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DE-CODING NEO-JIHADISM: THE IDEOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ISLAMISED RADICALISM

Sureyya Nur Cicek*

Abstract: The current jihad movement – “neo-jihadism” – seems to be more a product of modern conditions than Islamic traditions. This article focusses on the ideological and psychological factors to argue three points as to why the jihad concept has changed over time and adopted a military endeavour. First, the article discusses the ideological challenges – internal and external factors that contribute to this shift of conception. Second, the article explores the psychological factors that impact this shift of conception. It approaches the discourse around the definition of terrorism and its implications then looks at the aims for intervention. It also discusses the phases, stages and steps terrorism follows. Third, the article argues the issue of radicalisation needs to be tackled holistically to identify, apprehend and tackle the root cause of this phenomenon. Gülen’s holistic education approach, which is aimed at strengthening Muslims’ immune system (particularly the battle for youth hearts and minds), is needed to defeat the extremists in the battlefield of ideas.

Keywords: *The Hizmet Movement, de-radicalisation, sub-conscious, radicalisation, extremism, neo-jihadism, ISIS*

INTRODUCTION

This article argues that the current jihad movement – “neo-jihadism” – is more a product of modern conditions than Islamic traditions. In general, it discusses the radicalisation process, which is any form of terrorist violence. The European Commission Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation states there are a number and types of phases, stages or steps within the radicalisation process:

While radicalisation can pose a threat it is extremism, and particularly terrorism, that ought to be our main concern since it involves the active subversion of democratic values and the rule of law. In this sense violent radicalisation is to be understood as socialisation to extremism which manifests itself in terrorism ... Radicalisation is a context-bound phenomenon par excellence. Global, sociological and political drivers matter as much as ideological and psychological ones ... Since the end of the Cold War, partly due to globalisation, a wide spread dissatisfaction due to very rapid changes in society together with a tide of resentment against American unilateralism and, more generally, Western

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supremacy. The former contributes to polarisation within societies while the latter tends to stimulate processes of radicalisation with both forces boosting one another ... At the global level, polarising tendencies and radicalisation processes can be witnessed within many religious, ethnic and cultural population aggregates. Within the global mood that is also characterised by widespread feelings of inequity and injustice a very acute sense of marginalisation and humiliation exists, in particular within several Muslim communities worldwide as well as among immigrant communities with a Muslim background. These perceptions and feelings are often underestimated by Western observers. Today's religious and political radicalisation should however not be confounded. The former is closely intertwined with identity dynamics, whereas the latter is boosted by the aforementioned feelings of inequity whether real or perceived. Both expressions of radicalisation processes are thus the result of very different individual and collective dynamics ...¹

The European Commission Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation states some key elements to consider when highlighting the public and political discourse on terrorism.² First, the term "terrorism" came into existence during the French revolution (1794) to refer to

a policy of more or less arbitrary victimisation of alleged and real political opponents, the understanding of what constitutes "terrorism" has been changing. Initially the term referred to the exercise or punitive and deterrent public violence by the state, current usage tends to associate terrorism mainly, although not exclusively and sometimes erroneously, with acts of non-state actors only.³

Second, the three major contexts in which the term terrorism has been used: (i) as a form of repressive state policy as under totalitarian regimes, such as national socialism and communism; (ii) as a special shock tactic linked usually to irregular warfare, and (iii) as an extreme form of protest and agitation. Third,

groups that engage in tactics of terrorism are often linked, or emerge from wider social, political or religious movements ... While there are grey zones and borderline cases of what is and what is not acceptable in certain political contexts, there are certain forms of peacetime political violence and wartime activities which are widely seen as totally unacceptable. These include unprovoked attacks on civilians and the taking of hostages and other forms of wilful killings ...⁴

Fourth, terrorists generally stress the political character of their collective action. However, the generally political character of terrorism does not make it legitimate. Last, suicide terrorism is a form of attack involving the simultaneous destruction of the perpetrator and victims. It has been used mainly since the 1980s by an increasing number of often non-secular terrorist groups to compensate for a lack of more sophisticated military capabilities.

This article focusses on the ideological and psychological factors to argue three points as to why the concept of jihad has changed over the years and adopted a military endeavour. First,

¹ European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, *Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism* (Brussels: European Commission, 2008), 7–9, accessed July 10, 2017, http://www.rikcoolsaet.be/files/art_ip_wz/Expert%20Group%20Report%20Violent%20Radicalisation%20FINAL.pdf.

² Ibid., 6–7.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

the article discusses the ideological challenges – internal/external factors – that contribute to this shift of conception. Second, the article explores the psychological factors that impact this shift of conception. It approaches the discourse around the definition of terrorism and its implications, then will look at the aims for intervention. It also discusses the phases, stages and steps that terrorism follows. Third, the article argues the issue of radicalisation needs to be tackled holistically (heart/mind) to identify, apprehend and tackle the root cause of this phenomenon.

IDEOLOGICAL MOTIVATIONS

Internal Factors

The shift in the concept of jihad is a socio-political change and based on the development of modern conditions. Many negative conditions, such as economic backwardness, social and political dissolution, and cultural degeneration have prepared the ground for the formation of terrorist organisations in the Islamic world, and especially in Middle East countries.⁵ The stagnation of the Islamic world in science and technology over the past few centuries, and consequent limitations in economy growth, have resulted in many negative outcomes and weaknesses; most significantly, that of cultural crises.⁶ It is evident that the nation states have been divided into blocks. As a result, the Islamic countries have failed to form a united front, which has led them to becoming mere geographical entities that are wide open to foreign intervention and exploitation. As a result of the cultural crisis being experienced in the Middle East, some people and groups in the Muslim world have developed a sense of resentment towards the West. These people and groups have harboured growing feelings of rebellion as they consider the hegemonic powers to be imperialist and colonialist.⁷

In recent history, wars of independence have been fought against the colonisers. In the independence struggle, 80% of the nation states occupied by colonising powers have been activated with the concept of jihad.⁸ The Islamic scholars and leaders were quick to grasp the possible consequences of the energy of declaring jihad as something that could employ against colonialism.⁹ In the Caucasus, India and the Middle East, jihad has been used as a struggle against the occupying forces. Jihad gained ground and was used as a defence mechanism and framework to establish the legitimacy of war.¹⁰ The jihad movement was directed against the

⁵ Hamza Aktan, “Acts of Terror and Suicide Attacks in the light of the Qur’an and the Sunnah,” in *Terror and Suicide Attacks: An Islamic Perspective*, ed. Ergun Capan (New Jersey, USA: The Light Publisher Inc, 2004), 25.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., 26.

⁸ Ali Bulac, “Jihad,” in *Terror and Suicide Attacks: An Islamic Perspective*, ed. Ergun Capan (New Jersey, USA: The Light Publisher Inc, 2004), 63.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., 64.

Western forces, a notion that had a negative definition in religious and political literature and the West was seen as ‘the other’..¹¹

As the first Islamist generation of the nineteenth century formulated Islamism as an intellectual and political movement, they opened the way to *ijtihad* (scientific reasoning) by returning to the Qur’an and original sources of the religion. The Islamists placed special emphasis on jihad and awakening of its spirit. This understanding of jihad was a redefinition in a new conception, which was framed as a resistance tool against colonialism. As a result, the term jihad was used pragmatically to procure religious motivation, which was needed for economic, scientific and technological progress.¹²

Yet another meaning of jihad occurred – it was taken as a spiritual source that called into action a spiritual energy, a transforming and propagating force for the new communal movement and shaking off the old colonialism; therefore, dynamic social projects could be produced based on this energy.¹³

Jihad: Meaning in the Qur’an

The word jihad in the Qur’an and *sunna* has many inflections. It derives from the root *jahd*, which means effort or struggle. If the word jihad is defined with respect to the structure of its true meaning, it means the effort made to remove obstacles that stand between humanity and God.¹⁴

Jihad is the name for all efforts, exertions and endurance each Muslim demonstrates in order to please God. The reiterated term in the Qur’an ‘*al-jihad fisabil Allah*’ (striving in the path of God) allows for that action to be accomplished in myriad ways. According to the Qur’an, human beings should constantly engage in the basic moral endeavour of enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong.¹⁵

The means of carrying out this struggle varies according to circumstances, and the Qur’an frequently refers to those who “strive with their wealth and their selves” (*jahadu bi- amwalihim waanfusihim*)¹⁶ and exhorts believers to struggle in this manner throughout their lives.¹⁷ Therefore, the specific term semantically and interpretively allows jihad to be carried out in many ways: performance of charity; expenditure of one’s wealth for licit purposes; waging a spiritual struggle against the base desires of the carnal self; and verbal and physical actions, including armed resistance to social and other forms of injustice.¹⁸

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Bulac, “Jihad,” 64.

