judge of the 4th/10th Century in the Islamic Caliphate of the Abbasids; His Life and his

contribution to reason with regard to civilisation. Also, discussions on reason and civilisation are presented as an exclusive debate in modern social and political thoughts. However, this study shows that al-Māwardī conducted deep discussions on this issue a millennium ago. This article uncovers the meaning of reason from al-Māwardī's perspective to answer questions related to civilisation, such as what is the role of reason at individual and collective levels in regard to civilisation and why is reason an essential pillar for establishing and maintaining a civilization, "what constitutes rationally good?" and "what defines religiously sanctioned good?"

This article argues that, according to al-Māwardī, reason plays a significant role in the realisation of a flourishing civilisation, without disregarding the significant role of religion in this context. Religion plays an essential role in his thought.² To understand religion appropriately, people should depend on the faculty of reason and reasoning. Due to this fact, al-Māwardī initiated work on some of his main books³ by expounding the conception of reason. This article underscores that the concepts of "what is rationally good" and "what is religiously good" are not inherently conflicting in al-Māwardī's thought. However, his scholarship suggests that he prioritises reason over religion, believing that only through reason can humans appropriately comprehend religion.

As a methodological approach, this article scrutinises al-Māwardī's scholarship in comparison to substantial contributions in civilisation studies. It delves into the works of prominent classical Muslim thinkers preceding al-Māwardī, such as al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (d. 857) and Ibn Abi al-Dunyā (d. 894), as well as scholars that succeeded him, namely al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. 1108) and Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406). This will facilitate deeper understanding of al-Māwardī's perception of reason in relation to understanding civilisation. The selection of these scholars and social theorists lies in their considerable and significant contributions to this discourse. An insightful understanding of reason's role in civilisation provides an accurate perception of how civilisations are established and maintained.

THE CONCEPT OF REASON AND ITS DIFFERENT CATEGORIES

From al-Māwardī's perspective, reason encompasses an extensive range of meanings. This article expounds several aspects of his perception of reason to present a comprehensive conception. First, reason is about the ability to distinguish between *ḥaq* (right) and *bāṭil* (false); *ṣaḥīḥ* (sound) and *fāsid* (unsound); and *mumkin* (possible) and *mumtani'* (impossible).⁴ Second, reason also pertains to knowing and grasping concealed and complex matters. The individuals cannot reach these matters except through *istidlāl* (inference) and *naẓar* (deep

World of Thought] (Köln: Divanverlag, 2014). Also, Aḥmad Mubārak al-Baghdādī, "The Political Thought of Abu Al-Hassan Al-Mawardi" (PhD diss., University of Edinburgh, 1981), 1-54.

² Fadi Zadari, "Religion as a Pillar for Establishing a Civilization: Al-Māwardī's Perspective," *Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization* 11, no. 1 (2021), <http://dx.doi.org/10.32350/jitc.111.13>.

³ For instance, *ʿĀdāb al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn* and *A'lām al-Nubuwwa*.

⁴ Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī, *A'lām al-Nubuwwa* [Signs of Prophethood] (Beirut: Dar al-Nafa'is lil Nashr wa al Tawzi', 1994), 33.

thinking), enabling individuals to perceive reality accurately.⁵ Third, reason is about restraint, or the virtue of restraint, which is a main characteristic of reason, as emphasised by al-Māwardī. Constraint indicates abstaining from unethical and immoral conduct. Al-Māwardī states that ‘*āqil*’ was called as such because it hinders (or holds) a person from committing inappropriate things.⁶ Fourth, reason is closely related to experiential wisdom, as increased experience fosters greater wisdom in a person.⁷ Lastly, reason manifests in behaving decently, so it is not only about distinguishing between right and wrong or truth and falsehood, but also applying the right ethics and avoiding unethical behaviours and manners.⁸ According to al-Māwardī, good behaviour, combined with avoiding wrong and indecent acts, is what constitutes being rational. Thus, when a person possesses all these aspects, he can then be called ‘*āqil*’ from al-Māwardī’s perspective.

Moreover, al-Māwardī states that “Reason is conducive to proof, however, it is not a proof [in itself] because reason serves as the foundation of all the known proofs, indications and indicated things.”⁹ He further argues that all kinds of knowledge are driven by reason, which is why it should be called the “mother of all knowledge.”¹⁰ Therefore, reason, like the five senses, functions as an instrument for gathering evidence, which falls in line with al-Māwardī’s conception of reason as a pathway to knowledge of proofs. For al-Māwardī, the intellectual process comprises two types of reason, or more precisely, two stages.¹¹

The initial stage is characterised by natural reason, termed as “*al-‘aql al-gharīzī*,” which human beings inherently possess and is determined through inheritance. Al-Māwardī emphasises that “innate reason” does not imply inherent intellectual superiority of some nations over others. Al-Māwardī emphasises the existence of two types of intellectual categories or states, which, as a process, signifies that natural reason operates equitably on the social level, thereby negating any notion of inherent superiority among specific social classes. Raḍwān al-Sayyid asserts that al-Māwardī’s classification of reason as innate and acquired not only refutes the notion of stratified born individuals and elites, but also advocates for the equality of human nature.¹²

Al-Māwardī’s first stage of reason aligns with al-Muḥāsibī’s concept of reason as a natural aspect of the humanity.¹³ Through this innate reason, an individual can distinguish between good and evil in his worldly life, recognising it as a divine gift from God. Moreover, the

⁵ Ibid., 37.

⁶ Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī, *Kitāb ‘Ādāb al-Dunyā wal-Dīn* [The Book on the Ethics of Faith and Life], ed. Jasīn al-Sawas (Beirut: Dār ibn Kathīr, 2012), 15.

⁷ Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī, *Tas’hīl al-Nazar wa-ta’jīl al-Zafar fī Akhlāq al-Malik wa Siyāsāt al Mulk* [A Facilitated Consideration and Accelerated Attainment of Kings’ Good Ethics and Kingdoms’ Policies], ed. Ridwan Al-Sayyid (Beirut: Ibn Al Azraq Center for Political Heritage Studies, 2012), 147.