¹⁴ Asma Afsaruddin, “Striving in the Path of God: Fethullah Gülen’s Views on Jihad” (paper presented at the conference Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement, London, October 25–27, 2007), accessed July 8, 2017, <https://fgulen.com/en/gulen-movement/conference-papers/contributions-of-the-gulen-movement/25878-striving-in-the-path-of-god-fethullah-gulens-views-on-jihad>.

¹⁵ Ibid. Qur’an 3:104, 110, 114; 7:157; 9:71, 112.

¹⁶ Qur’an 8:72.

¹⁷ Qur’an 9:20.

¹⁸ Afsaruddin, “Striving in the Path of God.”

The notion of jihad can be grouped into four dimensions to better understand its underlying foundation:¹⁹

1. The *defensive* dimension is usually associated with the terms jihad, *ghaza* and *harb*. Although the word jihad and its conjunctions are repeated 34 times in the Qur'an, only four of these usages refer directly to war.²⁰
2. The *psychological* dimension is usually associated with the term *mujahada*.²¹
3. The *intellectual* dimension is expressed by the terms *ijtihad* (interpretation) and *tafakkur* (contemplation).²²
4. The *social* dimension relates to serving the entire community and striving against injustice.²³

As explained above, the notion of jihad can mean more than one thing. However, classical Islamic legal texts have often narrowed the meaning to the 'jihad to war'.

Classical Doctrine of Jihad

The classical doctrine of jihad assumes the existence of a united Muslim state (caliphate): a state ruled by Muslims under Islamic law or Sharia. The responsibilities of this state are to defend its borders, protect individuals against outside aggression, implement Islamic law and norms in the society for its Muslim populace, protect its non-Muslim citizens from outside or inside aggression, and maintain essential and basic services as well as law and order. In this, the functions of the Muslim state greatly concern the doctrine of self-defence.²⁴

In Islamic law, jihad can only be waged or permitted for particular reasons. One can wage war to defend one's homeland against invasion and aggression, for propagation of religion, and to punish those who violate peace treaties.²⁵ Where there is no threat of invasion, where there is freedom to propagate Islam, where there is peace between the Muslim state and others, jihad

¹⁹ Bekir Karliga, "Religion, Terror, War, and the Need for Global Ethics," in *Terror and Suicide Attacks: An Islamic Perspective*, ed. Ergun Capan (New Jersey, USA: The Light Publisher Inc, 2004), 50.

²⁰ See Afsaruddin, "Striving in the Path of God."

Actual fighting or armed combat as one aspect of *jihad* is designated by the specific Qur'anic term *qital*. *Qital* is a component of *jihad* in specific situations. *Harb* is the Arabic word for war in general. The Qur'an employs the term *harb* four times: to refer to illegitimate wars fought by those who wish to spread corruption on earth (5:64); to the thick of battle between believers and non-believers (8:57; 47:4); and, in one instance, to the possibility of war waged by God and His prophet those who would continue usury (2:279). This term is never conjoined to the phrase 'in the path of God' and has no bearing on the concept of *jihad*.

²¹ Karliga, "Religion, Terror, War," 50.

This term is a conjugate from the same root, in order to express the spiritual dimension of jihad. This is addressed in three different categories: *mujahada* against the enemy is jihad; *mujahada* against the devil is *takwa* (piety); and *mujahada* against the corporeal desires is *riyadha* (austerity). Ten verses concerning jihad in the Holy Quran deal with this category.

²² *Ibid.*

Ijtihad means making a great effort to reach a difficult goal. Islamic jurists define the term *ijtihad* as the effort of a Muslim scholar to arrive at a decision using all his intellectual capabilities, both in religious affairs and non-religious affairs.

²³ *Ibid.*

In this sense, the word jihad means to help people and struggle to prevent unfair actions.

²⁴ Abdullah Saeed, "Jihad and Violence: Changing Understandings of Jihad Among Muslims," in *Terrorism and Justice: Moral Argument in a Threatened World*, edited by Michael O'Keefe, & C. A. J Coady (Australia: Melbourne University Press, 2002), 74.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 75.

cannot be used. In the Qur'an, when referring to fighting, it clearly states individuals cannot oppress others and create injustice. The Qur'an refers to this as '*fitnah*', or what one might call terror. Individuals are also not allowed to use jihad to advance self-interest or material advantage. Therefore, the primary functions of jihad from a Qur'anic point of view are removing oppression and injustice from society as well as defending the community.²⁶

To understand certain functions within a society, the classical doctrine of jihad was developed by Muslim jurists based on the Qur'an and *sunna*, and also the events that took place in the early Islamic history. During the post-Prophetic period, the society was leading an environment of Islamic hegemony. This was the time when Muslim jurists developed the classical doctrine. The Islamic world covered the demographics of the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia, East Africa, and parts of India and Europe. The Muslim jurists divided the world into three spheres: one of Islam triumphant, one of a peaceful non-Islam, and a third in which aggressive non-Islam remained dominant.²⁷

The third is greatly relevant to the perpetual militancy conflict that has evolved in current conditions. The classical doctrine of jihad envisaged a doctrine of war between the Muslim state and aggressive non-Muslims, who were not at peace with the Muslim state. The classical jurists understood two types of jihad: offensive and defensive.²⁸

Modern Interpretations of Jihad

The classical doctrine remained influential up to the modern period. During the colonial period however, Muslims under the colonial rule felt that jihad was justified against the colonial powers, such as the French in Algeria or the British in Sudan and elsewhere. The Muslims who opposed the colonial powers saw their lands and people were occupied and oppressed, and believed that they had the duty to challenge this domination, by force if necessary.²⁹

The classical doctrine of jihad is still influential in the current day; however, different Muslim groups have provided modern reinterpretations. Where some Muslims hold the view jihad is purely defensive, others suggest it is purely militant–offensive.³⁰

Ibn Taymiyyah – Wahhab – al-Banna – Maududi – Qutb interpretations

Islam as a faith is universal, crossing national boundaries, encompassing all races and classes. As a consequence, doctrinal deviations are usually interpreted as coming from within

²⁶ Ibid., 76.

²⁷ Ibid., 77.

²⁸ Ibid.

The offensive jihad can be waged by the caliph or imam of the unitary Muslim state against the territory of belligerent non-Muslims to extend the borders of the state and to amplify its resources. Without the authority of the caliphate or imam, such an offensive jihad is not legitimate. *The defensive jihad* is used to protect the Muslim community from threats to its well being. Defensive jihad does not require the existence of the caliph or imam. Each individual in the community is under obligation to defend the land or the community when they are attacked.

²⁹ Ibid., 79–80.

³⁰ Ibid., 80.

the tradition rather than being challenges to it.³¹ There is a clear distinction between a fundamentalist and an Islamist.³²

Two religious leaders stand out in this historical process by which fundamentalists and Islamists came to challenge the religious and political orthodoxy of their time. Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328 CE) is the most prominent precursor of the Sunni school of revivalism in the 21st century.³³ He violently opposed heretical beliefs and practices, including innovation, preached jihad against unbelievers and placed restrictions on non-believers. He felt he had the authority to interpret the *sunna*, freeing himself from adopting the juridical opinions of his predecessors. Ibn Taymiyyah's overriding concern was to build a moral society on the basis of a reinvigorated Islamic ideology and its strict implementation in society. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, jihad has a higher obligation than prayer, pilgrimage or fasting.³⁴

Ibn Taymiyyah's direct spiritual descendant was Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab (d. 1792 CE), whose strict doctrinal teachings during the last century were based upon his interpretation of Ibn Taymiyyah, and his direct spiritual predecessor Ibn Hanbal (d. 855 CE). Wahhabism is a primary religious imperative within national and transnational Islamic terrorist groups, whose members volunteered for jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union.³⁵ The Wahhabis, who are known as the Salafi movement, share a puritanical approach to Islam replicating the model of Prophet Muhammad. The community is broad and encompasses such individuals as Osama Bin Laden. In the Salafi belief, culture is seen as the enemy of pure Islam. As Oliver Roy argues, one of the primary objectives of neo-fundamentalist groups like the Salafis is enculturation – to strip Islam to its pristine elements by getting rid of folk customs and delinking Islam from any cultural context. The Salafis therefore argue to transcend local space, traditions and religious authority by connecting Muslims to an imagined community of believers.³⁶

The end of the colonial era resulted in the development of independence movements and growth of nationalism, socialism and communism within European colonies in the Middle East and India. These were paralleled by the development of religio-political awakening.³⁷ In Egypt,

³¹ Michael Whine, "Islamism and Totalitarianism: Similarities and Differences," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 2, no. 2 (2001): 56–57.

³² Ibid.

Fundamentalists are traditionalist Muslims in which live according to the norm and strict rules which have held sway throughout the Middle East and elsewhere in the Muslim world for fourteen centuries. They are bound within the strict interpretations of the Sharia law. It is a tendency that is forever setting the reformer, the censor, and the tribunal against the corruption of the times and of sovereigns, against foreign influences, political opportunism, moral laxity and the forgetting of sacred texts. However, Islamist tends to be often educated but displaced, lower and middle class victims of urbanisation. Their influences are anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and anti-Western fused in symbolic fashion with the Western leftist ideologies and grafted onto a radicalised and politicised religious world outlook. Unlike the former they are not rejecting the ideas and symbols of modernity; they are adapting and using them.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., 58.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, no. 3 (2006): 210.

³⁷ Whine, "Islamism and Totalitarianism," 58.

a specifically Muslim political consciousness began first with the formation of the Ikhwan al Muslimun (Muslim Brothers) by Hassan al-Banna in 1929.³⁸

Despite the Muslim Brotherhoods Egyptian origins, its spiritual and political influences were all over the Arab world. During the inter war years Egypt was a battleground for competing anti-colonialist, nationalist and religious forces, all of which had failed to free Egypt from British imperial rule according to al-Banna.³⁹

In the 20th century, two thinkers came to reject the idea of modernist (defensive) and classical jihad, and adopted a broad interpretation of jihad. These two figures were: Maududi (d. 1979 CE) from the Jama`at Islam of Pakistan and Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966 CE) from the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt.⁴⁰

In 1947, Maududi defined the Muslim religion as a political system along the lines of other major ideologies of their time. In claiming legitimacy for his views, he sought to explain them in terms of the return to the early communities of believers. In the 1950s, Sayyid Qutb and Maududi raged against what they called '*jahiliyya*' (barbarity/ignorance), which Qutb used to define individualism and dissolution, and led to moral and social decline. He believed the Islamic world would become increasingly subject to this as Western influences grew. He foresaw Westernisation and the growth of multinationals with alien economic conceptions of interests, insurance, and the need to cater for foreign tourists' desires, as polluting the Islamic world.⁴¹

Maududi and Qutb were against nationalism, which they saw as a European invention imparted into the Middle East and south-east Asia. As such, the two thinkers argued it was bound to ally itself with that of the other European inventions, secularism, and so on, and this they believed created a European nationalism as essentially secularist, bred in a culture where religion and state were different entities.⁴² Qutb argued, to overcome *jahiliyya*, society must undergo a radical change, beginning with its moral foundations where "man made idols from agnosticism to capitalism hold sway." Qutb thought jihad must be waged against modernity so moral reform could take place.⁴³

While the classical doctrine of jihad argued war could only be waged by a state against another state, these thinkers believed jihad implied a doctrine of revolution against tyranny and oppression, as well as a means to establish an Islamic socio-political order. This social order was represented as Sharia law recognising the sovereignty of God's will in the state. Maududi adopted the broader definition of jihad, which could range from non-violent to violent. Therefore, Maududi argued jihad could be waged against other Muslims, such as political

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid., 58–59.

⁴⁰ Saeed, "Jihad and Violence," 82.

⁴¹ Whine, "Islamism and Totalitarianism," 59.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid., 59–60.

authorities who were seen to be ‘oppressing’ Islam by failing to implement a socio-political order based on Sharia.⁴⁴

Maududi and his followers criticised the modernist idea of jihad and argued their conception served the imperial interests of the West. Maududi took a negative view of the West and Western civilisation, thinking the West possessed corrupt views towards Islam. According to Maududi, the West posed a major threat to Islam and Muslims, and was the source of their social, political, economic and even intellectual problems. Maududi thought Muslims should resist the ‘lure’ of the West and engage in a revolutionary struggle to assert Islamic values, ideas, laws and social order in Muslim lands.⁴⁵ To achieve these means, Maududi used jihad as an essential revolutionary tool to motivate individuals. He took the classical doctrine further, to some extent he was borrowing on Marxist doctrine as a basis for his understanding of jihad as a revolutionary movement.⁴⁶ Maududi therefore transformed the classical understanding of jihad into a political system to struggle against a world that he saw as corrupt and unjust.

Maududi drew on a single world community (*ummah*) complying with the Muslim community to bind power. Maududi’s notion of jihad was established in Islamic world order. Sayyid Qutb also believed jihad was a powerful revolutionary instrument. For Qutb, nation states were artificial creations of the West. Also, like Maududi, he believed in an Islamic socio-political order, the objective of which was establishing God’s sovereignty on earth.⁴⁷

Militants’ Interpretation

In the 1970s and 1980s, several militant Muslim groups emerged in places such as Egypt and Syria, with some being offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood. Saeed states:

These groups adopted a more militant interpretation of Jihad. They adopted some aspects of the classical doctrine, particularly more extreme interpretations, as well as certain aspects of the Maududi and Qutb interpretation of Jihad as a revolutionary struggle. The result was a more militant, extremist view. The Classical jihad understanding was between the Muslim state and its adversaries; however the militant groups become a doctrine of war between the Muslims, a Muslim state, non-Muslims, and Muslims propounding the West.⁴⁸

The jihad movement underwent a radicalising change during the 1980s and 1990s. These were struggles for independence or self-determination and several religious-based conflicts. The first move towards radicalisation was the international engagement of jihad. Muslims from all over the world engaged in an international jihad against the Soviets until their expulsion from Afghanistan. These jihad fighters returned to their countries with practical experience and a narrowed view that “if they could defeat a superpower; they could also defeat those who were

⁴⁴ Saeed, “Jihad and Violence,” 82.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 82.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 83.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

Osama bin Laden, for example, declared that perpetual war existed between Islam and the West, in particular the Americans. Muslims who support the West in this conflict are also lumped together with the West as enemies of Islam and is therefore seen as a target of their jihad activity.

waging war against political Islam.” These militant groups believed all possible means had to be found to defeat the enemy, including terror against non-combatants. Suicide bombing became a weapon of the weak in the face of unequal power, despite the Islamic ethics of war and prohibition on suicide.⁴⁹

These militants were engaged in such activities to serve their political goals and motives. This was done by dressing up their claims in Islamic garb and selling it as a religious doctrine or command. This positioning is extremely unethical and against the core spirit of Islam.

Jihad and the Emergence of new Interpretations

This new interpretation of jihad emerged against the increasing militancy of a small number of Muslim extremist groups around the world who called for jihad against Muslims whom they considered to be apostates or ‘not sufficiently Muslim’ and Muslim states that, according to the militants, did not implement Islamic law.⁵⁰ These extremist groups also called for jihad against non-Muslims and Western countries they considered to ‘oppress’ Muslims and supporting anti-Muslim activities. According to the militants, jihad is a doctrine of self-defence and can be used only by a Muslim state against imminent and certain aggression by an enemy. In this, jihad is equivalent to the doctrine of self-defence in a modern nation state. It can also be declared in a liberation struggle, as was the case in Afghanistan after the Soviet occupation.⁵¹

The military understanding of jihad began to evolve in the 19th century; however, it gradually acquired its current form in response to the new set of geopolitical, social and religious circumstances of the 19th and 20th centuries. In the 21st century, the rise of Islamic State altered the understanding of not only militancy, but also of jihad in the global security landscape. Oliver Roy states

Up until the mid-1990s, most international jihadis came from the Middle East and had fought in Afghanistan prior to the fall of the communist regime there in 1992. But from 1995 onwards, a new breed began to develop-known in the west as the ‘homegrown terrorist.’⁵²

Lentini states

clearly a manifestation of political extremism it is not like the purely secular extremisms of fascism, or Nazism, or totalitarianisms. It draws from, but is different to, jihadism. This is evident in its targeting of victims for violence, geographic scope and means to support it. These properties make it a qualitatively different to its predecessors. Hence it appears appropriate to identify it and its supporting ideology and even subculture as ‘neo-jihadism’.⁵³

⁴⁹ Ibid., 84.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 85.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Oliver Roy, “Who Are The New Jihadis?,” *The Guardian*, April 13, 2017, accessed July 10, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/apr/13/who-are-the-new-jihadis>.