⁸ Al-Māwardī, *Kitāb ‘Ādāb al-Dunyā wal-Dīn*, 27.

⁹ Al-Māwardī, *A’lām al-Nubuwwa*, 33.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Al-Māwardī, *Kitāb ‘Ādāb al-Dunyā wal-Dīn*, 12-17.

¹² Al-Māwardī, *Tas’hīl al-Nazar wa-ta’jīl al-Zafar*, 12.

¹³ Al-Muḥāsibī calls it “*Inna al-‘aql Gharīzī*.”

evidence for someone being *'āqil* (a sane person)¹⁴ lies in their behaviour and deeds, which should illustrate their consciousness of good and evil. Consequently, an individual possessing this type or level of reason is held responsible for their conduct before God.¹⁵ To answer whether natural reason is restricted, al-Māwardī believes it is limited and cannot be improved or augmented. Like al-Muḥāsibī, al-Māwardī states that a human being becomes sane when they possess this type of natural reason distinguishing him from other beings. Al-Māwardī identifies two methods by which *al-'aql al-gharīzī* can collect knowledge and information.

Sensory senses: reflect humans' capacity and faculty, encompassing hearing, smelling, tasting, touching and seeing. According to al-Māwardī, if an individual perceives reality through one or more of these senses, they will possess specific knowledge. However, if an individual has lost one or more of these senses, it does not mean they have lesser reason. One can, to illustrate this, contrast between a person who cannot distinguish diverse colours and a mirage in a desert that makes a person in full possession of their sensory senses think there is water. In essence, sensory senses serve as instruments, facilitating the acquisition of knowledge by detecting inputs. However, the assessment of truthfulness or falsehood lies within reason. That is why "sensory senses" is a main source of gaining knowledge and information, yet not everything we perceive through our sensory senses is correct, as the mind and sensory senses can be deceived, exemplified by phenomena like mirages in a desert. Therefore, everything we perceive through sensory senses should be filtered through reason, which determines their validity or fallacy.

A priori knowledge:¹⁶ exemplified by understanding the impossibility of two contradictory objects coexisting at the same time, such as night and day or white and black. For al-Māwardī, this kind of knowledge cannot be detached from a sane person. Consequently, a rational person comprehends the basic facts. Moreover, al-Māwardī argues that if a person has the abilities and faculties to gain knowledge and information through these two means – the sensory senses and a priori knowledge – they are an entirely sane person.¹⁷

The sensory senses play an essential role in having a priori knowledge as they enable us to differentiate between night and day, black and white, etc. primarily through the sense of sight. Due to this fact, it is safe to assume that a priori knowledge depends on the sensory senses. Similar to sensory senses, a priori knowledge depends on reason and reasoning to be proven or refuted. Thus, sensory senses and a priori knowledge are sources to reach basic knowledge and information according to al-Māwardī, forming the basis expanding one's understanding. Once an individual has basic knowledge and information, the subsequent stage involves acquired reason, which represents the culmination of natural reason. The aim of acquired reason is to

¹⁴ This study does not translate the word *'āqil* as a rational being since the term "rationality" is a loaded term within Western philosophy. Instead, this study prefers to translate it as "a sane person" to keep the meaning clearer.

¹⁵ Al-Ḥārith Al-Muḥāsibī, *Al-'Aql wa-Fahm al-Qur'ān* [The Mind and Understanding the Qur'ān], ed. Husayn Al-Quwwatli (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1971), 202-203.

¹⁶ In al-Māwardī's words, "*mā kāna mubtada' fī al-nufūs.*"

¹⁷ Al-Māwardī, *Kitāb 'Ādāb al-Dunyā wal-Dīn*, 15.

reach “bright profound knowledge,” “soundness of behaviour” and “correct thought.”¹⁸ An individual can reach this stage of reason through various means, such as experiences,¹⁹ learning, education, consulting and training.²⁰ Unlike natural reason, acquired reason has no limit, and as long as one hones it, it advances and improves. Before elaborating more on al-Māwardī’s acquired reason, this article explores the integral notions of reason put forward by Al-Muḥāsibī and Ibn Abi al-Dunyā.

Al-Muḥāsibī’s Concept of Reason

Al-Muḥāsibī’s seminal work, *The Essence of Reason and its Meaning and Positions*, distinguishes three different conceptions of reason. First, reason as *gharīzī*, which is an instinct or character that God instilled in human beings. Through this level of reason, people know God and beneficial and harmful objects in worldly life. A person is rational if their actions reflect their knowledge to distinguish between beneficial and harmful aspects of the world.²¹ For al-Muḥāsibī, people are born with and acquire knowledge through that form of reason.²² Second, reason as understanding,²³ which indicates proper understanding of worldly life. Through it, human beings reach more profound understanding of the meaning of existing external phenomena through the five senses. When an individual reaches this level of understanding through their reason, they can comprehend the nature of existing phenomena only in their external expressions. This level of understanding is accessible to believers and non-believers, ethical and unethical individuals alike.²⁴ Lastly, al-Muḥāsibī describes reason as *baṣīrah* (spiritual insight).²⁵ This level of human reason is to comprehend the inner meaning, religious value and ethical aspects of existing phenomena. This level of reason, which is higher and more profound than the former types, leads to magnification of good and evil. Resulting from fear of punishment in the Hereafter, this type of reason makes people more motivated to enjoy what is right while avoiding what is wrong. Consequently, reason transitions from a theoretical to a practical role, influencing human conduct and behaviour. However, al-Muḥāsibī did not explain the process of developing these reasoning abilities and facilities.²⁶ He further argues that *‘aql al-baṣīrah* is equivalent to knowledge, especially knowledge about God and His Attributes.²⁷

¹⁸ Ibid., 16.

¹⁹ Associating the concept of experience with the concept of reason is common in earlier Muslims’ thought and philosophy. For instance, Ibn Abi al-Dunyā says that reason is a core one strengthens and supports through experiences. He also references what he says is an old Arabic adage that says the Arabs used to say “the Reason is the experiences.” See ‘Abdullah ibn Muḥammad ibn Abi al-Dunyā, *Kitāb al-‘Aql wa-Faḍlūhū* [The Book on the Mind and its Merit], ed. ‘Alī ‘abd al-Wāḥid Wāfi (Cairo: Nahḍat Miṣr, 1981), vol. 3, 42-3. This clearly shows the centrality of experience in reason.

²⁰ Ibn Abi al-Dunyā, *Kitāb al-‘Aql wa-Faḍlūhū*, 16-19.

²¹ Al-Muḥāsibī, *Al-‘Aql wa-Fahm al-Qur’ān*, 201- 202.

²² Ibid., 205.

²³ Al-Muḥāsibī uses “*Inna al-‘aql fahm*,” which can be approximately translated as “acuteness and sharpness of thought.”

²⁴ Al-Muḥāsibī, *Al-‘Aql wa-Fahm al-Qur’ān*, 208.

²⁵ Al-Muḥāsibī uses “*Inna al-‘Aql baṣīrah*.”

²⁶ Al-Muḥāsibī, *Al-‘Aql wa-Fahm al-Qur’ān*, 210.

²⁷ Ibid.

According to al-Muḥāsibī, while all individuals possess equality in the first level of reason, reason as *baṣīrah* is not uniformly distributed among people, especially concerning knowledge of God. He posits that a person can be deemed entirely rational in their relationship with God if they exhibit three key principles: they fear God and follow His commands, they have strong faith in Him and His decrees, and they have a deep knowledge about God's religion,²⁸ which are all manifestations of ethical behaviour. However, some destructive human features limit this level of reason. For instance, al-Muḥāsibī believes that self-admiration makes people blind to God's nature and His message.²⁹ Moreover, as frequently seen in al-Muḥāsibī's scholarship, one being reasonable or having reason means they should follow God's commands.³⁰ According to al-Muḥāsibī, reason's significance manifests in its primary role in inspiring people's behaviour and actions constructively. He therefore argues that, through reason, people not only can be humble in their conduct but also have mercy and patience in dealing with others and having decent discipline.³¹ Ultimately, reason plays a pivotal role in guiding individuals towards better conduct, which is crucial in the construction of a harmonious society, which is basically the original question of this article.

Ibn Abi al-Dunyā's Conception of Reason

Predating al-Māwardī, Ibn Abi al-Dunyā was a scholar who made a significant contribution to the concept of reason. He wrote a book on reason titled *Kitāb al-'aql wa-Faḍluhū* [The Book of Reason and its Merit]. He collected 110 quotations and narrations on the concept of reason illustrating diverse perspectives from earlier Islamic and Arabic literature. Ibn Abi al-Dunyā's compilation tackles a wide range of matters, including the definition of reason and its significance, the conflicting relationship between reason and passion, how a rational person should behave, why reason is foundational for having a religion, etc. For Ibn Abi al-Dunyā, there are two forms of reason: innate³² and practical.³³ The former is what distinguishes humankind from animal, and the latter is the knowledge and experiences gained through innate reason. A morally upright individual possesses both forms of reason, with practical reason stemming from innate reason. However, practical reason cannot exist independently of innate reason, as it is the product thereof, while innate reason can exist separately from practical reason.³⁴

Remarkably, there is a striking similarity between al-Māwardī's perspective and that of Ibn Abi al-Dunyā regarding the inseparability of acquired reason from natural reason. Al-Māwardī argues that acquired reason is inseparable from natural reason since the former is an outcome and a developed stage of the latter. However, if humans attempt to disassociate natural reason

²⁸ Ibid., 220.

²⁹ Ibid., 213.

³⁰ Ibid., 213.

³¹ Ibid., 222.

³² Ibn Abi al-Dunyā uses 'aql Nahiza.

³³ Ibn Abi al-Dunyā uses 'aql Tajarub.

³⁴ Ibn Abi al-Dunyā, *Kitāb al-'Aql wa-Faḍluhū*, 50.

from acquired reason, they will have neither virtue nor good deeds.³⁵ According to al-Māwardī, human beings' virtuous actions and adherence to normative behaviours stem from a synthesis of natural and acquired reason. The progression towards normative ethics and virtuous deeds reflects the culmination of reasoning abilities. Al-Māwardī's perspective suggests the establishment of civilisation relies heavily on acquired reason, representing an advanced stage of reasoning where individuals engage in actions and interactions guided by normative ethical principles. In essence, the construction of civilisation hinges on the application of advanced reasoning capacities that underpin ethical conduct and societal organisation.³⁶

So, what is the relationship between being rational and behaving normatively? The meaning of 'aql' (i.e., reason) is derived from "‘aqla al-nāqah," meaning "the camel's binding cord." In essence, reason prevents humankind from acting on its primal desires, just as the binding cord binds the camel. Therefore, if a person's reason prevents them from doing what they should not do (i.e., behaving normatively), then they are deemed sane or "‘aqlānī."³⁷ The relation between reason and normativity extends beyond al-Māwardī, with numerous scholars advocating a similar viewpoint. For instance, the Arabic expression "tie the camel" is found in al-İşfahānī's work, where he underscores reason's role in averting individuals from engaging in unethical behaviour, thereby emphasising its significance in guiding moral conduct.³⁸

Ibn Abi al-Dunyā posits that reason has inherent limitations, citing a quotation from Ibn Abi al-Zanad: "A sane person should not scrutinize everything through his reason's competences, same as how they should not hit everything with their sword."³⁹ Ibn Abi al-Dunyā demonstrates the existential boundaries of reason's abilities and faculties. However, the precise delineation of these limitations remains elusive. These constraints on reason can be interpreted as having dual significance: they encompass the boundary of enhancing reasoning and cognitive capacities as well as the restriction of reasoning abilities.

Al-Māwardī elaborates on the development of reason's capacities and faculties, outlining two primary methods for advancing acquired reason. First, he contends that regular usage of reason engenders increased experiences, encompassing events and incidents that shape individuals' psychologically and intellectually.⁴⁰ Second, the strength of awareness and focused attention varies among individuals, constituting an accumulative process where acquired reason continuously improves through the acquisition of additional experiences and the application of heightened awareness and concentration. Al-Māwardī's concept of experience encompasses personal practices and the experiences of others, collectively

³⁵ Al-Māwardī, *Kitāb 'Ādāb al-Dunyā wal-Dīn*, 28.