⁵³ Peter. Lentini, *Neojihadism: Towards a New Understanding of Terrorism and Extremism?* (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 2013), 197.

Roy argues

there is something new about the jihadi terrorist violence of the past two decades. Both terrorism and jihad have existed for many years, and forms of “globalised” terror-in which highly symbolic locations or innocent civilians are targeted, with no regard for national borders-go back at least as far as the anarchist movement of the late 19th century. What is unprecedented is the way that terrorists now deliberately pursue their own deaths ... home-grown terrorists show that they are violent nihilists who adopt Islam, rather than religious fundamentalists who turn to violence ... contemporary jihadism, at least in the West- is a youth movement that is also rooted in wider youth culture.⁵⁴

Roy underlines that

where ever such generational hatred occurs, it also takes the form of cultural iconoclasm. Not only are human beings destroyed, statues, places of worship and books are too. Memory is annihilated. “Wiping the slate clean,” is a goal common to Mao Zedong’s Red Guards, the Khmer Rouge and ISIS fighters.⁵⁵

One needs to distinguish the difference between the current geo-political occurrences in the Middle East, IS’ agenda and the youth movement. No doubt, “the reason for the rise of ISIS are without question related to the politics of the Middle East, and its demise will not change the basic elements of the situation.”⁵⁶ IS as an ideology emerged due to internal and external dynamics. Esposito claims the

political conditions in Syria and Iraq, ethnic-religious/sectarian divisions in the region, and the failures of the US and international community contributed to ISIS stunning if barbaric success. Bashar al-Assad’s brutal military response to the “threat” of the Arab uprisings or Spring’s seeming democratisation wave and the slaughter of moderate Syrian opposition groups, paved the way for outside jihadist groups and heightened Sunni-Shia sectarian warfare. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey’s initial support for militant Sunni jihadist groups like including ISIS rather than moderate anti-Assad groups, to fight a primarily political-driven proxy war in Syria against Assad, compounded the situation. In Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki’s installing a Shia-dominated government and political marginalisation of Sunni military officers joining ISIS and alienating some Iraqi Sunnis welcomed ISIS.⁵⁷

Among its most distinctive features, neojihadism is a global subculture and counterculture that is both virtual and physical. Its protagonists promote, discuss and demonstrate ideology and tactics, celebrate their heroes and victories, demean, vilify and demonise their enemies, and propagandize, exchange information, raise funds, build social bonds and gather intelligence and information through contemporary global media culture. The neojihadists’ world view, and patterns and sites of interaction, constitute what can be labelled as a ‘neojihadist milieu’, or more appropriately perhaps, ‘nejiverse’. This is the combination of the nejis’ constructed sense of reality and the systems and sites of communication that link them. Such entities are comprised of all forms of media, both voluntarily contributing to the neojihadist culture as well as antagonistic media that the nejis coopt, which contain information that establishes, reinforces and advocates the neojihadist world view. Hence, the neojihadist milieu/nejiverse encompasses press, broadcast and other electronic delivery and communication systems, such as satellite and cable television, radio, Internet, DVD, videocassette, audio cassette and even computer and video games. However, the neojihadist milieu/nejiverse also contains patterns of direct interpersonal interaction, including musallahs, madrassahs and pesantrans, cells and meetings where the culture is shaped and reinforced. Neojihadists pick, choose and construct the neojihadist milieu/nejiverse, which makes it simultaneously factual and fictional, derived from reality, fantasy and conspiracy.

⁵⁴ Roy, “Who are the New Jihadis?”

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ John. Esposito, “Islam and Political Violence,” *Religions* 6, no. 3 (2015): 1074.

Therefore,

it is important to distinguish here between the version of Islam espoused by ISIS itself, which is much more grounded in the methodological tradition of exegesis of the prophet Muhammad's words, and ostensibly based on the work of "scholars"- and the Islam of the jihadis who claim allegiances to ISIS, which first of all revolves around a vision of heroism and modern-day violence.⁵⁸

Consequently,

jihadis do not descend into violence after poring over sacred texts. They do not have the necessary religious culture-and, above all, care little about having one. They do not become radicals because they have misread the texts or because they have been manipulated. They are radicals because they choose to be, because only radicalism appeals to them.⁵⁹

Subsequently, Roy⁶⁰ clarifies

Although ISIS proclaims its mission to restore the caliphate, its nihilism makes it impossible to reach a political solution, engaged in any form of negotiation, or achieve any stable society within recognised borders ... [Therefore,] this self-destructive dimension has nothing to do with the politics of the Middle East. The caliphate is a fantasy, It is the myth of an ideological entity constantly expanding its territory. Its strategic impossibility explains why those who identify with it, instead of devoting themselves to the interests of local Muslims, have chosen to enter a death pact. There is no political perspective, no bright future, not even a place to pray in peace. But while the concept of the caliphate is indeed part of the Muslim religious imagination, the same cannot be said for the pursuit of death ... [Additionally,] the systematic association with death is one of the keys to understanding today's radicalisation: the nihilist dimension is central. What seduces and fascinates is the idea of revolt. Violence is not a means. It is an end in itself.

Therefore, Roy states, "terrorism does not arise from the radicalisation of Islam, but from the Islamisation of radicalism."⁶¹

Roy explains

the strength of ISIS is to play on our fears. And the principle fear is the fear of Islam. The only strategic impact of the attacks is their psychological effect. They do not affect the West's military capabilities; they have a marginal economic effect, and only jeopardise our democratic institutions to the extent that we ourselves call them into question through the

⁵⁸ Roy, "Who are the New Jihadis?"

⁵⁹ Ibid.

The typical radical is a young, second-generation or convert, very often involved in episodes of petty crime, with practically no religious education, but having a rapid and recent trajectory of conversion/reconversion, more often in the framework of a group of friends or over the internet than in the context of a mosque. The embrace of religion is rarely kept secret, but rather is exhibited, but it does not necessarily correspond to immersion in religious practice. The rhetoric of rupture is violent-the enemy is kafir, one with whom no compromise is possible-but also includes their own family, the member of which are accused of observing Islam improperly, or refusing to convert. At the same time, it is obvious that the radicals' decision to identify with jihad and to claim affiliation with a radical Islam group is not merely an opportunistic choice: the references to Islam make all the difference between jihad and the other forms of violence that young people indulge in. Pointing out this pervasive culture of violence does not amount to "exonerating" Islam. The fact that these young people choose Islam as a framework for thought and action is fundamental, and it is precisely the Islamisation of radicalisation that we must strive to understand.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

everlasting debate on the conflict between security and the rule of law. The fear is that our own societies will implode and there will be a civil war between Muslims and the “others”.⁶²

Furthermore, Roy states

we ask ourselves what Islam wants, what Islam is, without for a moment realising that this world of Islam does not exist; that the ummah is at best a pious wish and at worst an illusion; that the conflicts is first of all political; that national issues remain the key to the Middle East and social issues the key to integration... there is a temptation to see in Islam a radical ideology that mobilises throngs of people in the Muslim world, just as Nazism was able to mobilise large sections of the German population. But the reality is that ISIS’s pretention to establish a global caliphate is a delusion-that is why it draws in violent youngsters who have delusions of grandeur.⁶³

Roy⁶⁴ argues

the violent radicalisation is not the consequences of religious radicalisation, even if it often takes the same paths and borrows the same paradigms. Religious fundamentalism exists, of course, and it poses considerable societal problems, because it rejects values based on individual choice and personal freedom. But it does not necessarily lead to political violence ... the objection that radicals are motivated by the “suffering” experienced by Muslims who were formerly colonised, or victims of racism or any other sort of discrimination, US bombardments, drones, Orientalism, and so on, would imply that the revolt is primarily led by victims. But the relationship between radicals and victims is more imaginary than real ... [Furthermore,] those who perpetuate attacks in Europe are not inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, Libya or Afghanistan. They are not necessarily the poorest, the most humiliated or the least integrated. The fact that 25% of jihadis are converts show that the link between radicals and their “people” is also a largely imaginary constructs ... [Subsequently,] revolutionaries almost never come from the suffering classes. In their identification with the proletariat, the “masses” and the colonised, there is a choice based on something other than their objective situation. Very few terrorists or jihadis advertise their own life stories. They generally talk about what they have seen of others’ suffering, It was not Palestinians who shot up the Bataclan.