³⁶ Albert Schweitzer arrived at a similar conclusion. He states, "The ethical problem, then, is the problem of a basic principle of morality founded in thought." Albert Schweitzer, *The Philosophy of Civilization*, trans. C. T. Campion (Amherst and New York: Prometheus Books, 1987), 105.

³⁷ Al-Māwardī, *Kitāb 'Ādāb al-Dunyā wal-Dīn*, 15.

³⁸ Al-Rāghib Al-İşfahānī, *Al-Dharī'ah 'ilā Makārim al-Sharī'ah* [The Guide to the Purposes of Sharia], ed. Abu al-Yazid abu Zied al-Ajami (Cairo: Dār al-Salām, 2010), 137.

³⁹ Ibn Abi al-Dunyā, *Kitāb al-'Aql wa-Faḍluhū*, 46.

⁴⁰ Şalāh al-Dīn al-Nāhī, *Al-Khawālid min 'ārā' Abī al-Hasan al-Başrī al-Baġhdādī al-ma'rūf bi-al-Māwardī* [The Significant Views of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Başrī al-Baġhdādī, known as al-Māwardī] (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1994), 221.

contributing to acquired reason. In essence, the augmentation of acquired reason corresponds to the reinforcement of normative ethical and moral behaviours and actions.

Ibn Abi al-Dunyā reports that, “The best thing that people can get in the worldly life is reason...”⁴¹ This quote reflects his high regard for reason. Reason, not wealth or power for instance, is the best thing one can attain, through which they know their benefits and interests. Further, he alludes to the statement in the context of God’s speech addressing reason. He also states that “...I created nothing in a higher position than you. Through you I shall be known, worshiped and acknowledged...”⁴² This again reflects reason’s high position for Ibn Abi al-Dunyā. But a good question to postulate is why and how reason were deemed highly important by Ibn Abi al-Dunyā. This article suggests several answers to this question. First, he sees a strong correlation between good deeds and reason. On the one hand, these citations are to be mentioned: Ibn Abi al-Dunya speaks of the relationships between reason and *khayr* (goodness) and *sharr* (evil). He quotes that “distinguishing *khayr* from *sharr* is not proof of being rational, rather the rational person is the one who knows and follows *khayr*, and knows and avoids *sharr*.”⁴³ On the other hand, he reports Prophet Muhammad’s saying, “People perform *khayr* based on the quality of their reasons.”⁴⁴ This is to say what is noteworthy about reason lies in its constructive implementations and consequence in society.

Like al-Muḥāsibī, Ibn Abi al-Dunyā attaches the concept of reason to religion. Throughout his book, his objective is to confirm the notion that the more an individual practices Islam, the more the sanity increases.⁴⁵ He stresses diverse virtues to signify the concept of reason. For instance, he cites Sadaqah al-Dimashqī, who says:

A sane person should not believe in a notion without debate and measurement with their highly intellectual brothers...for the marriage of two faculties of reason in considering an idea is bound to be more effective than only one reason.⁴⁶

Ibn Abi al-Dunya perceives revelation as a normative source that enriches reason’s capabilities. For instance, he views consultation and collective discussions known as *al-Shūrā* as avenues for generating rewarding ideas. This perspective suggests that increased societal engagement in decision-making may foster improved behaviour, as individuals feel a sense of ownership in the system. Furthermore, Ibn Abi al-Dunyā endorses that reason is the foundational element for having religion. He quotes Ibn Jurayj, who articulates that “A person’s foundation is his reason; however, a person without reason has no religion.”⁴⁷

Humans’ ability to draw on past experiences and knowledge as a defining trait of civilisation, a sentiment echoed by al-Māwardī’s concept of acquired reason, which emphasises the role of experience in enhancing rational faculties. This association between experience and

⁴¹ Ibn Abi al-Dunyā, *Kitāb al-’Aql wa-Faḍluhū*, 40.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 39-40.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 59.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 37.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 28-29.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 45-46.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 69.

reason is prevalent in earlier Muslim thought, as evidenced by Ibn Abi al-Dunyā's view that reason is fortified and enriched through lived experiences, reflecting a shared recognition of the formative role of experience in human cognition and civilisation.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, associating experience with reason is common in earlier Muslim thought. For instance, Ibn Abi al-Dunyā says that reason is a force one strengthens and supports through experiences. Also, he underscores the Arab saying, "Reason is the experiences."⁴⁹

Hawá as Antithesis to Reason

Hawá, as per al-Māwardī's perspective, represents a divergence from reason, denoting inclinations and intense passions often directed towards malevolent desires.⁵⁰ Al-Māwardī elucidates the parallels and distinctions between *hawá* (strong passion) and *shahwa* (physical desires). While both contribute to the commission of nefarious deeds, *hawá* is uniquely linked to corrupted opinions, beliefs and religious doctrines in his view.⁵¹ On the contrary, *shahwa* is correlated with physical desires, whereas *hawá* is more particular and pertains to corrupted opinions and beliefs. Consequently, *shahwa* is considered the consequence and manifestation of *hawá* in al-Māwardī's perspective.⁵²

Originally, the concept of *hawá* is a term that appears in several parts of the Qur'ān. Al-Iṣfahāni has one unique contribution that expounds on Qur'ānic terminologies. In *Al-Mufradāt fi Gharīb al-Qur'ān*, al-Iṣfahāni defines *hawá* as leaning the Self to desire and passion. It was called *hawá* – fall and collapse – because it leads the follower of it to pitfall and downfall in worldly life and the Hereafter. He argues there is a different *hawá* for every individual and it is infinite for everyone. However, the end destination of following *hawá* is always confusion and deprivation.⁵³

Al-Māwardī perceives *hawá* as preventing and hindering a person's ability to behave and act virtuously. Furthermore, *hawá* generates the nastiest manners and human actions and behaviours – it is the source of evil. Likewise, *hawá* facilitates countless means to act in corrupt ways.⁵⁴ Therefore, following *hawá* on the individual or collective level indicates the decline and decay of the individual or even a whole society. Khān'zādah emphasises in his commentary on *Kitāb 'Ādāb al-Dunyā wal-Dīn* that following *hawá* instead of reason leads to calamity in worldly life and hellfire in the Hereafter.⁵⁵

⁴⁸ Al-Māwardī, *Kitāb 'Ādāb al-Dunyā wal-Dīn*, 16.