Roy adds “terrorist attacks do not bring western societies to their knees – they only provoke a counter-reaction. And this kind of terrorism today claims more Muslim lives than western lives.”⁶⁵ Therefore, I now turn to the external factors to understand the underlying foundations of political Islam.

External Factors

Western and Islamic societies were closed communities before the Enlightenment and the development of the trans-movement of cultures across the globe as labour markets formed and expanded. The developments of the labour force after the 1950s allowed a mixing of cultures between the West and East; as a result, the West has witnessed an infusion of migration.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

Muslim communities began living in the West and had brought with them century old psychological baggage towards the West. The integration issues of second and third generation Muslim youth have been a highly contested problem in the 21st century. The alienation and marginalisation of Muslims, particularly the youth, have been the reasons for policy makers to debate whether Muslim communities are a threat to Western social fabrics within society. Moreover,

the Islamic realm is itself in the process of redefinition as Muslim minorities become a permanent and indigenous presence in the Western societies of Europe, North America, and Australia. These Muslim minorities, who live with the daily demands of an open society, are especially important to the work of the reformers in shifting the terms of the debate away from the radicals.⁶⁶

On the other side of the spectrum, Muslims in the Middle East have gone through 100 years of Western influences and political manoeuvring in Arab countries. This century long interference in the Arab world has caused tensions between the West and East. The West has not received the image of liberator among the people of the Middle East.⁶⁷ These tensions have contributed to a sense of distrust of the West by Arab peoples⁶⁸ and as a result have been the primary reason for the breeding of hatred and injustice in Islamist philosophy. Many Arab national movements adopted anti-Western political speech to gain popularity among their peoples. Alkadry argues there was “almost one hundred years of struggle by indigenous people in the Middle East for liberation-from the West and not by the West.”⁶⁹

According to Alkadry, there are four reasons why the Arab world resists the West in the last century. He argues “the result of these instances is a decolonised Middle East without popular sovereignty and democratic governance. Throughout these moments, western interests prevailed at the expense of human and political rights of the people of the decolonised Middle East peoples.”⁷⁰ Alkadry states:

1. The “epoch of resistance is one of betrayal of the pan-Arab nationalistic aspirations to spare Western economic and political interests.”⁷¹
2. “The French and British administrations immediately transformed the Arab world into several nation-states with arbitrary borders.”⁷²
3. “The British and French colonialists suppressed national movements within the colonised nations, silenced voices for national independence and self-determination and

⁶⁶ Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 464.

⁶⁷ Mohamad Alkadry, “Colonialism in a Postmodern Age: The West, Arabs and the Battle of Baghdad,” *Public Administration and Management: An Interactive Journal* 9, no. 1 (2004): 36.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 35–36.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 36–37.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 37–38.

installed local puppet leaders to help suppress Arab populations in the newly created states.”⁷³

4. “The Arab confrontation with Europe and European colonialism was transformed into confrontation between Arabs and the United States of America.”⁷⁴

Esposito states the

major polls have consistently reported that Islam is a significant component of religious and cultural identity in Muslim countries and communities globally and thus the use of Islam by violent extremists as an instrument for legitimising and mobilisation is not surprising ... [However,] a primary catalyst for extremism, often seen inseparable from the threat to Muslim religious and cultural identity, is the threat of political domination and occupation ... [Furthermore,] while religion/Islam does play a significant role, political grievances also play a significant role, often intertwined with religion. Western military invasion, occupation and support for authoritarian regimes, the Iraqi and Syrian governments’ killing of tens of thousands of civilians and “crimes” committed by individuals/groups (Iraqi soldiers, police, and government workers). Both the Iraqi and Syrian governments and their oppositions have conflated political grievances and violence with Sunni-Shia sectarianism. The Syrian and Iraqi regimes have deliberately and successfully portrayed the conflict as sectarian to discredit the opposition and unify non-Sunnis around the governments. Many in the opposition in turn have embraced sectarianism.⁷⁵

Esposito reminds

the British officials have noted ISIS atrocities play well with certain segments among Muslim youth, particularly those already involved in criminal activity. As a recent past, so too today, these grievances have remained powerful among some 20,000 foreign recruits, including more than 5000 Europeans and Americans.⁷⁶

Subsequently, Esposito argues

like Al-Qaida and other militant Muslim groups or movements, ISIS is a symptom of much deeper systematic problems in the Arab world that must be addressed by Arab political and religious leaders, Arab societies and the West. There is a direct linkage between the spread of extremism and authoritarian and repressive governments on the one hand and Western double standards on the other ... [Furthermore,] the fallout from the failure of the Arab Spring, crushing hopes for democratisation; Egypt’s military-led coup which overthrew a democratically elected president and restoration of authoritarianism with the massacre of civilians, brutal repression of the Muslim Brotherhood and secular activist opposition; the U.S. and European Union’s ambivalent response; and restoration of aid to the Abdel Fatah el-Sisi regime have all been a gift to ISIS and other terrorists’ propaganda and recruitment. U.S. and European strengthening of ties with authoritarian Arab allies to defeat ISIS at the expense of their espoused principles and support for the right to self-determination,

⁷³ James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, *Politics in the Middle East*, 3rd edn. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1990); Christopher Clapham, *Third World Politics* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); Alkadry, “Colonialism in a Postmodern Age,” 38–39.

⁷⁴ Alkadry, “Colonialism in a Postmodern Age,” 39–41.

⁷⁵ Esposito, “Islam and Political Violence,” 1076.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

democracy and human rights reinforces the image and reality of a Western double standard.⁷⁷

Esposito contends

the suppression of moderate Islamist and secular groups and parties by authoritarian regimes with the acquiescence or support of Western allies fuels political violence and the rise and spread of Al-Qaida, ISIS and their lookalikes. Violence and terrorism in the name of Islam by a host of militant Muslim movements in recent decades is a product of historical and political factors, not simply religion or a militant Islamic theology/ideology. Focusing on reading the Quran or violent passages in the Quran can obscure the importance of the policies of authoritarianism and oppressive regimes and their Western allies. Many contemporary Muslim religious scholars and leaders have denounced extremists' appeals to Islam and their acts of violence and terrorism, issued fatwas, supported madrasa reforms and de-radicalisation programs. However, in the long run, to break the cycle of Muslim violence and terrorism, Muslim governments and their western allies must address the political conditions that terrorist movements exploit. Addressing real grievances of the population (such as occupation, authoritarianism, repression, tyranny, and corruption) will suck the air from the extremist organisations and ideologies.⁷⁸

PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

The Issue of Definition

In *Tangled Roots: Social and Psychological Factors in the Genesis of Terrorism*, Gupta state “within the extremely diverse literature, there is a thin but resolute strand on which there is a general agreement: it is impossible to offer a universally accepted definition of terrorism.”⁷⁹ Therefore, with the term terrorism remaining largely ambiguous, conveying different meanings to different people, its analyses suffer from an inherent and yet incurable conceptual weakness. As Schmid and Jongman⁸⁰ famously tabulated, more than 100 definitions have been proposed.⁸¹

Furthermore, Western terrorism scholarship has been notoriously narrow-gauged in its conceptualisation of the problem. As Crelinsten puts it, “The major weaknesses in the current approaches to the study of terrorism are: (a) *a truncated objective of study*, which reflects (b) *a skewed focus of the researcher*, which stems from (c) *a narrow policy orientation on prevention and control...*”⁸² The vast majority of the work in the field takes up the subject of

⁷⁷ Ibid., 1078–1079.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Dipak K. Gupta, “Tyranny of Data: Going beyond Theories,” in *Tangled Roots: Social and Psychological Factors in the Genesis of Terrorism*, ed. J. Victoroff (Amsterdam, Netherlands, Washington, DC: IOS Press, 2006), 38.

⁸⁰ Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman., *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature*, revised edn. (Somerset, NJ: Transaction Publishers 1988).

⁸¹ Jeffery I. Victoroff, ed., *Tangled Roots: Social and Psychological Factors in the Genesis of Terrorism* (Amsterdam, Netherlands, Washington, DC: IOS Press. 2006), 2.

⁸² Ronald D. Crelinsten, “Terrorism as Political Communications: The Relationship Between the Controller and the Controlled,” in *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*, ed. P. Wilkinson and A.M. Stewart (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987).

sub-state, clandestine, often insurgent group terrorism and treats it as the problem. Crelinsten also says, “The muddled state of definitions in the field of terrorism also stem directly from this narrowing of conceptual frameworks to just those actors whose goals we find unacceptable.”⁸³ Held puts it another way:

Many of those who use “terrorist” as a term of denunciation apply it ... to their opponents and refuse to apply it to the acts of their own government, or of governments of which they approve, even when such governmental action is clearly violent, intended to spread fear, or expectably productive of the killing of non-combatants.⁸⁴

This is part of the broader problem that, in examining human violence, it is common to draw sharp moral distinctions that are treated as illegal violence, while official acts of violence are granted the mantle of state authority, and thus shielded from criticism and criminal sanctions.⁸⁵

Stohl argues that

given the political context in which terrorism occurs it is not surprising that governments would have trouble agreeing upon a definition but scholars have also failed to consistently define (and thus as a consequences) delimit the behaviours and thus the actors, organisations and events that should be included in the study of terror, terrorism and terrorists. While, in general there is agreement that terrorism is “bad,” and over time many have concluded that the element of intent, violence, victim, audience, and fear should be included, there are still significant disagreements as to the inclusion of particular actors (states), legality and victims (combatants vs. non-combatants). Such disagreements mean that there are significant disparities in the actual events, actors and organisations under study.⁸⁶

Subsequently, Stohl defines terrorism as: “The purposeful act or the threat of the act of violence to create fear and/or compliant behaviour in a victim and/or audience of the act or threat.”⁸⁷ Therefore, all the definitions include some form of intimidation, coercion, influence as well as violence or its threat. Consequently, “the cliché that One Man’s Terrorist is Another’s Freedom Fighter” confuses terrorism with the terrorist. An actor is a terrorist when they employ terrorist methods. Although one may wish to argue the ends justify the means, they do not alter the methods. Likewise, all groups that have performed terrorist actions in the past are not ipso facto terrorism. Therefore Stohl argues “until we are willing to treat one man’s terrorist as everyone’s terrorist, we will make very little progress in either our understanding of the problem of terrorism or begin to take steps to effectively reduce its occurrence.”⁸⁸

Gearty sums up the major challenge of the definition problem when he notes:

The label itself is inevitably value-laden. Its meaning is moulded by government, the media and in popular usage, not by academic departments. The world resonates with moral

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Virginia Held, “Terrorism, Rights, and Political Goals,” in *Violence, Terrorism and Justice*, ed. R. G. Frey and C. W. Morris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

⁸⁵ Victoroff, *Tangled Roots: Social and Psychological Factors*, 3.

⁸⁶ Michael Stohl, “Knowledge Claims and the Study of Terrorism,” in *Tangled Roots: Social and Psychological Factors in the Genesis of Terrorism*, ed. J. Victoroff (Amsterdam, Netherlands, Washington, DC: IOS Press, 2006), 25.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 29.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 29.

opprobrium and as such is, as far as the authorities and others are concerned, far too useful an insult to be pinned down and controlled.⁸⁹

Freedman and Thussu argue “the news media have played a crucial role in developing the narrative of the ‘war on terror’ as an ever-breaking global story, thus projecting the ‘war on terror’ as the most serious threat in our collective imagination.”⁹⁰ The conflict has given the media world a ‘global vocabulary war,’⁹¹ with new words and phrases such as ‘water boarding,’ ‘Shock and Awe’ and ‘extraordinary rendition.’ Furthermore, Manuel Castells has suggested ‘the “war on terror and its associated images and themes (al-Qaeda, Afghanistan, the Iraq War, radical Islamism, Muslims in general) constructed a network of associations in people’s minds. They activate the deepest emotion in the human brain: the fear of death.”⁹² It is undoubtedly the case that Islamic militant groups – in Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq, Pakistan; Afghanistan, India – have used terrorist activities (including suicide bombings) as an extreme manifestation of political protest. However, what is the motivation that drives young men and women to sacrifice their lives? Is it extreme Islamist propaganda or, as Pape and Feldman have argued, the rhetoric of Islamist extremist groups “functions mainly as a recruiting tool in the context of national resistance” while the “principle cause of suicide terrorism is resistance to foreign occupation, *not Islamic fundamentalism*.”⁹³

Freedman and Thussu⁹⁴ states

in the post-Cold War, post 9/11 world a particular version of terrorism has come to dominate policy and media discourse internationally. The Kremlinologists have been replaced by the proliferation of ‘jihadi studies’, one leading exponent of which has baldly suggested that the ‘war on terror’ is going to be a generational event: *The Longest War*.⁹⁵

Furthermore,

this is where definitions matter and where the influence of the media in making things ‘obvious’ is particularly stark. By privileging certain associations—for example, of Islam as a ‘violent’ religion, of the West as a ‘victim’ of terrorist attacks, of terrorism itself as a form of violence carried out against ‘democratic’ states—the media assist in the naturalisation of particular interpretations of terrorism and thus legitimise specific strategies used to confront terrorist actions. Such strategies might include passing domestic anti-terror legislation, curbing civil liberties in order to reduce the threat of terrorism and invading occupying and

⁸⁹ Andrew Silke, *The Psychology of Counter-terrorism (Case Series on Political Violence)* (London, New York: Routledge, 2011), 2.

⁹⁰ Des Freedman and Daya Kishan Thussu, *Media and Terrorism: Global Perspectives* (London, Los Angeles: SAGE, 2011), 2.

⁹¹ Fred Halliday, *Shock and Awe: How the War on Terror and Jihad Have Changed the English Language* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 11.

⁹² Manuel Castells, *Communication Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 169.

⁹³ Robert Pape and James Feldman, *Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2010).

⁹⁴ Freedman and Thussu, *Media and Terrorism*, 4.

⁹⁵ Peter Bergen, *The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between America and Al-Qaeda* (New York: Simon & Schuster 2011).

bombing countries that are said to host terrorist elements—all in the name of a ‘war on terror’ conducted by a ‘civilised’ West against a less civilised ‘other’.⁹⁶

Freedman and Thussu⁹⁷ argue ‘in the post 9/11 era, terrorism has all too often been reduced to acts of fanaticism and random brutality carried out by ‘clandestine’ groups against democratic states—this is the ‘irregular warfare’ that is distinct from the ‘regular’ military action (including the use of air strikes, psy-ops, rendition and water boarding) conducted by elected governments. By definition, the former is illegitimate, the latter legitimate; the action is ‘terrorist’ the reaction is ‘counterterrorist’. Conceived in this way, terrorism refers to acts of indiscriminate violence carried out against those with the power to define it in this way or, as Noam Chomsky put it, that ‘the term applies only to terrorism against us, not the terrorism we carry out against them.’⁹⁸ Also ‘as far as it is possible to adopt a ‘literal’ understanding of the concepts we use so that terrorism is defined not by the identity of the perpetrators but the nature of the deeds.’⁹⁹ Subsequently, ‘argue that terrorism should be understood in relation to; ‘actions involving the creation of terror and usually the harming or perhaps deliberate targeting of civilians and non-combatants’, this must necessarily involve both state and non-state actors, those of democratic and non-democratic regimes, small groups of people and official standing armies. The definition, they suggest, must be applied without discrimination.’¹⁰⁰

Additionally, Freedman and Thussu¹⁰¹ state the ‘existing definitions of and approaches to terrorism are naturalised through a range of institutions including, most centrally for us, the media. For the majority of people who are not directly subject to its violence or intimidation, terrorism had to be ‘made to mean’ and the media are crucial ideological vehicles in systematising and organising disparate ‘acts of terror.’ Indeed, media are not simply external actors passively bringing the news of terrorist incidents to global audiences but are increasingly seen as active agents in the actual conceptualisation of terrorist events. They are credited, in other words, not simply with definitional but constitutive power: we now have ‘mediated terrorism’¹⁰², ‘media-oriented terrorism,’¹⁰³ ‘media-ised warfare’¹⁰⁴ and ‘mass-mediated terrorism.’¹⁰⁵

Consequently, Freedman and Thussu claim

⁹⁶ Freedman and Thussu, *Media and Terrorism*, 7.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁹⁸ Noam Chomsky, Who are the Global Terrorists? In *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order*, ed. K. Booth and T. Dunne (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 131.