⁴⁹ Ibn Abi al-Dunyā, *Kitāb al-'Aql wa-Faḍlūhū*, 42-43.

⁵⁰ "Lust," "passion" or physical "desire" are potential English translations of the Arabic expression *hawá*. Yet, the literary meaning of *hawá* is "to suddenly fall or to collapse."

⁵¹ 'Uways Wafā ibn Muḥammad Khān'zādah, *Minhāj al-Yaqīn: Sharḥ 'Ādāb al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn* [The Truthful Way: An Elaboration of the Ethics of Faith and Life], ed. Muhammad al-Azzazi, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dar Al-Kotob Al-'Ilm'iyah, 2019), 129.

⁵² Al-Māwardī, *Kitāb 'Ādāb al-Dunyā wal-Dīn*, 42-43.

⁵³ Al-Rāghib Al-Iṣfahāni, *Al-Mufradāt fi Gharīb al-Qur'ān* [The Dictionary of Odd Words of the Qur'ān], ed. Muḥamad Khaliel Ghitanie (Beirut: Dār al-Ma'ārifah, 2010), 524-25.

⁵⁴ Al-Māwardī, *Kitāb 'Ādāb al-Dunyā wal-Dīn*, 33.

⁵⁵ Khān'zādah, *Minhāj al-Yaqīn*, 106.

Al-Iṣfahāni delves into the influence of *hawá* on human judgement and decision-making processes, elucidating the interplay between reason and *hawá* in assessing consequences and making choices. He states that reason recognises and selects the more appropriate and optimal effects, even if one faces hardship. On the contrary, *hawá* avoids exertion and does not consider harmful effects. Al-Iṣfahāni contends that reason enables individuals to discern beneficial and detrimental outcomes, as well as comprehend their duties and responsibilities. Conversely, *hawá* blinds people to adverse consequences and neglects their obligations and moral responsibilities.⁵⁶ In other words, *hawá* affects decision-making as it blinds people from considering the consequences of their decisions and actions. Likewise, Ibn al-Jawzī emphasises that *hawá* pushes people to desire without letting them think about negative consequences in the future. He acknowledges that *hawá* leads people to focus on the current desire and passion, even if that leads to delayed pain and harm. Ibn al-Jawzī maintains that reason acts as a deterrent against desires and passions that result in suffering and remorse. Thus, individuals should cultivate habits that allow reason to effectively govern their actions.⁵⁷

Al-Māwardī posits that reason grows and expands as long as it is dominating *hawá*.⁵⁸ He perceives *hawá* as a hindrance for reason to keep growing and strongly emphasises that reason and *hawá* are permanently conflicting with each other. Al-Māwardī cites several scholars, philosophers and Prophet Muhammad to advocate this perspective. For instance, he quotes Wahb b. Munabbih, who articulates, “*Hawá* and reason wrestle in the heart, so whichever prevails, will have the upper hand [on the personality].”⁵⁹ Besides, al-Māwardī also highlights, “whoever subjugates his *hawá*, he will become strengthened and furthered.”⁶⁰ This suggests the imperative for individuals not to allow reason to become subservient to *hawá*, with reason ideally assuming the role of commander over *hawá*.

Al-Māwardī believes that reason and *hawá* are struggling to take over the self. If reason prevails over the self, then the person will perform virtuous acts. However, if *hawá* dominates the self, the person will commit vices.⁶¹ Elaborating on the contradictory relationships between reason and its consequence on individual and society was a question of primary importance to al-Māwardī and earlier scholars. For instance, Ibn Abi al-Dunyā contends “...Every individual should have two internal judges. One is an adviser, and the second is a deceiver. The adviser is the reason, and the deceiver is the *hawá*; they contradict, and the inclination towards one of them ruins the other.”⁶² Even though Ibn Abi al-Dunyā indicates how reason and *hawá* contradict, he still does not explain how reason can take over *hawá* or vice versa.

Al-Māwardī elaborates on the contradictory relationship between reason and *hawá* at the societal level. He brings the idea of *ʿifsad* (corruption) – a subsequent effect of following *hawá*

⁵⁶ Al-Iṣfahāni, *Al-Dharīʿah ʿlā Makārim al-Sharīʿah*, 92-93.

⁵⁷ Ibn al-Jawzī, *Dhamm al-Hawā* [In Lambasting Caprice], ed. Khaled Abdul Latif Al-Sabe Al-Alami (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 2010), 36.

⁵⁸ Al-Māwardī, *Kitāb ʿĀdāb al-Dunyā wal-Dīn*, 16.

⁵⁹ Al-Māwardī, *Tasʿhīl al-Nazar wa-taʿjīl al-Zafar*, 164-165.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 148.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 164.

⁶² As cited in Ibn Abi al-Dunyā, *Kitāb al-ʿAql wa-Faḍluhū*, 69-70.

– as opposed to *'iṣlāḥ* (betterment, and amelioration) – the outcome of following reason. According to al-Māwardī, the process of *'iṣlāḥ* begins with self-improvement; individuals also have collective *'iṣlāḥ* commitments. Initially, an individual makes *'iṣlāḥ* of themself, then they can contribute to the *'iṣlāḥ* of their society.⁶³ Reason is the principal element leading to *'iṣlāḥ*, while *hawá* is the main element leading to *'ifsad*. Thus, *'iṣlāḥ* and *'ifsad* on individual and societal levels are the potential outcomes of these conflicting relationships between reason and *hawá*.