⁹⁹ Freedman and Thussu, *Media and Terrorism*, 9.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁰² Simon Cottle, *Mediatized Conflict: Developments in Media and Conflict Studies* (Maidenhead: Open University Press 2006).

¹⁰³ Ray Surette, Kelly Hansen and Greg Noble, “Measuring Media Oriented Terrorism,” *Journal of Criminal Justice* 37, no. 4 (2009).

¹⁰⁴ Erik P. Louw, “The ‘War Against Terrorism’: A Public Relations Challenge for the Pentagon,” *Gazette* 65, no. 3 (2003).

¹⁰⁵ Brigitte L. Nacos, *Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).

this emphasis on the ‘optical’ character of terrorism is certainly relevant to the major ‘media events’ of 9/11 and 7/7 but what about the less visible, far more mundane but no less terrifying bombing campaigns of civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan that were not accompanied by live pictures and Fox News commentaries?¹⁰⁶

Additionally, they argue

the Media theorists need fully to contextualise terrorism: to recognise the ways in which media have been implicated in transformations of terrorist acts but also to acknowledge that terror is an essential part of unequal societies and an imbalanced world. We run the risk of mediatising-and restricting-terrorism into an adjunct of symbolic systems rather than geopolitical conflicts.¹⁰⁷

Therefore one must ask: How is the agentive role of the media in shaping and maintaining the fractious and fractured realities of the global order to be reclaimed for a politics of truth against power? Therefore, a ‘self-conscience intervention is needed.’¹⁰⁸

Aims for Intervention

Counter-terrorism can take a variety of forms; one common problem is the specific aims for those different interventions vary considerably.¹⁰⁹

As terrorism occurs in phases, stages and steps, research on the radicalisation process has involved convicted terrorists and the retrospective study of their lives to identify risk factors, triggers and catalysts for the emergence of radicalisation.¹¹⁰ Which counter-terrorism policies are the most effective? This is not a straightforward question to answer. Therefore, in considering the overall impact, it is useful to start by first considering how terrorism is intended to work. Successful terrorist campaigns, from the perpetrator’s perspective, can be broken into four general elements:¹¹¹

1. Provocation¹¹²
2. Escalation¹¹³
3. Blame¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁶ Freedman and Thussu, *Media and Terrorism*, 12.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Lena Jayyusi, “Terror, War and Disjunctures in the Global Order,” in *Media and Terrorism: Global Perspectives*, ed. Des Freedman and Daya Kishan Thussu (London, Los Angeles: SAGE, 2011), 41.

¹⁰⁹ Silke, *The Psychology of Counter-terrorism*, 2.

¹¹⁰ See Riyad H. Rahimullah, Stephen Larmer and Mohamad Abdalla, “Understanding Violent Radicalization amongst Muslims: A Review of the Literature,” *Journal of Psychological and Behavioural Science* 1, no. 1 (2013).

¹¹¹ Silke, *The Psychology of Counter-terrorism*, 4.

¹¹² Ibid.

The terrorists carry out acts of violence, which are intended to provoke a strong reaction from the state and its forces.

¹¹³ Ibid.

The terrorists attempt to increase the severity of attacks which results in a demand for even greater security and protection.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

In the face of increased atrocities and rule-breaking on both sides, the conflict enters a blame phase where all parties attempt to place the responsibility for *all* atrocities at the feet of the other. This is the classic battle for hearts and minds.

4. Endurance¹¹⁵

Therefore, Silke argues, “in order for counter-terrorism to be effective then it somehow has to prevent the terrorists from realising this chain.”¹¹⁶ This raises questions about the state’s use of a range of policies and tactics to defeat terrorism. Silke argue that reviews that try to identify ‘what works’ in combating terrorism face this same problem.¹¹⁷ In reality, most of these reviews say essentially not what works, but simply list what states have tried. Cronin has provided a variation on this theme by highlighting how terrorist campaigns are ended.¹¹⁸

Cronin argues the state should facilitate one of these scenarios to bring about the demise of a current group. For example, the current UK policy aimed at counter-terrorism is guided by what is called the *CONTEST* strategy. *CONTEST* (COuNter TErrorism STRategy) aims to tackle terrorism in a holistic way. *CONTEST* focuses not only on identifying and apprehending active terrorists, but also on tackling the root causes of extremism to deprive terrorist groups of recruits and support from communities. Also, law enforcement and intelligence agencies incorporate resilience strands in cases of emergency.¹¹⁹

Four key elements provide the foundation for *CONTEST*:

1. Prevent¹²⁰
2. Pursue¹²¹
3. Protect¹²²
4. Prepare¹²³

Silke argue

victory in any terrorist conflict ultimately depends on two critical factors. One is the intelligence war. Each side must protect its own secrets and plans while uncovering those of the enemy. The second, and arguably the more important, is what have come to be called

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

The terrorists aim to break the will and morale of the state to sustain the conflict. Amid the carnage of the escalation and the battle for hearts, the terrorists seek to convince the state and its supporters that the terrorists’ commitment to the conflict and ability to stay in the fight is greater than the state’s ability to continue to pay the mounting costs for the struggle. As belief in final victory fades, the search for ways out and alternative solutions increase.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 11.

¹¹⁸ Audrey K. Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

The terrorists leaders are captured or killed, The terrorists are crushed by state repression, The terrorists win (which only happened in 6 per cent of cases in this study), The terrorists group moves away from politics and into criminality, The terrorists negotiate and accept a compromise settlement, The terrorists lose popular support.

¹¹⁹ Silke, *The Psychology of Counter-terrorism*, 4.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

Is aimed at stopping radicalisation and is also the strand most keenly known as winning the battle for hearts and minds. The prevent strand aims at deterring people who encourage support for terrorism, and tackling the root causes of extremism.

¹²¹ Ibid.

Aimed at identifying and disrupting existing terrorist networks and operations (Intelligence work).

¹²² Ibid.

Reducing vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Enhance border security, target hardening, protection of infrastructure, sites and facilities, and avoid massive disruptions.

¹²³ Ibid.

Efforts to identify potential risks and scenarios and to build up training and capabilities to respond to these as effectively as possible.

the battle for hearts and minds. This is a psychological struggle to win and hold support. So long as a terrorist cause enjoys a significant amount of popular support, then a conflict can continue. If that support ebbs away, however, then the terrorists and their cause become fish out of water and their days are numbered.¹²⁴

This leads one to argue, in order to reverse radicalisation, a holistic approach is needed that addresses the mind and heart. Prolific Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen, in *Politico Europe*, addressed that Muslims have a unique responsibility in fighting terror. He states

In response to the brutal, deadly attacks on innocent civilians carried out by the so-called Islamic State, in response to this threat, the world's Muslims can and should help intelligence and security communities ward off future attacks and eliminate the lifelines of this menace.¹²⁵

He states

denying this barbaric group a geographical base that emboldens them to claim statehood-an essential element of their propaganda to potential recruits-is a worthwhile goal that all Muslims should support. But the challenge isn't only military. ISIS, and other groups like it, recruit alienated Muslim youth by offering them a false sense of purpose and belonging in the service of a totalitarian ideology. Countering that appeal will include religious, political, psycho-social and economic efforts. It will require that local communities and government institutions address structural issues such as discrimination and exclusion.¹²⁶

Furthermore, he claims

International organisations must protect citizens against violent persecution of the kind we witnessed in Syria and assist with transitions to democratic governance. Western governments, too, have a responsibility to adopt a more ethical and consistent foreign policy.' He adds that 'Muslim citizens and organisations can and should be part of these broader efforts, but we also have a unique role and responsibility in this fight.'¹²⁷

He states that,

across the world, Muslims need to strengthen the immune system of our communities, especially our youth, against violent extremism. We must ask: How did our communities become grounds for terrorist recruitment? Yes, external factors must be addressed, but we must also look within.¹²⁸

He claims "self-examination is an Islamic ethic. There are actions we can take, as Muslim parents, teachers, community leaders and imams, to help our youth protect themselves. We must defeat these murderous extremists in the battlefield of ideas."¹²⁹

¹²⁴ Ibid., 13.