According to al-Māwardī, *hawá* is generally predominant and prevalent among humanity.⁶⁴ Therefore, if reason's abilities and faculties fail to restrain it, *hawá* can result in the decline of individuals and societies. Al-Māwardī asserts that reason serves as the observer and internal combatant against *hawá*, recognising its heedlessness and ignorance. Reason actively combats *hawá*'s inclinations and defends against its deceitful tendencies, safeguarding individuals against its malicious influence.⁶⁵ Based on this, reason serves as the foundation for progress and improvement, on individual and societal scales, whereas *hawá* represents a significant factor contributing to decline and stagnation. Normatively, al-Māwardī posits that rulers, leaders and elites bear a heightened responsibility to eradicate and manage *hawá* within society.⁶⁶ In accordance with al-Māwardī, if the ruler follows desires that leads their people to corruption, then these desires lead the ruler to wickedness and unrighteous behaviour.⁶⁷

Hawá exerts control over peoples' manners and behaviour in two aspects. First, *hawá* becomes strong by repeating impermissible physical behaviours, where desires seize the body and reason. In this case, reason will be weak and ineffective in its ability to combat *hawá*, even though reason knows such desires are nasty. The solution to this dilemma is contingent on several factors. In one sense, it depends on reason's facilities and abilities to contemplate the ultimate destination of *hawá*, which leads to "intense harm," "abhorrent impact," "abundance of misdeeds" and "accumulation of unrighteousness." Al-Māwardī recommends a solution, which he terms "the encouragement and intimidation."⁶⁸ Likewise, al-Māwardī expands on the importance of restraining and curbing *hawá* by quoting al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, who articulates that "The greatest *Jihād* is the *Jihād* against *hawá*."⁶⁹ This means the internal struggle encountering one's desires has superiority over any other external struggle and it is the place from where individuals should start.

⁶³ Al-Māwardī, *Tas'hīl al-Nazar wa-ta'jīl al-Zafar*, 238-239.

⁶⁴ 'Uways Wafā ibn Muḥammad Khān'zādah, *Minhāj al-Yaqīn: Sharḥ Adāb al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn* [The Truthful Way: An Elaboration of the Ethics of Faith and Life] (Istanbul: Mahmūd Bey Maṭba'āsi, 1910), 37.

⁶⁵ Al-Māwardī, *Kitāb 'Ādāb al-Dunyā wal-Dīn*, 36. Also see Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, trans. David McLintock (London: Penguin Books, 2002), 58.

⁶⁶ Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī, *Al-Nukat wal-'Uyūn: Tafṣīr al-Māwardī* [Al-Māwardī's Commentary on the Qur'ān], ed. Abdul Maqṣūd bin Abdul Rahman (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 2007), vol. 4, 62; al-Māwardī, *Kitāb 'Ādāb al-Dunyā wal-Dīn*, 36.

⁶⁷ Al-Māwardī, *Kitāb 'Ādāb al-Dunyā wal-Dīn*, 241-42.

⁶⁸ Encouragement means thinking about positive things, which will happen after actions and deeds. Intimidation means fear of the negative consequences of these deeds and actions. See Khān'zādah, *Minhāj al-Yaqīn* (1910), 39.

⁶⁹ Al-Māwardī, *Kitāb 'Ādāb al-Dunyā wal-Dīn*, 38.

Second, *hawá* gains control over reason when individuals suppress their desires due to external pressure and coercion, leading to confusion regarding reality and the nature of actions. Oppression distorts reason's perception, causing individuals to perceive negativity as positive and harm as beneficial.⁷⁰ This can be explained from two standpoints. On the one hand, the compulsion of natural inclinations towards physical desires inhibits individuals from discerning reality, resulting in a tendency to perceive ugliness as noble and good. On the other hand, seeking the easiest and comfortable approach to distinguish issues based on the rule that what is comfortable is better to follow and what is difficult is to be despised.⁷¹ However, in one of his later⁷² books on politics and ethics, al-Māwardī's focus was mainly on the collective level. To elaborate more on this issue, in *Tas'hīl al-naẓar*, al-Māwardī extraordinarily associates the instituting and declining of civilisation⁷³ with the concepts of reason and *hawá*,⁷⁴ respectively. He argues that instituting a civilisation is when reason is superior to desires and desires serve reason. Conversely, the decline occurs when desires take precedence over reason and serve the interests of those desires.⁷⁵

Reason as an Original Pillar of Civilisation

Al-Māwardī affirms that for every virtue (*faḍīlah*) there is an essence and for every *ādāb* (good manners) there is a source, and both are compiled in reason. Reason is the origin of virtue and a significant source of *ādāb*. Reason is a pillar in instituting and being successful in the “worldly life.” Through reason, civilisation is planned and ordered, and different hearts, desires and intentions are integrated.⁷⁶ This demonstrates reason's primary role in establishing worldly life or civilisation. Al-Māwardī states his position on reason and does not take an extreme view favouring reason over religion or vice versa. This article maintains that reason and religion have a foundational role to play in reaching a flourishing civilisation in Al-Māwardī's thought. But, relying on only one of them will have negative consequences for individuals and society. Civilisation is comprehended as an organised society or societies based substantially on reason's faculties and talents. Based on Al-Māwardī's contribution, this article argues that reason constitutes the primary pillar of a civilisation and it serves as a critical element to

⁷⁰ Al-Kawakibi wrote an excellent contribution on how oppression and tyranny corrupt humans' actions and behaviours. Abdul Rahman Al-Kawakibi, *The Nature of Tyranny: And the Devastating Results of Oppression*, trans. Amer Chaikhouni (Oxford University Press, 2022).

⁷¹ Al-Māwardī, *Kitāb 'Ādāb al-Dunyā wal-Dīn*, 39.

⁷² Raḍwān al-Sayyid claims that *Kitāb adab al-dunyā wa-al-dīn* was written in 1029 CE/420 H; however, *Tas'hīl al-naẓar* was written in 1041 CE/432 H. Al-Māwardī, *Tas'hīl al-Naẓar wa-ta'jīl al-Zafar*, 102.

⁷³ Al-Māwardī used the concept of state (in Arabic *al-Dawlah*) as a unit of study, which has no national boundaries like the modern notion of nation state. Therefore, we can easily use civilisation instead, since civilisation in this study is understood as a unit of study of society and/or societies.

⁷⁴ Ibn Raḍwān Al-Mālaqī provides a historical example of how the Umayyad dynasty declined because of following desires and *hawá*. Ibn Raḍwān Al-Mālaqī, *al-Shuḥub al-Lāmi 'ah fī al-Siyāsah al-Nāfi 'ah* [The Glittering Stars in Beneficial Politics], ed. 'Alī Sāmī al-Nashshār (Cairo: Dār al-Salām, 2007), 375. Also, contemporary scholars such as Al-Faruqī associate ethics with collapse. See Isma'īl R. Al-Faruqī, *Al Tawhīd: Its Implications on Thought and Life*. (Herndon: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1992), 13.

⁷⁵ Al-Māwardī, *Tas'hīl al-Naẓar wa-ta'jīl al-Zafar*, 252.

⁷⁶ Al-Māwardī, *Kitāb 'Ādāb al-Dunyā wal-Dīn*, 11.

understand and comprehend religion,⁷⁷ which is another essential foundation according to al-Māwardī.

Al-Māwardī considers that reason is a foundation of ethics and *ādāb*. He argues there are categories of principles for all virtues, the prime and original virtue is reason, and the last is justice. All virtues emerge and generate from reason and reason manages and orders these virtues.⁷⁸ Al-Māwardī realises the significance of reason according to the *ḥadīth* that states: “For everything, there is a pillar and the pillar of the man’s deeds is his reason.”⁷⁹ Al-Māwardī’s perspective on reason as the pillar of human deeds and virtues extends beyond citing the *ḥadīth* in his book; he views reason as essential for discerning the reality of things.⁸⁰ Through reason, individuals can differentiate between noble and evil deeds, underscoring the pivotal role reason plays in guiding moral actions and choices.

Al-Iṣfahānī parallels al-Māwardī’s view by identifying three fundamental objectives for humankind to fulfil.⁸¹ First, ‘*imārat al-’ard*,⁸² i.e. constructing a civilisation, where individuals should obtain their livelihood from the earth, not only for themselves, but also for others. Second, worshipping⁸³ God, i.e. an individual should obey God’s commands and avoid His prohibitions. Third, the mission of humanity’s vicegerency, which entails submission to God in accordance with one’s ability by applying the noble qualities of Divine Law, comprising wisdom, justice, forbearance, benevolence and graciousness. Al-Iṣfahānī emphasises that establishing civilisation transcends mere worship and vicegerency, as it provides the environment for individuals to practice their beliefs and fulfil their mission as vicegerents.

A later philosopher than al-Māwardī, Ibn Khaldūn, believes there are three degrees of reason that result from humans’ ability to think: discerning reason, practical reason and abstract reason. However, Ibn Khaldūn argues that instituting a civilisation is based on practical reason and not on speculative reason, since practical reason discovers the essence of things and perceives the categorisations of cases and their reasons. Furthermore, he asserts that practical reason can recognise the order and system that exists among things, either by nature or through an arbitrary arrangement.⁸⁴ For all the philosophers and thinkers mentioned above, there cannot be any civilisation without human reason. Strictly speaking, reason is to be considered one of civilisation’s essential foundations.

⁷⁷ For a comprehensive study on al-Māwardī’s conception of religion and its relations to civilisation, see Zatarī “Religion as a Pillar.”

⁷⁸ Al-Māwardī, *Tas’ḥīl al-Nazar wa-ta’jīl al-Zafar*, 134.

⁷⁹ As cited in al-Māwardī, *Kitāb ‘Ādāb al-Dunyā wal-Dīn*, 11.

⁸⁰ Al-Māwardī, *Tas’ḥīl al-Nazar wa-ta’jīl al-Zafar*, 134.

⁸¹ Al-Iṣfahānī, *Al-Dharī‘ah ‘alā Makārim al-Sharī‘ah*, 82-83.

⁸² Historically, Al-Iṣfahānī’s theoretical contribution and ideas of *‘umrān* are prior to Ibn Khaldūn; however, Ibn Khaldūn’s contribution focuses on practical and theoretical aspects intensively and expansively. Also compare constructing civilisation with Guizot, in particular the first lecture in François Guizot, *History of Civilization in Europe*, trans. William Hazlitt (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Inc, 2013), 28.

⁸³ This is not limited to religious rites, such as prayers, but it could include any possible actions and deeds with the intention of being closer to God, such as fasting the month of Ramaḍān, in which one experiences social solidarity with the poor.

⁸⁴ ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Ibn Khaldūn, *Al-Muqaddimah* [The Prolegomena], ed. ‘Alī ‘abd alWāḥid Wāfi, vol. 3 (Cairo: Nahḍat Miṣr, 1981), 1010-1011.

Al-Māwardī contends that individuals who employ cunning and malicious actions degrade themselves and their civilisation, as they misuse their reason for nefarious purposes. Conversely, those who employ reason for benevolent ends earn respect and renown, reflecting positively on their character and contributing to the elevation of civilisation.⁸⁵ What is good and what is evil from al-Māwardī's perspective? And how can reason distinguish between them? Reason, in itself, disproves and contradicts all kinds of *munkar* (evil action, or wrongdoing). Also, reason recognises all types of *ma'rūf* (good deeds and kindness).⁸⁶ The ascendancy of *hawá* (desires) can overshadow one's rational faculties, causing a person's discernment of right and wrong, or assessment of beneficial and detrimental outcomes, to become obscured and muddled.

Consequently, that person's reason will perceive ugliness – wrongly – as beauty and the damages – mistakenly – as advantages.⁸⁷ Even though al-Māwardī believes reason *per se* can recognise evil and good – even without religion as a moral compass – this indicates that reason is substantially a leading element that can help humans reach good ethics and avoid evil actions. Yet, at the end of his chapter on reason, al-Māwardī emphasises the role of God and asks, “Could there be any refuge for us other than God's forgiveness?”⁸⁸ That is, al-Māwardī includes God's will as a cause for success in distinguishing good and bad from each other and following good and avoiding evil. Moreover, al-Māwardī places reason in a leading position for humans to deal with good moral conduct. He argues that one cannot perform good ethical behaviour in the absence of reason.