¹²⁵ See Fethullah Gülen, "Muslims' Unique Responsibility in Fighting Terror," *Politico Europe*, June 11, 2017, accessed July 10, 2017, <http://www.politico.eu/article/muslims-unique-responsibility-in-fighting-terror-london-attack-fethullah-gulen/>.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

Gülen argues

the common fallacy of violent extremist ideologues is to de-contextualise the teachings of the Quran and the Prophet and misinterpret them to serve their pre-determined goals. These ideologues turn snapshots from his or his companions' lives into instruments to justify a criminal act.¹³⁰

Consequently,

the antidote is a religious education program that teaches the tradition in a holistic and contextualised way. To be able to resist the deceits of radical ideologues, young Muslims must understand the spirit of their scripture and the overarching principle of their Prophet's life. We need to teach our youth the full story of how the Prophet moved his society from savagery into ethical norms shared by Abrahamic faiths.¹³¹

Gülen claims

a holistic religious education should start with the commitment to the dignity of every person as a unique creation of God, regardless of faith. When God says "We have honoured the children of Adam" (Qur'an, 17:70), all humanity is honoured.¹³²

He states

the violent extremists also commit another major fallacy: transplanting into the 21st century religious verdict from the Middle Ages, in which political rivalries were often confused with religious differences. Today, Muslims have freedom to practice their religion in democratic, secular countries.¹³³

Hence, "the values of participatory governments align with core Muslim ideals of social justice, the rule of law, collective decision-making and equality. Muslims can and so live as contributing citizens of democracies around the world."¹³⁴

Therefore, he states

proactively, we must develop positive ways to satisfy the social needs of our youth. Youth groups should be encouraged to volunteer in humanitarian relief projects to help victims of disaster and violent conflicts. In teaching them to help others, we will give them the tools to empower themselves and feel that they are a part of something meaningful. We also have the duty to help them engage in dialogue with members of other faiths to nurture mutual understanding and respect. As Muslims, we are not just members of a faith community, but of the human family.¹³⁵

He states

since the 1970s, the participants in the social movement Hizmet-the Turkish word for service-have founded more than 1000 modern secular schools, free tutoring centres, colleges, hospitals and humanitarian relief organisations in more than 150 countries. By

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

facilitating the involvement of young students and professionals as service providers, mentors, tutors and helpers, these institutions and their social networks foster a sense of identity, belonging, meaning and empowerment that constitute an antidote to the false promise of violent extremists.¹³⁶

He further states,

indeed, the best way to proactively protect our youth is to provide them with a positive counter-narrative. By offering opportunities for language learning and cultural exchanges, these kinds of institutions nurture a pluralistic outlook, critical thinking and empathy ... As part of their daily rituals, practicing Muslims pray for god to keep them “on the straight path”. Today, the straight path means examining our understanding of the core values of our faith, how we embody those values in our daily lives and strengthening our youth’s resistance to influences that contradict those values ... [Therefore, we should be] apart of the worldwide effort to help stop violent religious radicals from repeating the cruelties (around the world) is both a human and religious responsibility.¹³⁷

Therefore, Gülen’s concept of reconciling the ‘heart and mind’ is a practical re-evaluation of Kant’s moral prescription or principles and Batson’s empathy-induced altruism.¹³⁸ Gülen aims for a moral reawakening aimed at purifying the heart by prescribing education and knowledge that is based on using prophetic ideals/values to reawaken the conscious.¹³⁹ The mind signifies Batson’s empathy–altruism hypothesis, in which dialogical encounters and service/*hizmet* rework and realign science and morality. The Hizmet movement aims to socialise for empathy and altruism to gain first-hand experience of the perception of the others’ needs and adoption of others’ perspective to experience empathetic emotion and enact viable behavioural means to reach altruistic goals.¹⁴⁰

CONCLUSION

Events such as 9/11 and its kind have allowed caused Islam’s bright face to fade and sadly allowed the hijacking of Islam by terrorists who claim to be Muslims and act out of religious conviction. According to Gülen:

In order to understand the true side of Islam one should seek Islam through its own sources and in its own representatives throughout history, not through the actions of a tiny minority that misrepresents Islam.¹⁴¹

Gülen in an interview with Nuriye Akman notes:

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ See Sureyya N. Cicek, “How Purposive Intention Modifies Actions: Altruism,” *Australian Journal of Islamic Studies* (forthcoming).

¹³⁹ Sureyya N. Cicek, “The Gülen/Hizmet Movement in Melbourne and Sydney and Its Development of Social Capital in Dialogical Engagement with Non-Muslim Communities,” PhD diss., Monash University, 2016, 66–102.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 149–164.

¹⁴¹ Afsaruddin, “Striving in the Path of God.”

In Islam, killing a human being is an act that is equal in gravity to unbelief. Individuals can not kill other human beings. Islam does not give right to touch innocent people even in a time of war. No one can give a fatwah (legal pronouncement in Islam) in this matter. No one can be a suicide bomber. No one can rush into crowds with bombs tied to their bodies. Regardless of the religion of the crowds, this is not religiously permissible. Even in the event of war this is not permitted. Islam overtly states: "Do not touch children, elderly, disabled or people who worship in churches/ synagogues/ mosque etc". This has been repeated many times throughout the history.

Islam is a just religion, it should be lived justly. It is definitely not right either to use a futile pretext on the way to Islam. As the target is required to be just, all the means to reach that target should be just as well. Within this perspective, one cannot go to heaven by killing another. A Muslim cannot say, "I will kill a man and then go to heaven." Acceptance of the will of Allah cannot be earned by killing men. The rules in Islam are clear, especially in terms of war. Individuals cannot declare war. A group or organisation cannot declare war. War is declared by the state. War cannot be declared without a president or an army first saying that there is going to be war. Otherwise it is a relative war (or an act of terror).¹⁴²

The classical doctrine of jihad by Muslim jurists focuses largely on verses that are more aggressive in tone and builds a doctrine based on their reading of Qur'anic texts in the light of the socio-political context of the time. Events that took place during the 1970s-1990s in several parts of the Muslim world led to the emergence of a militant reinterpretation of jihad in a struggle against imperialism, neo-colonising and authoritarianism, an interpretation that relies on a more extreme and militant interpretations of jihad.¹⁴³

In tracing jihadist thought over the past few decades, it appears many of the shifts and changes are the result of new understandings about the context rather than new readings of the religious texts or associated principles. Jihadists continue to use the same texts, quotes and religious evidence based on earlier scholars; however, the develop new understandings about content and concepts such as belief, defence, aggression and civilians.

The genealogy of the radical ideas that underline the justification for violence shows that the development of jihadi thought over the past decades is characterised by the erosion of critical constraints used to limit warfare and violence in classical Islam.¹⁴⁴

Cited by El Sherif,¹⁴⁵ more importantly,

these social and political changes have also contributed to a fragmentation of religious authority whereby, to put it succinctly, the meaning of scripture no longer needs to be interpreted by a religious institution or orthodoxy but, rather, lies in the eye of the beholder. Many Muslims conventionally would incessantly uphold the idea that the centuries-long

¹⁴² Akman, Nuriye. "No Islamic World Exists Today," Fethullah Gulen, March 22, 2004, accessed July 10, 2017, <http://www.fethullahgulen.com/en/biography/1322-fgulen-com-english/press/nuriye-akmans-interview-in-zaman-daily/25170-no-islamic-world-exists-today>.

¹⁴³ Saeed, "Jihad and Violence," 86.

¹⁴⁴ Quintan Wiktorowicz, "A Genealogy of Radical Islam," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 28, no. 2 (2005): 75.

¹⁴⁵ Ashraf El Sherif, "Democratic Islamic Yuppies: Post-Islamism or Another Islamism?" (paper presented AMSS 35th annual conference "Muslim Identities: Shifting Boundaries and Dialogue" cosponsored by Hartford Seminary, Hartford, CT, October 27-29, 2006), 9.

development of Islamic jurisprudence and Qur'anic exegesis/hermeneutics provides definitive authoritative guidance to the devout Muslims. But this tradition now confronts the proliferation of modern-educated individuals, who have direct access to the basic religious texts and increasingly question why they should automatically always defer to the religious establishment.¹⁴⁶

Radicalisation and the shift of the notion of jihad appear to have emerged as much from distinctly modern conditions as from the prior experience of unpromising Muslim–Western encounters.

¹⁴⁶ Robert Hefner, *Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Francois Burgat and John L. Esposito, *Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in Europe and the Middle East* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2003).

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