Similarly, according to al-Māwardī and Ibn Abi al-Dunyā, reason is linked with virtuous actions and noble conduct. Ibn Abi al-Dunyā underscores the correlation between reason and virtuous deeds, suggesting that mental soundness is not merely awareness of moral distinctions; rather, it is the application of this awareness by embracing the good and rejecting the bad.⁸⁹ Therefore, according to his perspective, reason is inseparable from virtuous behaviours and commendable actions, echoing the conclusion reached by al-Muḥāsibī. A later scholar than al-Māwardī, al-Iṣfahānī, answers the same question proposed above, by insisting on the relationship between reason and avoiding evil deeds and argues that “...Reason prevents a human being from sinning...reason is perceived as a means of restraining humans from pursuing bad deeds...”⁹⁰ Here, reason is not merely the ability to think and understand, distinguishing between the good and the bad, but also about behaving and acting ethically. This understanding applies to collective societies and individual beings, highlighting reason as a central distinguishing feature that sets humanity apart from animals. For instance, Ibn Khaldūn argues that God favours human beings over animals because of their actions and behaviour, which is a particular function of reason, particularly in experimental reason. For Ibn Khaldūn,

⁸⁵ Al-Māwardī, *Kitāb 'Ādāb al-Dunyā wal-Dīn*, 27.

⁸⁶ al-Māwardī, *Al-Nukat wal-'Uyūn*, vol. 2, 62; al-Māwardī, *Kitāb 'Ādāb al-Dunyā wal-Dīn*, 379.

⁸⁷ Al-Māwardī, *Kitāb 'Ādāb al-Dunyā wal-Dīn*, 39.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 53.

⁸⁹ Ibn Abi 'l-Dunyā, *Kitāb al-'Aql wa-Faḍluhū*, 51.

⁹⁰ Al-Iṣfahānī, *Al-Dharī 'ah 'lā Makārim al-Sharī 'ah*, 137.

this reflects in the Qur'ān's revelation (2:30),⁹¹ where God preferred and appointed human beings as His successors.⁹² Similarly, Abū Bakr al-Ṭurṭūshī reasserts that good behaviour and ethics are the best attributes to distinguish humans, and through decent actions, individuals distinguish themselves.⁹³

However, within the theory of civilisation, this correlation between reason and good deeds is still debatable. For instance, Norbert Elias does not agree that reason influences behaviour and acts. For him, there is no possibility to understand good and bad behaviour from an intellectual perspective nor is it possible to connect the idea of bad and good behaviour with reason and rationality.⁹⁴ Elias claims there are many reasons and criteria for why people do something or avoid doing something. For example, concepts such as “*Civilité*”⁹⁵ and “*embarrassing*”⁹⁶ are used to evaluate whether something is good or bad in someone's behaviour and deeds. Similarly, another method to discern between good and evil is by observing the behaviour of the higher social classes and emulating their practices.⁹⁷ For Elias, good and bad behaviour are socially constructed, particularly by the higher social strata. His understanding of the relationship between reason and good deeds disregards any role for reason and Divine revelation. However, reason and religion are sources of goodness and norms from al-Māwardī's perspective. Al-Māwardī states: “...Reason is to be followed in matters which are not prevented by *al-Shar'* (the Sharia, religious law); meanwhile *al-Shar'* is to be followed in issues which are not excluded by reason. This assumes that the Sharia does not put orders in issues unacceptable by reason. And that reason should not be followed in issues banned by *al-Shar'*.”⁹⁸ Al-Māwardī perceives that reason and religion are criteria for how people should behave and act. These criteria serve to deter evil conduct while promoting good conduct on individual and collective levels. Consequently, al-Māwardī suggests that reason and religion should complement each other to establish an ethical framework for civilisation.

CONCLUSION

For al-Māwardī, reason is mirrored directly in the human's behaviour and actions through performing virtuous acts. This article reaffirmed the crucial features of al-Māwardī's concept of reason. It also identified characteristics of reason based on my understating of al-Māwardī's. First, reason serves as the pillar for societal construction and individual improvement. Second, reason and religion should be perceived as one solid unit. Third, reason should invariably be

⁹¹ “And when thy Lord said unto the angels: Lo! I am about to place a viceroy in the earth.” Translated into English by M. M. Pickthall.

⁹² Ibn Kḥaldūn, *Al-Muqaddimah*, 1010-1011.

⁹³ Abū Bakr al-Ṭurṭūshī, *Sirāj al-Mulūk* [Lamp of Kings] (Beirut: Dar al-Minhaj, 2016), 497.

⁹⁴ Norbert Elias, *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen Wandlungen des Verhaltens in den weltlichen Oberschichten des Abendlandes* [On Civilizing Processes: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations of Changes in Behavior in the Secular Upper Classes of the West], vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag, 1997), 244-47.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 245.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 246.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ Al-Māwardī, *Tas'hīl al-Nazar wa-ta'jīl al-Zafar*, 139-140.

associated with goodness, guiding individuals towards virtuous deeds. Al-Māwardī posits that a sane person exhibits right speech and commendable behaviour; intelligence alone does not define sanity. However, if an individual commits evil acts, they are not considered a sane person even if they are very intelligent. Humans are to be evaluated based on ethics and not only on intelligence, since an intelligent person could perform unethical deeds and actions. Lastly, acquired reason contains all available experiences of humankind. There can be no growth for a civilisation without considering previous experiences. If people ignored and removed their earlier experiences from the thinking and reasoning process, this will weaken their civilisation. Acquired reason evaluates human beings' experiences from different approaches to understand it from all possible aspects. Accordingly, everything relies on reason and reason, in turn, relies on every available experience. Experiences augment individuals' capacities for sound thought and behaviour, reinforcing the symbiotic relationship between reason and experience.

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